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Abstract
U.S. counterterrorism policy appears to be influenced by different perspectives, as
evidenced by conflicting statements by U.S. presidents regarding the causes of terrorism.
Academic theories are not always applied by U.S. government employees who develop,
influence, and implement counterterrorism policy. The purpose of this qualitative
phenomenological study was to understand U.S. government policymakers’ perspectives
on the causes of terrorism, the influences on these views, and the impact on U.S.
counterterrorism policy. Six theories regarding the causes of terrorism provided the
theoretical framework. Additional theories related to individual and organizational impact
on decision-making provided a broader conceptual framework. Data were collected from
interviews and survey questionnaires from 31 participants. Data were coded and
categorized for thematic analysis. Five key findings were observed: (a) Root causes
theory was a predominant factor in participants’ understanding of the cause of terrorism,
(b) personal experiences are a dominant influence on these views, (c) organizational
influence on the views of terrorism varied by organization, (d) participants viewed their
interagency colleagues as well informed regarding the causes of terrorism, and (e)
individual views among U.S. policymakers have a minimal impact on U.S.
counterterrorism policy. Findings may be used to influence U.S. counterterrorism
policymakers’ views at the national policy level.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
This research study addressed the individual perspectives of U.S. government
policymakers who work on counterterrorism policy. I identified what they view as the
primary causes of terrorism and situated these views within the context of individual
influences and bureaucratic, cultural, or other influences in the organizations where they
work. Although research into U.S. counterterrorism policy exists, researchers had not
conducted field interviews with mid-grade U.S. counterterrorism policymakers, relying
instead on case studies or narrative methodologies. The results of this study may provide
needed academic insights enabling a fuller understanding of not only the perspectives of
U.S. policymakers on the causes of terrorism, but also what influences their perceptions,
and how both impact the development of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
The first sections of this chapter provide an introduction to the study and a
broader background of the topic. This is followed by the problem statement and a
description of the purpose of the study. The research questions are then outlined. The
theoretical foundation is articulated, which is followed by a description of the conceptual
framework. The next section outlines the nature of the study, followed by the
assumptions made, scope and delimitations used, and limitations of this research. The
significance of the study is then addressed and placed in the wider academic body of
knowledge. This chapter concludes with brief summary and an overview of Chapter 2.
Background
The term terrorism has many definitions (Nacos, 2012). There is general
consensus that terrorism involves extreme violence, is focused against noncombatants, is
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conducted by subnational or transnational groups, is based on political or ideological
objectives, and is intended to cause broad fear and panic to force a particular outcome
(Bongar, Brown, Beutler, Breckenridge, & Zimbardo, 2007; Borum, 2004; Laqueur,
1987; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011; Nacos, 2012). The threat of terrorism, fueled by
instability and active military conflict across much of North Africa and the Middle East,
poses unique challenges to U.S. policymakers (Badea, Binningb, Verlhiaca, & Sherman,
2018; Ramakrishna, 2017; Sandler, 2014; Steele, Parker, & Lickel, 2015; Woods &
Arthur, 2014). This instability is periodically punctuated by terrorist attacks against
civilian soft targets in Europe, the United States, and other locations outside of obvious
conflict zones (Badea et al., 2018; Sandler, 2014; Steele et al., 2015; Ramakrishna, 2017;
Woods & Arthur, 2014).
Recommendations regarding U.S. counterterrorism policy are developed within
select organizations of the U.S. government’s executive branch (Emerson, 2014; Jordan,
Kosal, & Rubin, 2016; Lint & Kassa, 2015). Diverse theories regarding the causes of
terrorism emphasize different fundamental approaches, activities, and tools necessary to
achieve success (Fukuyama, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011;
Kuzner, 2007; Newman, 2006; Sterling, 1981). Examples of differing perspectives
regarding terrorism are evident in statements from recent U.S. presidents and key leaders
within their respective administrations (Emerson, 2014; Jordan et al., 2016; Lint & Kassa,
2015). President George W. Bush and his administration used the term radical Islam
cautiously, and also referred to terrorists as evil and dead enders (J. Phillips, 2005;
Pilecki, Muro, Hammack, & Clemons, 2014). President Obama and his administration
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were mostly circumspect regarding terrorism and Islam, stressing numerous causes
depending on the particular venue being addressed (Goldberg, 2016; Stern, 2015).
President Trump has used the term radical Islamic terrorism often in reference to its
primary cause and motivation (Toosi, 2017). These statements reflect the dissonance in
perspectives regarding the topic, sometimes by the same senior official articulating
different positions at separate times (Goldberg, 2016; Pilecki et al., 2014).
Problem Statement
The theory a policy professional holds regarding the primary causes of terrorism
is influenced by numerous factors, such as experience, education, profession, cultural
awareness, and relationships (Akhtar, 2017; Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010; Welch,
2016). Personal views may also be influenced by broader bureaucratic cultures (Janis,
1971; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These factors impact the development and
implementation of U.S. national counterterrorism policies (Akhtar, 2017; Githens-Mazer
& Lambert, 2010; Welch, 2016). Incorrectly applying tools to address terrorism based on
one theoretical frame could be ineffective at best and counterproductive at worse (Garcia
& Geva, 2016; Horne & Bestvater, 2016; Jackson, 2015; Lee, 2016). Effects would be
exasperated, even incoherent, if different government organizations attempted to apply
tools from conflicting theoretical frames simultaneously (Garcia & Geva, 2016; Horne &
Bestvater, 2016; Jackson, 2015; Lee, 2016).
A literature review indicated a wide body of writing and research on differing
theories regarding the causes of terrorism and suggested approaches for addressing the
underlying factors (Fukuyama, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011,
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Kuzner, 2007; Newman, 2006; Sterling, 1981). Researchers also examined specific U.S.
counterterrorism policies based in large part on narrative and case study methodologies
that addressed not only institutional factors within the U.S. policymaking bureaucracy,
but also what appears to be some consistency among the U.S. political elite regarding
perspectives on terrorism (Desch, 2010; Goldsmith, 2009; Jackson, 2011; Stern, 2015).
Broader insights into senior decision-making relative to counterterrorism policy exist as
well (Klaidman, 2012; Mann, 2012; Sanger, 2012; Wolff, 2018; Woodward, 2007, 2011).
Although these last examples may be based on firsthand accounts and contain rich detail,
journalistic standards are not the same as scholarly standards and do not include
acceptable research methodologies (Kassop, 2013).
Questions exist for scholars regarding what factors influence the development and
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies (Jackson, 2011). A gap in research
appeared to exist within the realm of U.S. counterterrorism policy at the intersection
where academic theories on the causes of terrorism meet the reality of U.S. policymakers,
with their individual perspectives and potential influences. Most studies in this area
included historical archival data and little analysis of field interviews (Sageman, 2014).
Kassop (2013) suggested that scholars need to conduct detailed research, including
collecting data from current government counterterrorism officials, to confirm and
explain factors that influence the decision process regarding counterterrorism policy.
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to understand the link between theory and
application, specifically the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories
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regarding the causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism
policymaking organizations. To address this gap, I used a qualitative approach including
individual interviews and participant questionnaires to analyze U.S. policymakers’
perspectives within organizational cultures and to assess the impacts on U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
Research Questions
The following research question (RQ) was addressed in this study:
RQ: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism among
U.S. policymakers, and the possible influences on these views due to personal factors,
organizational cultures, and interagency bureaucracies, impact the shaping of U.S.
counterterrorism policy?
In addition, the following five subquestions (SQs) were used to amplify the
central research question:
SQ1: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align
with existing academic theories?
SQ2: To what extent can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be
understood through individual factors related to personal experience?
SQ3: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced
by existing bureaucratic cultures in specific U.S. counterterrorism policymaking
organizations?
SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected
between and among the key policymaking organizations?
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SQ5: To what extent do these perspectives impact the shaping of U.S.
counterterrorism policy?
Theoretical Foundation
Although there are various and somewhat divergent theories on the causes of
modern terrorism, including similarities and differences in assumptions made, approaches
used, and conclusions drawn, they provide a useful theoretical foundation for outlining
key factors, constructs, variables, and relationships from which to understand individual
worldviews and broader organizational implications (Akhtar, 2017; Jackson, Jarvis,
Gunning, & Breen-Smyth, 2011; Martin, 2017). Notable among them include the main
terrorism theories of religious ideology (Berman, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Owen, 2014),
root causes (Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006), state sponsorship (Arendt, 1953;
Byman, 2007; Sterling, 1981), failed states (Crocker; 2003; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002;
Fukuyama, 2004); rational choice (Crenshaw, 2003; Hoffman, 2011; Krieger &
Meierrieks, 2011), and group dynamics (Berrebi, 2009; Kuzner, 2007; Piazza, 2007).
I made no academic assessment or research judgment regarding the soundness of
these six theories regarding the causes of terrorism (see Jackson, Toros, Jarvis, & HeathKelly, 2017; Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016). Rather, the theories were used to
examine individual perceptions to understand the views of current U.S. counterterrorism
policy professionals (see Jackson et al., 2011; Martin, 2017; Schroden et al., 2016; Silke
& Schnidt-Petersen, 2017). Regardless of how these theories on the causes of terrorism
are viewed in the academic community, they were relevant because they are routinely
identified or alluded to in statements by senior U.S. officials or outlined in official U.S.
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government policy documents that address terrorism (National Counterterrorism Center
[NCTC], 2017; Office of the Director for National Intelligence [ODNI], n.d.; U.S.
Department of State & Agency for International Development [USAID], 2016).
Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework used in this study included several additional theories
that relate to why individual policymakers may have particular perspectives regarding the
causes of terrorism. This conceptional framework consisted of two factors: individual
factors and organizational factors. To address possible individual factors, elements from
social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1989, 2001, 2011) and cultural theory (Douglas, 1985;
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Wildavsky, 1987) were used to examine how individuals
may view their surroundings, ascribe context to events, weigh select criteria, and make
decisions. Regarding potential organizational factors, elements from resource dependency
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), groupthink theory (Janis, 1971, 1972), and the
organizational processes model (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999) were used to
assess the individual perspectives regarding the causes of terrorism within the context of
unique organizational bureaucracies, influences, or biases.
Nature of the Study
I used qualitative methodology, to explore and understand the meaning derived by
individuals or groups associated with a social or human phenomenon (see Creswell,
2014). A naturalistic approach associated with a social construction perspective provided
the appropriate research design to focus on how individuals perceive the world and how
they interpret meaning based on their experiences (see Rubin & Rubin, 2012). A
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qualitative phenomenological research strategy of inquiry allowed me to investigate,
analyze, and understand individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism, as well as
personal insights regarding bureaucratic influences and broader intradepartmental unity
of effort.
Assumptions
Assumptions are a necessary part of qualitative research methodology (Creswell,
2014; Patton, 2014; Ravitch & Carl, 2016). Based on the phenomenon of interest, which
was understanding the perspectives of current U.S. counterterrorism policymakers on the
causes of terrorism, a number of assumptions were necessary due to the use of interviews
to collect data (see Leedy & Ormrod, 2010; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). The key assumptions
made during the course of this study were as follows:
•

U.S. counterterrorism policy professionals have individual perspectives on the
causes of terrorism.

•

Participants are willing to participate, share their experiences, and answer all
questions openly and honestly.

•

Information obtained from the participants provides a consistent and accurate
representation of each participant’s point of view.

•

Selection criteria provided for suitable participants knowledgeable in
counterterrorism policies and the organizational roles, responsibilities,
bureaucracies, and cultural nuances of their organizations.

•

Semistructured individual interviews provided appropriate detail to describe
and understand the perceptions of the participants.
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•

Additional background information collected in the participant survey
questionnaire is sufficient to provide meaningful context and nuance related to
the perceptions articulated by study participants.

•

The research questions, methodological structure, and research processes used
in this study appropriately mitigate potential interviewer biases during
individual interviews in the data collection process.

•

The sample size and composition of the study participants are sufficient to
obtain reliable data and enable meaningful conclusions within, among, and
between the four selected U.S. counterterrorism policy organizations.

•

The findings from the study may be generalized to similar populations of U.S.
counterterrorism policy experts.

•

The results of the study will enable positive social change in the development
and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies.
Scope and Delimitations

The scope of this study addressed the who, what, and why necessary for
comprehensively understanding the selected phenomenon of interest. The selected study
population bound the who, which come from four key U.S. organizations whose
employees are instrumental to the development and implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy: Department of State, Department of Defense (DoD), the USAID,
and the NCTC. Individual interviews were conducted across all four organizations, with
participants required to have a minimum of 8-10 years of experience, leading to a total
study sample of 31 participants. Political appointees, as well as U.S. government
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employees with less than 8 years of experience, were excluded from the sample because
of their relative short-term or intermittent government experience.
The theoretical framework for this research constituted the what and included six
general theories regarding the causes of terrorism: religious ideology, root causes, state
sponsorship, failed states, rational choice, and group dynamics. The why was examined
through the conceptual framework and addressed how individual and organizational
influencers may impact these perspectives. This focus included social cognitive theory,
cultural theory, resource dependency theory, groupthink theory, and the organizational
processes model. Perspectives regarding the causes of terrorism obtained from current
U.S. government employees from the four organizations provided a useful understanding
of the phenomenon of interest. Findings from this study were transferable for use and
comparison with other relevant studies regarding counterterrorism policies.
Limitations
There were two acknowledged limitations in this study. First was the number of
participants from a select number of U.S. policymaking organizations. Counterterrorism
policy is addressed by, and influenced from, many U.S. departments and agencies across
the executive branch. There are also key outside influencers, such as Congress, think
tanks, lobbyists, and the media. The selection of study participants from four key
organizations involved in counterterrorism policy spanning differing career perspectives
such as diplomacy, defense, development, and intelligence was deliberate to collect a
broad sample of perspectives on the phenomenon of interest. The number of participants
from each of the four selected organizations was also purposeful, targeting those who
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work in counterterrorism offices to provide a meaningful and representative sample of the
broader bureaucracy (see Creswell, 2014; Maxwell, 2013).
Additionally, my personal biases and those of the study participants may have
limited the findings of the study. I am a career member of the federal civil service and
have worked for the U.S. government in various capacities for 32 years, the last 16 years
in defense policy organizations within the Pentagon. My participation in policymaking
debates during the last decade and a half on the phenomenon of interest revealed differing
worldviews from employees across the U.S. interagency counterterrorism policy
community. I acknowledge that I have a particular worldview and perspective regarding
the causes of terrorism, and I therefore had an inherent bias in my role as the researcher.
The structured steps taken in the manner in which questions were developed, how
individual interviews were conducted, the process and procedures followed to collect and
process the qualitative data, and the approach used in the analysis of the data and
development of findings and recommendations were assessed to have sufficiently
mitigated the risks of my personal biases from tainting this research (see Anney, 2014;
Shenton, 2004; Tobin & Begley, 2004).
Significance of the Study
This study was significant for individual American citizens and had ramifications
for U.S. foreign policy and relationships with foreign countries and international
organizations (see Jackson, 2011; Kassop, 2013, Sageman, 2014). This research was
unique because it addressed six general academic theories regarding the causes of
terrorism (see Fukuyama, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; Kuzner,
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2007; Newman, 2006; Sterling, 1981), which were derived from studying terrorists and
their actions from an outside-in perspective, focusing on individual U.S. government
employees currently working in the development and implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy. Rather than attempting to assess these individual perspectives
through analysis of policy documents, public statements, pronouncements, or the
language from policy speeches, I leveraged my unique placement and access to obtain
firsthand perspectives from U.S. counterterrorism policymakers.
The results of this study may provide a fuller understanding of individual and
organizational factors that influence counterterrorism policy according to personal
perspectives on the causes of terrorism (see Jackson, 2011; Kassop, 2013, Sageman,
2014). The qualitative methodology enabled me to explore and understand the meaning
derived by U.S. counterterrorism policymakers regarding the causes of terrorism. The
approach used in this study provided a template for other researchers interested in gaining
a deeper understanding of significant policy issues affecting U.S. national security.
Summary
The threat of terrorism poses challenges for current U.S. policy. Counterterrorism
policy appears to be influenced by individual perspectives evident by conflicting
statements by U.S. presidents and their senior administration officials regarding the
causes of terrorism. Differing theories on the causes of terrorism emphasize different
approaches, which if applied simultaneously can be ineffective or counterproductive. A
gap in research existed at the intersection where academic theories meet the reality of
individual U.S. government employees who develop, influence, and implement
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counterterrorism policy. The purpose of this qualitative study was to understand the
perspectives of individual U.S. government policymakers regarding the causes of
terrorism. The research question addressed individual perspectives on the causes of
terrorism among U.S. policymakers, and the possible influences on these views from
personal factors, organizational cultures, and interagency bureaucracies that shape U.S.
counterterrorism policy. Qualitative phenomenological methodology was used to collect
data from individual participant interviews and a detailed questionnaire. Research
findings enabled strong analytic conclusions and meaningful recommendations grounded
in solid academic research processes to strengthen U.S. counterterrorism initiatives at the
national policy level.
This first chapter provided a background of this study, the problem statement,
purpose of the study, primary and secondary research questions, theoretical foundation,
conceptual framework, nature of the study, assumptions, scope and delimitations,
limitations, and significance of the study. Chapter 2 includes the literature search
strategy, a general overview of U.S. policymaking and organizations, the theoretical
foundation, the conceptual framework related to theories describing individual and
organizational influences on perspectives, and the assessed gap in the literature regarding
the phenomenon of interest.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The threat of terrorism poses challenges for current U.S. policy. The purpose of
this literature review was to examine the information and research related to
understanding the perspectives on terrorism of individual U.S. government policymakers,
as well as determine a reasonable context for assessing possible individual and
organizational influences on the shaping of these perspectives. An understanding of these
perceptions may provide other researchers with valuable insights into factors that impact
the development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. In addition to
providing the academic context for this research, this literature review also indicates how
the resulting findings will contribute to the wider body of knowledge regarding individual
perceptions on the causes of terrorism and how it is confronted through U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
There exists a wide body of writing and research regarding differing theories on
the causes of terrorism and suggested approaches for addressing the respective
underlying factors (Fukuyama, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011,
Kuzner, 2007; Newman, 2006; Sterling, 1981). Research into specific U.S.
counterterrorism policies exists as well, including apparent consistencies among some
U.S. political elites regarding their perspectives on terrorism (Desch, 2010; Goldsmith,
2009; Jackson, 2011; Stern, 2015). Firsthand journalistic accounts regarding senior U.S.
decision-makers’ perspectives on terrorism also exist but are not based on scholarly
approaches (Kassop, 2013; Klaidman, 2012; Mann, 2012; Sanger, 2012; Wolff, 2018;
Woodward, 2007). Real questions still exist for scholars as to what factors influence the
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development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies (Jackson, 2011;
Kassop, 2013).
This literature review is organized to systematically address who, what, and why
for understanding the selected phenomenon of interest. The scope of who is defined by
the four selected stakeholder organizations. The theoretical framework for this research
constitutes the what, which includes six general theories regarding the causes of
terrorism. The why is the conceptual framework of both individual and organizational
influencers for these perspectives. All three provide a strong research foundation from
which to describe, assess, and understand U.S. counterterrorism policymakers’
perspectives on the causes of terrorism.
The first section of the chapter provides a description of the literature search
strategy used to gather relevant information and research. The second section provides a
U.S. policy overview as a general foundation related to the policymaking process, how
terrorism is defined, the primary U.S. organizations involved in counterterrorism policy,
the individual roles and responsibilities of individual policymakers, and how policy is
implemented. The third section provides the theoretical foundation upon which this study
was based, which includes six general theories regarding the causes of terrorism. This is
followed by a section that addresses some other conceptual theories used to describe and
assess both individual and organizational influences on U.S. policymakers’ perceptions of
the causes of terrorism. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the gap in the
literature regarding this specific phenomenon to demonstrate how the research benefits
the academic body of knowledge.
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Literature Review and Search Strategy
This literature review focused on retrieving and reviewing literature in three
primary areas: policy development, processes, and implementation; theories on the causes
of terrorism; and theories relative to the development of individual perspectives within
the context of personal and organizational influences. The literature search strategy
included the Walden University library and its linked research databases: Digital National
Security Archive, EBSCO ebooks, Homeland Security Digital Library, International
Security and Counterterrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection,
Political Science Complete, ProQuest Central, and SAGE Journals. An emphasis was
placed on finding peer-reviewed journals published within the last 5 years; however, this
was not a rigid criterion to exclude relevant research, especially foundational literature
regarding the theoretical and conceptual frameworks.
In addition to key word searches within these specific databases, Google Scholar
was also used to search for relevant literature from peer-reviewed periodicals or journals.
Many of the identified articles were available in the Walden University library, which I
linked to in Google Scholar. Google Scholar was also used to identify relevant books or
particular portions obtained electronically. Broader Google searches were also used in a
limited fashion to identify statements made by political leaders reported by news media
entities, such as The Atlantic, The New Republic, and Politico, as well as by selected
organizations such as The Heritage Foundation.
The search strategy included a topic- or subject-based approach to identify
potential research to inform this study. Key words used in the literature search included
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U.S. policy process, counterterrorism policy, counterterrorism policy stakeholders,
counterterrorism policy organizations, individual roles in counterterrorism policy, U.S.
counterterrorism programs, counterterrorism program implementation, terrorism,
terrorism definition, terrorism theory, causes of terrorism, cause of terrorism theory,
terrorism religious ideology, terrorism root causes, State sponsorship of terrorism,
terrorism and failed states, terrorism as rational choice, group dynamics and terrorism,
U.S. government employees and terrorism, U.S. government employee terrorism
perspectives, terrorism and social cognitive theory, organizational influence bias,
resource dependency theory, groupthink theory, organizational process model, and
multiple combinations of these search terms.
Policy Context
Before delving into the theoretical foundations regarding terrorism and conceptual
frameworks that assist in understanding individual and organizational influence factors
impacting how terrorism is viewed, a general background regarding the structure and
process of counterterrorism policymaking is warranted. This is done to place the
phenomenon of interest for this study, which is individual policymakers’ perspectives on
the causes of terrorism, in the broader context. The information provided in this section
includes the U.S. policymaking process and definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism
from a U.S. government perspective. The primary U.S. organizations in the executive
branch involved in making counterterrorism policy are then identified, as are their
generally observed organizational cultures. The roles and responsibilities of individual
policymakers within this environment is then highlighted, as is some of the primary
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outside influences of policy, such as Congress, think tanks, lobbyists, and the media. This
section ends with a summary of how U.S. policy is implemented by departments and
agencies once decisions are made.
Policymaking Process
The term policy is used liberally when discussing the functions of government
(Hoffman & Neuhard, 2016; McConnell, 2010). The term can be defined as “a definite
course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given
conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions” (Policy, 2018a, para.
2.a.). In the government context, policy is focused on meeting identified goals or
objectives (Hoffman & Neuhard, 2016; Miller, 2013; Policy, 2018b). Policy is made
through an integrated, coordinated process across federal departments and agencies that
work to set goals, identify courses of action, build consensus, and seek decisions by
senior government officials (George, 2017; Gvosdev, 2017; Miller, 2013).
The current policymaking structure is the same as that established by Brent
Scowcroft, the national security advisor to President George H. W. Bush (George, 2017).
The process is managed by the National Security Council (NSC) staff, which identifies
issues and topics and brings together policy experts from across the interagency (George,
2017; Gvosdev, 2017; Miller, 2013). The structure consists of numerous topically based
interagency working groups or policy coordination committees, the deputies committee
(made up of deputy secretaries and chaired by the deputy national security advisor), the
principal committee (the cabinet secretary level, chaired by the national security advisor),
and the full NSC (again with cabinet secretaries, but chaired by the President) (George,

19
2017; Rothkopf, 2014; Whittaker, Brown, Smith, & McCune, 2011). Only major
decisions are pushed up to deputies or higher, or where interagency consensus at lower
levels cannot be reached (George, 2017). The process is generally structured to centralize
policy development, enabled and managed via the NSC staff, and decentralize policy
execution through departments and agencies within their respective programs and
activities.
The interagency consists of the mid- to senior-level policy personnel from across
all the relevant departments and agencies for a given topic (George, 2017; Hoffman &
Neuhard, 2016; Miller, 2013). This interdepartmental enterprise includes government
experts from both regional offices and functional offices (Gvosdev, 2017; Hoffman &
Neuhard, 2016). Due to the span of the U.S. federal bureaucracy, coordination of effort to
develop policy and build consensus can be difficult, with many challenges (George,
2017). The policy experts within the departments and agencies are knowledgeable of
their authorities, resources, and programs and are protective of their organizations’
prerogatives (George, 2017). These policy experts can at times resist what they view as
undue interference by the NSC staff, crossing from what needs to be done into the details
of how policies are being resourced and implemented (Gvosdev, 2017; Hoffman &
Neuhard, 2016). The trend for NSC staff involvement in the details of policy
implementation is evidenced by the growing number of NSC staff personnel over the last
four presidential administrations (Gvosdev, 2017). The NSC staff of 50 under George H.
W. Bush grew to approximately 100 under Bill Clinton, then doubled to 200 under
George W. Bush and doubled again to over 400 under Barack Obama (Gvosdev, 2017).
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This steady increase in the size of the NSC staff over time has been attributed by some to
suspicions by presidents that the national security bureaucracy is not moving aggressively
enough to support their policy objectives and decisions (Chollet, 2016).
Terrorism and Counterterrorism Defined
The term terrorism has many definitions (Nacos, 2012). Three of note follow
from different official definitions from U.S. departments or agencies. From the
Department of State, terrorism means “premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents”
(Kraft & Marks, 2011, p. 3). The Department of Defense (2018a) defines terrorism as
“the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political,
or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit
of goals that are usually political” (p. 219). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (n.d.)
distinguished between international and domestic terrorism, with international terrorism
“perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with designated
foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored)” (What We Investigate:
Terrorism section, para. 2) and domestic terrorism “perpetrated by individuals and/or
groups inspired by or associated with primarily U.S.-based movements that espouse
extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature”
(What We Investigate: Terrorism section, para. 3). There is general consensus across
these and other definitions that terrorism involves extreme violence, is focused against
noncombatants, is conducted by subnational or transnational groups, is based on political
or ideological objectives, and is intended to cause broad fear and panic to force a
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particular outcome (Bongar et al., 2007; Borum, 2004; Laqueur, 1987; Moskalenko &
McCauley, 2011; Nacos, 2012).
In contrast, counterterrorism functions are the “activities and operations taken to
neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them
incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve
their goals” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018a, p. 55). Since the September 11 attack,
counterterrorism policy has played an increasingly central role in U.S. government
foreign policy (Lint & Kassa, 2015; Nacos, 2012). This is in large part due to the
increased public perception of the terrorist threat, fueled by increasing political instability
and long-term military conflict across much of North Africa and the Middle East in the
last decade (Badea et al., 2018; Sandler, 2014; Woods & Arthur, 2014). The public
concerns over terrorism are periodically punctuated by terrorist attacks against civilian
soft targets in Europe, the United States, and other locations outside of obvious conflict
zones (Ramakrishna, 2017; Steele et al., 2015; Woods & Arthur, 2014). The difficulty
and complexities of the situation make it difficult for U.S. policymakers to develop and
maintain a consistent counterterrorism policy in which they try to balance public fears,
align suitable government programs and activities, and maintain foreign relationships
(Crenshaw, 2001).
Primary Counterterrorism Policy Stakeholder Organizations
The setting for this research was U.S. government employees who work
developing and implementing policy within the main U.S. departments and agencies
involved in counterterrorism. The four primary organizations involved in this effort
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include the Departments of State and Defense, the USAID, and the NCTC (Crenshaw,
2001). In the current U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy this is commonly described as the
‘3-D’s’ for diplomacy, development, and defense (George, 2017; Keane & Diesen, 2015;
Kraft & Marks, 2011). These departments and agencies, along with many others, provide
the depth of experience and expertise that influence the development of counterterrorism
policy options, and help translate identified policy goals and objectives into language that
drives programs, activities, and ultimately resources (Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann, &
Hermann, 2001; Crenshaw, 2001; Kraft & Marks, 2011). Policymakers within each
department or agency bring not only unique program and activity expertise to the
counterterrorism challenge, they also bring insights gained over time, which influences
their perspective (Keane & Diesen, 2015; Morin & Paquin, 2018).
State Department. The Department of State is the lead Federal agency for
advancing U.S. interests abroad (Kopp & Gillespie, 2008; Ross, 2007; U.S. Department
of State, n.d.a.). The foreign service officers, career members of the civil service, and
foreign national employees of the State Department do this through diplomacy, advocacy,
and assistance (U.S. Department of State, n.d.a.). The State Department employs
approximately 66,000 people, of which about 23,000 are U.S. citizens and the rest are
foreign national support staff (Kopp & Gillespie, 2008; U.S. Department of State, n.d.a.).
The annual State Department budget is $22 billion (U.S. Department of State, 2018).
Approximately 8,000 of State Department personnel, fully one-third of their U.S. citizen
workforce, are deployed overseas, serving in U.S. embassies, consulates, or in other
foreign capacities (U.S. Department of State, n.d.a.).
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There is a distinctive diplomatic culture among State Department personal, which
is generally described as having fluency in languages, extensive foreign experience, a
broad perspective, open and tolerant, a ready sympathy for foreigners and their points of
view, an appreciation for nuance and ambiguity, and a fondness for process and
negotiation (George, 2017; Haass, 2017; Kopp & Gillespie, 2008; Ross, 2007). This
culture has its roots in the ‘balance-of-power’ system between nations, structured around
state sovereignty, and enabled by diplomatic structures, processes, negotiation, and
persuasion (Lauren, Craig, & George, 2007; Ross, 2007). To some in the interagency,
State Department personnel are also viewed as having an aversion to strategic planning,
tying goals to distinct timelines, or linking policy objectives directly to resources
(George, 2017; Haass, 2017).
Defense Department. The largest Federal department by far in both personnel
and resources is the Department of Defense (Gates, 2014; George, 2017; Smith &
Gerstein, 2007; U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.). Made up of civilian employees,
military personnel, and support contractors, the mission of the Defense Department “is to
provide a lethal Joint Force to defend the security of our country and sustain American
influence abroad” (U.S. Department of Defense, n.d., Mission section, para. 1). The
Defense Department employs 742,000 government civilians, 1.3 million uniformed
military personnel (i.e., across the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps), and is the
largest employer in the world (U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.). It has an annual budget
of $686 billion (with $617 billion in the base budget plus $69 billon for overseas
contingency operations), which totals more than the defense budgets of the next fourteen

24
countries combined (Garamone, 2018; George, 2017; Taylor & Karklis, 2016; U.S.
Department of Defense, n.d.). The sheer size of U.S. military forces, combat capabilities,
extensive worldwide presence, and global reach of the Defense Department underpins the
U.S. international role as a superpower (Feith, 2008; Gates, 2014; George, 2017;
Rodman, 2009).
Regarding policymaking, the culture among civilians within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense generally tends to be more conservative in approach, somewhat risk
adverse, and skeptical of foreign government intentions or promises (Feith, 2008; Gates,
2014; George, 2017). They tend to focus more on capabilities than intentions, viewing
situations in many cases as risks rather than opportunities, driven in large part by the
tendency of the rest of the interagency (and the White House) to go to the military
solution first (Gates, 2014; George, 2017; Smith & Gerstein, 2007). Some of this is
driven by the large budget and extensive resources of DoD when compared to other
departments and agencies (Gates, 2014; George, 2017; Smith & Gerstein, 2007). Unlike
other departments and agencies, senior leadership in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense is also more political, with presidential appointees filling most of the senior
executive positions, at numbers which are a larger percentage than that in the rest of the
interagency (Feith, 2008; Gates, 2014; George, 2017; Smith & Gerstein, 2007). The
uniformed military, represented mostly by the Joint Staff in policymaking, is also
impacted by culture and tradition (Donnithorne, 2017; George, 2017; Golby & Karlin,
2018; Smith & Gerstein, 2007). While military service on the Joint Staff in Washington is
expected to be ‘joint,’ blending the capabilities of all four branches of the military, their
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distinctive service cultures can play a role in how they view issues and present options
(Donnithorne, 2017; George, 2017; Golby & Karlin, 2018; Smith & Gerstein, 2007)
U.S. Agency for International Development. The USAID is the lead agency in
the U.S. government for providing development and humanitarian assistance (USAID,
2018a). Their stated mission is to “promote and demonstrate democratic values abroad,
and advance a free, peaceful, and prosperous world,” leading U.S. Government
“international development and disaster assistance through partnerships and investments
that save lives, reduce poverty, strengthen democratic governance, and help people
emerge from humanitarian crises and progress beyond assistance” (USAID, 2018b,
Mission, Vision, and Values section, para. 1). USAID personnel work closely with
international and non-governmental relief organizations, as well as coordinates
developmental and humanitarian assistance activities with other countries and regional
entities (Hills, 2006; Howell & Lind, 2009; Modirzadeh, Lewis, & Bruderlein, 2011;
USAID, 2018a). USAID has an annual budget of approximately $15 billion, and employs
approximately 3,100 government personnel, split between members of the USAID
foreign service (at 1,600) and career civil service (at 1,500) (Kopp & Gillespie, 2008;
USAID, 2017; U.S. Department of State, 2018). Almost 60 percent (or 900-1,000 people)
of USAID’s foreign service officers are deployed at regional offices overseas, as well as
in larger U.S. embassies, and they are supported by 4,500 foreign national employees
who assist them in managing and implementing development programs at the local level
(Kopp & Gillespie, 2008).
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Like the bureaucracies briefly described above, USAID also has a recognized
culture among its personnel (Kopp & Gillespie, 2008; Ross, 2007; USAID, 2018a). The
relatively small size of the workforce, as compared to other U.S. federal departments and
agencies, strengthens its employees’ sense of purpose and enhances personal
relationships (Hills, 2006; Kopp & Gillespie, 2008; Ross, 2007). With their deep local
roots, they can be perceived as passionate about their work, dedicated, and altruistic
(Aldrich, 2014; Hills, 2006; Howell & Lind, 2009; Ross, 2007). They have keen
individual knowledge at the local level, nuanced cultural awareness, and language skills,
based on long term service in country- or regional-specific program management
(Aldrich, 2014; Hills, 2006; Howell & Lind, 2009; Ross, 2007). Many of them have
unique specialization and skills in such fields as agriculture, sanitation, health care,
disaster relief, community development, family affairs, and conflict resolution (Kopp &
Gillespie, 2008; Modirzadeh, Lewis, & Bruderlein, 2011; Ross, 2007).
USAID personnel involvement in counterterrorism policy ebbs and flows
somewhat depending on administration priorities, which defines how closely
development gets aligned with diplomacy and defense (i.e., the ‘3-D’s” mentioned
previously) (George, 2017; Keane & Diesen, 2015; Kraft & Marks, 2011). Since
September 11, 2001, it is generally recognized that there has been an increased
‘securitization’ of development assistance (Howell & Lind, 2009). This has resulted in
the use of development projects in many ways as tools for terrorism prevention (Aldrich,
2014; Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, & Potter, 2015; Miles, 2012; Modirzadeh, Lewis, &
Bruderlein, 2011). Some development professionals, both inside of USAID as well with
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their partners, are concerned with this trend, however, which has closely linked and
integrated development with security (Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, & Potter, 2015; Hills,
2006; Modirzadeh, Lewis, & Bruderlein, 2011).
National Counterterrorism Center. The NCTC was created in 2004 in the
aftermath of the 9/11 commission (Fessenden, 2005; George, 2017; Kean & Hamilton,
2004; Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), n.d.; Priest & Arkin, 2012).
Part of the new ODNI, the NCTC is one of four analytic centers within that organization
that was created by Congress (ODNI, n.d.; Priest & Arkin, 2012; Reinwald, 2007). The
NCTC mission is to “lead and integrate the national counterterrorism (CT) effort by
fusing foreign and domestic CT information, providing terrorism analysis, sharing
information with partners across the CT enterprise, and driving whole-of-government
action to secure our national CT objectives” (ODNI, n.d.).
NCTC is staffed by more than 1,000 personnel, with almost half of NCTC’s
workforce being liaisons officers or employees detailed from approximately 20 different
Federal departments and agencies—from intelligence, defense and military, homeland
security, and law enforcement communities (Fessenden, 2005; George, 2017; Reinwald,
2007; ODNI, n.d.). The NCTC budget is classified, as is the annual budget for all of the
U.S. intelligence community, but open source information indicates the overall
intelligence community budget is funded at approximately $42 million (Fessenden, 2005;
NCTC, 2017). NCTC has the responsibilities for integrating analysis and coordinating
information sharing from across the intelligence community (George, 2017; NCTC,
2017; ODNI, n.d.; Priest & Arkin, 2012; Reinwald, 2007). As such, the NCTC provides
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an interagency forum and supporting process to link national-level counterterrorism
policy to strategic operational objectives and tasks for counterterrorism (NCTC, 2017;
ODNI, n.d.).
Being an intelligence entity, the organizational culture at NCTC shares many of
the traits that are routinely used to describe intelligence professionals (Bean, 2009; Best,
2011; (Fessenden, 2005; Kean & Hamilton, 2004). This organizational culture includes
dedication to mission, being analytic and technical, and having a process-oriented view
(Bruijn, 2006; Johnston, 2005; Priest & Arkin, 2012). The process perspective is viewed
by some in the interagency as somewhat overdone, as they are known for broad
coordination of their products and efforts to reach consensus in their assessments
(Johnston, 2005; Jones, 2006; Kean & Hamilton, 2004). They have a general reputation
for ambiguity, nuance, and avoiding taking sides in policy debates (Feith, 2008; Johnston,
2005; Jones, 2006; Rodman, 2009). They focus on what is known, based on a regimented
assessment of confidence levels, and avoid predictions or extrapolation (Jones, 2006;
NCTC, 2017).
The broader intelligence community, of which NCTC is one part, is viewed by
some in the interagency as ‘stove-piped,’ with each of the 16 separate organizations that
make up the intelligence community jealously guarding their own independent views and
assessments (Bruijn, 2006; Fessenden, 2005; Garicano, & Posner, 2005; Kean &
Hamilton, 2004). They report both majority and dissenting assessments in the same
product (NCTC, 2017). The perceived culture regarding intelligence professionals by
many in the interagency is due in large part to the role they play in U.S. government
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policymaking (Cronin, 2010; Garicano, & Posner, 2005; Marrin, 2007). They are policy
advisors, not policymakers, and pride themselves in being objective and unbiased
(Fessenden, 2005; Marrin, 2007; NCTC, 2017; Rodman, 2009). This can, however, cause
some policymakers to gravitate to those select intelligence products that reinforce their
own views and perspectives (Feith, 2008; Fessenden, 2005; Kean & Hamilton, 2004;
Marrin, 2007).
Individual Policymaker Roles and Responsibilities
Individual government employees in U.S. departments and agencies can and do
have real impact in both the development and implementation of policy decisions
(George, 2017; Halperin & Clapp, 2007; Kraft & Marsk, 2011; McCormick, 2012). This
is due to a couple of factors, first of which is their access and placement within the policy
bureaucracy (Feith, 2008; Gates, 2014; Halperin & Clapp, 2007; Kraft & Marsk, 2011;
Rodman, 2009). They serve at the touch point between senior decision makers in
government and the programs and activities necessary for carrying out policy decisions
(Feith, 2008; Gates, 2014; Ross, 2007; Rodman, 2009). Senior decision makers are those
at the highest levels of government, including the political appointees who are nominated
by the president and confirmed by the Senate, but also include the additional political
appointees who are placed in lower level positions by the president but don’t require
Congressional confirmation (George, 2017; Halperin & Clapp, 2007; Jackson, 2015a).
The political appointees number approximately 4,000 individuals across the
various departments and agencies of the U.S. executive branch, and of these more than
1,200 require Senate confirmation (Piaker, 2016; Political Appointee Tracker, 2018). For
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reference, the number of presidential nominated, Senate confirmed political positions at
the four departments or agencies referenced above, which represent their respective
senior leadership, include 161 at State, 57 at Defense, 11 at USAID, and 1 at NCTC
(Piaker, 2016; Political Appointee Tracker, 2018). Given the span of their
responsibilities, and the complexities of the issues they must deal with on a daily basis,
they are critically dependent upon the senior career members of the civil service (as well
as the members of the foreign service and military) who support them as members of
their immediate staff (Abrams, 2017; Cohen, 2018; Feith, 2008; Gates, 2014; Ross, 2007;
Rodman, 2009). It is these individual government employees who frame the issues in
papers, draft the policy positions for review, coordinate their review within the inter- and
intra-departmental bureaucracy, present them for decisions, promulgate decisions into the
interagency, and oversee implementation of decisions made (Cohen, 2018; Cotter, 2017;
George, 2017; Halperin & Clapp, 2007; Kraft & Marks, 2011; McCormick, 2012).
A second factor, which is of no less significance, is the extensive knowledge and
experience gained over many years, sometimes decades, resident in the members of the
government civil service who have the information and skills critical to successful
policymaking and implementation (Avey & Desch, 2014; Bacchus, 2015; Cohen, 2018;
Destler, 2015).
Policy development and implementation is a complex and challenging
environment, dealing with the details related to the programs and personnel available, the
approved legislative authorities, the appropriated resources, the processes and
mechanisms for achieving consensus, and the relationships (and trust) necessary across

31
the policymaking enterprise to work through difficult bureaucratic challenges (Abrams,
2017; Avey & Desch, 2014; Bacchus, 2015; Cotter, 2017; McCormick, 2012). The
bureaucratic process is by its nature designed to be deliberative, which is why those
individuals who have worked for extended times within the system and bureaucracy can
and do have a tremendous amount of influence (Abrams, 2017; Avey & Desch, 2014;
Bacchus, 2015; Cohen, 2018; Cotter, 2017; Destler, 2015).
Key Outside Influencers
Beyond just dealings with their own departments and agencies senior leaders,
individual U.S. government employees who work in the policy environment are also
attuned to other key entities that can and do influence the making of U.S. policy (George,
2017; Kraft & Marsk, 2011; McCormick, 2012). These entities include Congress (both
elected members and their staff), think tanks, lobbyists, and the media (Eisenfeld, 2017;
George, 2017; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). Part of the function of policy
development and implementation by U.S. government employees includes routinely
engaging with these entities (Eisenfeld, 2017; George, 2017; Kraft & Marsk, 2011). This
engagement falls into two general categories, which is soliciting inputs and information
in the development of policy, and then describing and explaining policy decisions and
resulting programs and activities (George, 2017; Kraft & Marsk, 2011). The former
category of engagement with outside entities serves to inform the development of
potential policy options or courses of action that can be refined and recommended to
senior policymakers (George, 2017; Kraft & Marsk, 2011; Milner & Tingley, 2015). The
latter category of engagement contributes to an administration’s role and responsibility to
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articulate policy decisions and actions of government to key stakeholders, principal
among these being Congress and the general public (George, 2017; Milner & Tingley,
2015; Skidmore, 2012).
Congress. First and foremost, the principal outside influencer of policy is the
Congress (Carter & Scott, 2010; Halperin & Clapp, 2007; Spanier & Nogee, 2013). As
the directly elected representatives of the people, Congress is the organization that both
authorizes programs and activities and appropriates the resources necessary for their
implementation (Hersman, 2010; Mann, 2010; Spanier & Nogee, 2013). Since policy
statements and documents provide the framework for setting the goals and objectives of
government efforts, the Congress plays an integral role in the policy process (Skidmore,
2012; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016; Spanier & Nogee, 2013). Congressional authority
within foreign policy is exercised in numerous ways. The Senate must confirm
Presidential nominees for high executive branch positions, and once confirmed, routinely
summon these senior leaders to testify before them on their efforts and activities
(Auerswald & Maltzman, 2003; Gvosdev, 2017; Halperin & Clapp, 2007).
The power of the purse manifests itself through Congressional members,
particularly in the appropriations committees, and their committee staff, who require
significant reporting on program allocation and implementation (Hersman, 2010;
McCormick, 2012; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). Since the budget is authorized and
appropriated on an annual basis, members of Congress and their committee staff are
continuously engaged with department and agency personnel in monitoring
appropriations allocated in the past, discussing implementation in the present, and
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planning for increases or reductions in the future (Hersman, 2010; Mann, 2010; Smith,
Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). For personnel in the State Department and USAID, it is the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Appropriations Committee, House Foreign
Affairs Committee, and House Appropriations Committee, that exert the most influence
on foreign policy and foreign developmental aid (George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; Kraft &
Marks, 2011; McCormick, 2012). For those in the Defense Department policy
organizations, it is the Senate armed services committee, House armed services
committee, and the respective Defense appropriation committees, that demand significant
detail into military planning, activities, and operations (George, 2017; Hersman, 2010;
Kraft & Marks, 2011; McCormick, 2012).
A significant number of the members of Congress have served multiple terms,
many over decades, which provides them a great deal of knowledge, expertise, and
legacy regarding the details of foreign policy (George, 2017; Mann, 2010; McCormick,
2012). This relative longevity is also reflected in the Congressional staff and the role they
play, particularly with the Congressional committee staff, who have both the deep
knowledge as well as the personal and professional relationships with the U.S.
government employees who work in the policy environment (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012;
George, 2017; Mann, 2010; McCormick, 2012). U.S. government employees who work
developing and implementing foreign policy maintain a careful balance between the
policy requirements of the president through the executive branch and the legislative
oversight functions of the Congress (George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; Mann, 2010;
McCormick, 2012).
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Think tanks. Think tanks are not-for-profit organizations staffed by subject
matter experts and policy practitioners that focus their analysis in areas related to foreign
affairs and security policy (George, 2017; McGann, 2007; Nicander, 2015; Weidenbaum,
2011). This focus has direct implications to policy development regarding terrorism and
counterterrorism (Kraft & Marks, 2011; McGann, 2007; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield,
2016; Weidenbaum, 2011). Differing from lobbying or issue advocacy groups, think
tanks are generally research based organizations that in many cases serve as a bridge
between the academic community and policymakers (Abelson, 2006; Milner & Tingley,
2015; Nicander, 2015; Nicander, 2016). By some counts there are more than 1,500 think
tanks in the U.S., most located in and around Washington, D.C., providing independent
analysis, advice, and exerting a significant amount of influence (McGann, 2007;
Medvetz, 2012).
The best known, and considered both independent and bipartisan, are the Center
for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), the Brookings Institution, the Council on
Foreign Relations (CFR), RAND Corporation, and the Center for a New American
Security (CNAS), with others like the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise
Institute (AEI), and Cato Institute, generally described as having a more partisan
perspective (Nicander, 2015; Nicander, 2016; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016;
Weidenbaum, 2011). Many who are familiar with think tanks and their work refer to
them as ‘non-academic researchers’ or ‘universities without students’ (Nicander, 2015;
Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016; Weidenbaum, 2011). These organizations, and their
key personnel, are well-known in the policy environment of Washington, advising
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policymakers, providing expert testimony to Congress before committees, and leveraged
by journalists and the media (Medvetz, 2012; Milner & Tingley, 2015; Mulgan, 2006)
Think tanks play an important role in foreign and security policy generally, and
counterterrorism policy specifically, for two reasons (Abelson, 2006; McGann, 2007;
Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). First is their strong reputation, which is based on the
quality of their personnel and their products (Kraft & Marks, 2011; George, 2017;
Nicander, 2016). Second is their networking, based on what some have identified as a
‘revolving door’ between their organizations and the government (George, 2017;
Nicander, 2016; Weidenbaum, 2011). In essence, think tanks in Washington serve as a
shadow bureaucracy for foreign and security policymaking, since many of their senior
and mid-level employees consist of former government policymakers or senior decision
makers (Abelson, 2006; Nicander, 2015; Nicander, 2016; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield,
2016). This environment also provides their personnels’ unique access to existing
government employees in the Federal departments and agencies (Abelson, 2006;
Nicander, 2015; Nicander, 2016; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). The more partisan
Heritage Foundation, AEI, and Cato Institute, are even recognized as temporary
placeholders for senior leaders in the party that is ‘out of power,’ that is, whichever party
that doesn’t hold the White House at a particular time (Abelson, 2006; George, 2017;
Nicander, 2016). It is this revolving door, and staffing with past and potential future
senior leaders, that requires current U.S. government policymakers to take think tanks,
and the positions they espouse and the products they produce, very seriously (George,
2017; Nicander, 2016).
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Lobbyists. Policymakers within the U.S. government are also directly engaged
and influenced by individuals and groups who seek to push personal or collective policy
agendas (Eisenfeld, 2017; George, 2017; Grossmann, 2012; McCormick, 2012). These
types of outside influencers of policy are most commonly referred to as lobbyists, interest
groups, or issue advocacy organizations (George, 2017; Grossmann, 2012; McCormick,
2012). There are hundreds, if not thousands, of specific interest groups within the U.S.
that aggressively advocate for specific policy enactments (Grossmann, 2012; Milner &
Tingley, 2015; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016).
The principal focus of lobbying is on the Congress; however, executive branch
departments and agencies are also regularly engaged by lobbying organizations regarding
policy issues (George, 2017; Grossmann, 2012; McCormick, 2012). Lobbying is
regulated, with groups declared and officially registered (Grossmann, 2012; Milner &
Tingley, 2015; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). In the foreign affairs and security
domain, lobbying groups advocate for items across a wide spectrum of topics and issues,
for example developmental assistance, humanitarian aid, foreign relations and positions
for (and against) specific nations, security assistance, military education, human rights,
rule of law, war crimes, etc. (Gabaccia, 2017; George, 2017; Gilens & Page, 2014;
Newhouse, 2009; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016; Tidwell, 2017). In the area of foreign
and defense policy, lobbyists can also represent foreign interests, both of governments as
well as non-governmental organizations, and some foreign governments use lobbyists to
great effect (Newhouse, 2009; Tidwell, 2017).
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The power of lobbyists or issue advocacy groups to influence policy is in their
collective membership as well as their ability to generate visibility and awareness,
mobilize support or opposition, and build consensus across political coalitions (Gilens &
Page, 2014; Grossmann, 2012; Milner & Tingley, 2015; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield,
2016). Influence on executive branch policymakers can also be brought to bear indirectly,
as when lobbyists energize an elected member of Congress on an issue (or problem)
within a specific program in a particular Federal department or agency (Eisenfeld, 2017;
George, 2017; Milner & Tingley, 2015). The nature of the political systems and processes
in the U.S. make influence efforts by lobbyists, interest groups, and issue advocacy
organizations very effective, including in foreign and security policy (Eisenfeld, 2017;
Gilens & Page, 2014; Shakoori, Kiani, & Heidarpour, 2016).
Media. The final key influence entity discussed is the media. This is a broad
category, given the proliferation of information sources available via the Internet, and the
term ‘the Media’ can mean a host of organizations existing across a wide array of
products and platforms (Cohen, 2015; George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; McCormick, 2012).
Examples specifically dedicated to professional journalism include traditional entities
such as newspapers, magazines, and broadcast organizations, both television and radio
(McCormick, 2012; Milner & Tingley, 2015; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). Many of
these also have an online presence on the Internet (Milner & Tingley, 2015; Smith,
Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). The traditional function of ‘the press’ has been to observe,
investigate, and report to the public on the functions and activities of government (Felle,
2016; Graber & Dunaway, 2017). In this capacity, serving a non-governmental check and
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balance function, the press is referred to by some as the ‘fourth estate’ (Felle, 2016;
George, 2017; Graber & Dunaway, 2017).
In the emerging age of ‘fake news,’ and charges of bias in journalism, it can be
increasingly difficult to know which are reputable, objectives sources and which are not
(Entman, 2007; Felle, 2016; Hanitzsch & Vos, 2016; Meijer & Bijleveld, 2016; Meijer &
Bijleveld, 2016; Weaver & Willnat, 2016). The 24-hour news cycle, with its need to fill
time and generate revenue, has to many blurred the lines between the profession of
journalism from those who provide subject matter knowledge or commentary on one
hand, and those who state opinions or provide witty (or witless) entertainment on the
other (Cohen, 2015; Meijer & Bijleveld, 2016; Milner & Tingley, 2015; Robinson, 2001;
Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). For issues related to government and politics,
specifically regarding foreign affairs and security policy, the media entities generally
recognized as objective, credible, and reliable, known for following the principals of
professional journalism, exist across the platforms of print, television, and radio, all of
which also maintain a presence online on the Internet (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012; Eisenfeld,
2017; Hersman, 2010; Milner & Tingley, 2015).
Media entities not only report on the making of policy, but also have a significant
impact in influencing policy (Cohen, 2015; George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; McCormick,
2012; Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004). While the functions of policy development,
particularly related to foreign affairs and security, are conducted outside of direct public
view, journalists have significant access to policy stakeholders, from which they are able
to obtain ‘inside information’ regarding issues, debates, and conflicts (Gadarian, 2010;
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George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; McCormick, 2012; Robinson, 2001). As such, the media
serves as a parallel process to the official policy mechanism for which policymakers can
indirectly influence decisions, ‘leaking’ information to enhance certain positions or bring
pressure to bear to achieve particular decisions (Cohen, 2015; McCormick, 2012; Milner
& Tingley, 2015; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016).
U.S. government employees who work in foreign affairs and security policy are
very attuned to media journalist’s awareness of and reporting on topics of interest to their
political leadership (George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; Mann, 2010; McCormick, 2012).
Statements by senior political decision makers on policy issues that are reported in the
media are watched closely by U.S. government employees, as are the reactions to these
pronouncements by other political actors (George, 2017; Graber & Dunaway, 2017;
Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). In addition, ‘breaking news’ items are also monitored
closely, as these emergent issues can result in immediate shifts of focus or priority by
senior political policymakers (George, 2017; Graber & Dunaway, 2017; Smith, Dunne, &
Hadfield, 2016).
Counterterrorism Policy Implementation
Counterterrorism policy within the ‘3-D’ construct, spanning diplomacy,
development, and defense initiatives, is implemented through specific programs and
activities (George, 2017; Keane & Diesen, 2015; Kraft & Marks, 2011). Diplomacy
programs and activities related to counterterrorism are those implemented by the State
Department (George, 2017; Kraft & Marks, 2011; U.S. Department of State, n.d.b.; U.S.
Department of State, n.d.c.). Examples of these span a broad range of efforts, including
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antiterrorism assistance programs, initiatives to counter violent extremism, countering
terrorism finance, sponsoring international security awareness events and regional
strategic initiatives, terrorist screening and interdiction programs, and specific regionallybased counterterrorism partnerships (U.S. Department of State, n.d.b.; U.S. Department
of State, n.d.c.). State Department counterterrorism programs are designed to strengthen
bilateral and regional partnerships, support civilian capacities for governance, improve
law enforcement and judicial capabilities, and enhance information sharing to counter
terrorist threats (Bernard, 2016; Byman, 2015; Jordan, Kosal, & Rubin, 2016; U.S.
Department of State, n.d.b.).
Numerous development programs and activities implemented by USAID also
support counterterrorism policy (George, 2017; Kraft & Marks, 2011; USAID, n.d.;
USAID, 2011; U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016). These USAID initiatives fall
under the category of working in crises and conflict (USAID, n.d.; USAID, 2011).
Programs related to this category include political transition initiatives, peacebuilding and
reconciliation, providing safe and secure environments, and community resilience,
provide foundational support through prevention in areas that are at risk for terrorism
(Jordan, Kosal, & Rubin, 2016; USAID, n.d.; USAID, 2011). For areas of instability and
conflict, there are programs related to conflict mitigation and prevention, recovering from
crisis, and atrocity prevention, that seek to address the challenges in areas where conflicts
are ongoing (Jordan, Kosal, & Rubin, 2016; USAID, n.d.; USAID, 2011).
There is a special category of USAID development efforts that are specifically
related to countering violent extremism, which are divided into two areas (USAID, 2011;
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U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016). The first seeks to counter what are called
‘push’ factors, such as social marginalization, ungoverned areas, government repression,
human rights violations, corruption, and threat perceptions based on ethnic or cultural
issues (Kraft & Marks, 2011; USAID, 2011; U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016).
The second area addresses ‘pull’ factors that influence individual radicalization and
recruitment, such as social status, respect from peers, sense of belonging or commitment,
personal empowerment, and achieving success and fulfilment (Kraft & Marks, 2011;
USAID, 2011; U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016). Some of these initiatives have
been controversial within the development community, both inside and outside of
government, where some resist what they view is an attempt to ‘securitize development’
(Bernard, 2016; Jordan, Kosal, & Rubin, 2016; USAID, 2011).
The Defense Department also conducts a robust range of programs and activities
that support achievement of U.S. counterterrorism policy objectives (Defense Security
Cooperation Agency [DSCA], n.d.; George, 2017; Kraft & Marks, 2011; McNerney,
2016). Foreign military sales, including with financing arrangements for resourcechallenged nations, and the transfer of excess military equipment from U.S. stockpiles are
provided for partner countries that face urgent or other capability gaps in their operations
against terrorist or insurgent groups (DSCA, n.d.; George, 2017; Kraft & Marks, 2011;
McNerney, 2016). A wide range of military-to-military training activities, including
advising and assisting in partner nation counterterrorism operations, are also conducted
by U.S. military personnel that support partner nation militaries in tactical proficiency
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and operational capacity building (Carr, 2016; DSCA, n.d.; Frazier & Hutto, 2017;
George, 2017; Kraft & Marks, 2011; Reveron, 2016).
Defense Department security cooperation projects focus on U.S. partner nations,
primarily those that need to implement responsible civilian control of military and
security forces, building up the institutions necessary to provide essential services to their
own civilian populations (DSCA, n.d.; Kraft & Marks, 2011; Omelicheva, Carter, &
Campbell, 2017; Reveron, 2016). Finally, the Defense Department also hosts mid-tosenior level military officers from allied and partner nations in numerous military
education programs within the United States, such as that provided through the National
Defense University, regional centers, and service war colleges (DSCA, n.d.; Kraft &
Marks, 2011; Omelicheva, Carter, & Campbell, 2017; Reveron, 2016). These courses,
many ending with academic degrees or professional certifications, provide for leadership
development, strategic thinking, and operational planning, which all contribute to
collective security and enhance U.S. military partnerships worldwide (Kraft & Marks,
2011; McNerney, 2016; Reveron, 2016).
Theoretical Foundations Regarding the Causes of Terrorism
Since the goal of this study was to understand individual policymakers
perspectives on the causes of terrorism, it was necessary to have a baseline for which to
describe what they may view as the prime motivators of terrorism. To this end, six
primary theories related to what causes terrorism provided a sound research framework
(Jackson, Toros, Jarvis, & Heath-Kelly, 2017; Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016).
These theories address terrorism as being caused by religious ideology (Berman, 2004;
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Huntington, 1996; Owen, 2014), root causes (Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006),
State sponsorship (Arendt, 1953; Byman, 2007; Sterling, 1981), failed states (Crocker;
2003; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004); rational choice (Crenshaw, 2003;
Hoffman, 2011; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011), and group dynamics (Berrebi, 2009;
Kuzner, 2007; Piazza, 2007). The underlying academic elements and key research
findings of each of these theories are summarized in this section.
It is of note that while many of these theories share common characteristics, they
are also unique in the assumptions made, approaches used, and conclusions drawn
(Akhtar, 2017; Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Breen-Smyth, 2011; Martin, 2017). Research
into the causes of terrorism is relatively recent, beginning in the 1970s following the end
of colonialism and creation of new independent states in the post-World War II period,
some of which involved violent political insurgencies (Hain & Pisoiu, 2017; Martin,
2017; Silke & Schnidt-Petersen, 2017). Prior to this, the research into the use of violence
against civilians, whether political or military, was studied within the context of
traditional warfare (Hain & Pisoiu, 2017; Martin, 2017; Silke & Schnidt-Petersen, 2017).
There remain some in the academic community who believe that modern research into
the causes of terrorism is skewed to an overly Western perspective (Jackson, Toros,
Jarvis, & Heath-Kelly, 2017; Jarvis & Lister, 2014; Silke & Schnidt-Petersen, 2017).
Others are concerned that modern research into the causes of terrorism is overly
‘positivist,’ attempting to only establish causal relationships between phenomena, such as
violence and grievance, but missing broader and deeper critical academic opportunities
for knowledge (Akhtar, 2017; Hain & Pisoiu, 2017).
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This study made no academic assessment or research judgement regarding the
soundness of specific theories on causes of terrorism (Jackson, Toros, Jarvis, & HeathKelly, 2017; Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016). I sought to leverage existing research
from which to qualitatively view individual perceptions to understanding the views of
current U.S. counterterrorism policy professionals (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & BreenSmyth, 2011; Martin, 2017; Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016; Silke & SchnidtPetersen, 2017). Regardless of how these numerous theories on the causes of terrorism
are viewed in the academic community, they are relevant, since they are routinely
identified or alluded to in official government policy documents that address terrorism
(NCTC, 2017; ODNI, n.d.; U.S. Department of State, n.d.b.; U.S. Department of State,
n.d.c.; U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016).
Religious Ideology
Huntington (1996) is considered by many the chief among modern political
theorists who consider that ideology, specifically driven by culture, race, language, and
religion, is the prime motivator for the use of violence against civilians as a means to
achieve political ends. Others who have promoted this theory as a cause of terrorism
include Berman (2004), Frum and Perle (2003), and Owen (2014). Ideology is defined as
“a system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or
political theory,” and “the set of beliefs characteristic of a social group or individual”
(Ideology, 2018, para. 1). Those who view religious ideology as a primary cause of
terrorism also see religion as a central defining characteristic of culture and therefore of
civilizations, and view clashes due to conflicting ideologies as the greatest threat to world
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peace (Berman, 2004; Frum & Perle, 2003; Huntington, 1996; Owen, 2014). They stress
that religious ideological factors create both global security challenges and an existential
threat to the Westphalian state system (Antwi-Boateng, 2017; Carson & Suppenbach,
2018).
This theory usually presents ‘political Islam,’ termed Islamism by proponents of
this theoretical approach, as a religious ideology that underline political approaches,
systems, and structures, comparable by some to the totalitarian ideologies of Nazism and
communism (Berman, 2004; Owen, 2014). Advocates of this theory often point to
statements by notable terrorist such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu
Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leaders within al Qaeda and the Islamic
State, respectively, to support their theoretical position (Ibrahim, 2007; Rubin, 2014; U.S.
Department of State, 2004). Each of these terrorists routinely and consistently use the
language of religion (in this case, Islam) as the principal justification of their violence,
especially as it relates to the use of violence against civilian targets (Ibrahim, 2007;
Rubin, 2014; U.S. Department of State, 2004). The perspective regarding religious
ideology as a cause of terrorism is also reflected in statements by President’s Bush,
Obama, and Trump, and therefore has influenced U.S. counterterrorism policy (Goldberg,
2016; Johnson, 2002; Johnson & Hauslohner, 2017).
Qualitative studies demonstrate links between religious ideology and terror attack
lethality (Carson & Suppenbach, 2018). Qualitative research findings also indicate both
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors with religious ideology overtones, where radical Islamists are
‘pushed’ towards violence due to a backlash against the impacts of globalization and
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‘pulled’ towards religious radicalization through global media availability, the purpose of
a pure cause and lure of martyrdom, and influences of Madrassas (i.e., Islamic religious
schools) (Antwi-Boateng, 2017; Buzdar, Tariq, & Ali, 2018; Carson & Suppenbach,
2018). The role of religion in radicalization can also be strengthened within cultures as
well as across cultures, given that Islam is not a unitary belief structure but consists of
numerous sects and splinter elements, notably that between the Salafi, Shi’a, and Sufi
traditions, evidenced in recent times by the split between al Qaeda and the Islamic State
(Cohen et al., 2018). Research further indicates radicalization can be a key component of
conflict where radical leaders compete to obtain adherents and followers, whether locally
via direct engagement or globally via the Internet; however, most studies show that
individuals are still mostly influenced by personal, face-to-face interactions on the path to
radicalization (Isaacs, 2017; Jiries, 2016)
Research results from quantitative methods also support the theory regarding
religious ideology being a primary cause of terrorism (Barron & Maye, 2017; Cherney &
Murphy, 2017; Neo et al., 2017). A multitude of research that analyzes population
surveys spanning numerous regions (e.g., the U.S., Europe, North Africa, the Middle
East, even Australia and Southeast Asia) demonstrate causal linkages between aspects of
religious belief among Muslims and their support for, or even participation in, violence to
achieve specific objectives (Barron & Maye, 2017; Burstein, 2018; Cherney & Murphy,
2017). Additionally, some research findings conclude that the presence of religious
ideology espoused by attackers correlates with more deadly attack tactics and patterns
(Burstein, 2018). This is particularly the case for those who indicate a strong belief in the
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concept of jihad (as ‘holy war’) (Barron & Maye, 2017; Cherney & Murphy, 2017).
Quantitative studies also demonstrate results that indicate measurable impacts from the
portrayal in the media of discrimination against Muslims and the propensity of
radicalized Muslims to use violence and terrorism in support of a perceived cause or to
even exact revenge (Saiya, 2017; Schbley, 2004; Neo et al., 2017).
There are studies, however, that demonstrate using the language of ‘religious
ideology’ in describing terrorism is unhelpful (Francis, 2016; Gunning & Jackson, 2011).
This research indicates perceived differences between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ acts of
violence against civilians is over-simplistic or even misleading (Gunning & Jackson,
2011; Sing, 2016). The underlying factors used in research design is critical, and
opponents of the ‘religious ideology’ theory as a cause of terrorism stress that some key
assumptions about the motives, causes, and behavior of groups are in many cases
unsupported (Francis, 2016; Gunning & Jackson, 2011). This opposing research indicates
making connections between Islam and violence only contributes to ‘Islamophobia,’
undermining a fuller understanding on root causes of political violence, and even
building the growth of intolerant attitudes against Muslims (Pop, 2016; Sing, 2016).
Some research even indicates possible links between government efforts to
delegitimizing certain actors while attempting to justify contentious counterterrorist
practices (Gunning & Jackson, 2011).
Application of this theory in U.S. counterterrorism policy is evidenced
predominately in military responses through combat operations as well as programs
related to countering violent extremism (Kraft & Marks, 2011; McIntosh, 2015;
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Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016; Tan, 2009). These responses have three primary
objectives, which is to degrade and destroy Islamist armed groups, deter potential future
attacks by demonstrating strength and resolve, and undermine the ideological justification
that underpins Islamist religious justification for violence (Kraft & Marks, 2011;
Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016; Tan, 2009). Significant U.S. military operations
against al Qaeda and Islamic State forces and operatives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria,
have been underway for over 17 years (Cronin, 2015; McIntosh, 2015). These operations
are also augmented by periodic drone strikes in other locations, such as in North Africa,
Somalia, and Yemen (Jordan, 2009; McCrisken, 2013). Counter narrative campaigns,
embedded in broader U.S. countering violent extremism programs, are also focused on
undermining Islamist religious messaging that justifies violence (Aly, 2013; Holtmann,
2013; U.S. State Department & USAID, 2016). These efforts remain controversial, as
many who don’t subscribe to the role of religious ideology in terrorist motivation still
question the coherence and effectiveness of counter narrative efforts (Betz, 2008;
Prentice, 2012; Quiggin, 2009).
Root Causes
The root causes theory as it relates to the motivations of terrorism stresses key
underlying factors, mostly related to economic, educational, demographic, and political
issues, as the fundamental reasons individuals move to the use of violence to achieve
political objectives (Betts, 2002; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000). Much of the theoretical
underpinnings of this approach is based on research into the economics of violence and
conflict that preceded the attacks of 9/11 (Abadie, 2006; Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, &
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Swagel, 1996; Becker, 1983; Hirshleifer, 1991). As such, this approach makes linkages
between poverty, political instability, and the use of violence (Abadie, 2006; Alesina et
al., 1996). Some research indicated poor economic conditions in a country increase the
probability of political coups or serve as reliable predictions for the outbreak of civil wars
(Alesina et al., 1996; Collier & Hoeffer, 2004; Miguel, Satyanath, & Sergenti, 2004).
This theory also highlights the role of poverty in explaining how violence and terrorism
would be exasperated when combined with the presence of rampant disease, corruption,
and competition for reducing resources necessary for a minimal level of personal
sustainment (Feldman, 2009; Miguel et al., 2004).
A broad lack of education among a population has also been researched as
another key economic factor to explain a root cause of terrorism (Feldman, 2009;
Newman, 2006). Studies suggest that there are potential linkages, at least at the individual
level, of a lower standard of living and low education both being present in those who
participate in terrorist attacks (Khan & Azam, 2008; Newman, 2006). Other research
focuses on other potential causal factors, such as discrimination and political grievance,
arbitrary actions and physical abuse by security services, and lack of opportunities for
betterment or advancement (Betts, 2002; Feldman, 2009; Krueger & Malecˇkova´, 2003).
The root cause of terrorism perspective can be seen in U.S. counterterrorism policy, even
that articulated relatively recently, particularly related to programs designed to counter
violent extremism (U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016). “In many environments
where the risk of violent extremism is high, development has failed to take root, gover-
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nance is weak, access to education and training is limited, economic opportunities are
few, and unemployment is high” (U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016, p. 4).
A review of recent academic literature demonstrates qualitative research that build
on the root causes perspective that terrorist violence is an economic phenomenon
(Ayegba, 2015; Chauhan & Foster, 2014; Intriligator, 2010). Studies regarding
populations for regions in both Africa and the Middle East highlight connections between
poverty, unemployment, age, and violence of a terrorist nature (Ayegba, 2015; Caruso &
Gavrilova, 2012; Chauhan & Foster, 2014). Research results suggest that there are also
positive indications within the root causes framework that these types of economic
factors can be exasperated by a young population demographic, particularly young men,
as well as the presence of repression and brutality by state security forces (Caruso &
Gavrilova, 2012; Intriligator, 2010; Jarvis & Lister, 2016). The impact of education upon
populations is another contributing root cause that has also been studied, in the context of
how it contributes to social differences, social fractures, and political violence (Jarvis &
Lister, 2016). When economic differences manifest itself as a real or perceived
discrimination of an ethnic minority, this also has been shown through qualitative
analysis to be a valid predictor of domestic violence, including terrorism (Ayegba, 2015;
Piazza, 2011). More research through qualitative methods into broader socio-economic
and contributing factors as root causes for terrorism is clearly warranted in the academic
community (Caruso & Gavrilova, 2012; Chauhan & Foster, 2014).
Root cause theory regarding terrorism has also been studied through quantitative
methods (Campos & Gassebner, 2013; Jacques & Taylor, 2013; Qvortrup & Lijphart;
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2013; Shahbaz, 2013). Research indicates that explanations on the use of terrorism where
economics is a contributing root cause has consistency (Bird, Blomberg, & Hess, 2008;
Qvortrup & Lijphart; 2013). In Europe, there are quantitative results demonstrating that
terrorists come from relatively poor background (or are first- or second-generation
immigrants from poor countries), who become disenchanted and angry in their new home
(Bird, Blomberg, & Hess, 2008; Qvortrup & Lijphart; 2013). Economic factors have also
been highlighted as a quantitatively determined contributor to terrorism in Pakistan,
which like its neighbor Afghanistan, suffers from a steady stream of terrorism attacks
against civilian targets (Shahbaz, 2013). The potential role of poverty as a causal factor
for terrorism has also been studied in the Israeli-Palestinian context, even as it relates to
motivational differences between male and female terrorist attackers (Jacques & Taylor,
2013). Within the U.S. domestic context, studies have indicated less linkages between
poverty or economic factors and terrorist attacks (Piazza, 2017). However, the root
causes theory for terrorism is not without its critics in the academic community (Djankov
& Reynal-Querol, 2010; Mintz & Brule, 2009). Some find the linkage between poverty
and terrorism spurious, based on faulty assumptions and biased perspectives (Djankov &
Reynal-Querol, 2010). Others question the research findings, stressing that the evidence
is weak since it may be more inferentially based and not grounded on a solid data
foundation (Mintz & Brule, 2009).
Regardless of its academic critics, however, the root cause of terrorism theory,
particularly in the context of poverty and despair as a driver of terrorism, was prevalent in
statements made by senior leadership within both the Bush and Obama administrations
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(Acosta, 2015; Aldrich, 2014; Bush, 2002a; Powell, 2009; Sterman, 2015). In a
Washington summit on countering extremism, President Obama called on governments
to “address the grievances that terrorists exploit, both political and economic” (Acosta,
2015, para. 2). Obama’s Secretary of State, John Kerry, routinely used similar language
about fighting violent extremism by countering poverty. “The fight against violent
extremism will continue for decades unless the root causes of despair and hopelessness
are addressed” (Morello, 2015, para. 1). “We have a huge common interest in dealing
with this issue of poverty, which in many cases is the root cause of terrorism” (Sterman,
2015, para. 2). In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush
told a gathering of economic leaders at a United Nations summit, “we fight against
poverty because hope is an answer to terror” (Bush, 2002a, para. 3). The use of
developmental assistance programs to counter terrorism was also articulated by Secretary
of State Colin Powell, who often spoke of development as a core national security issue,
drawing direct links between terrorism and poverty (Powell, 2009). While the language
of root cause theory is absent from how President Trump speaks about terrorism, its
legacy remains in numerous aspects of developmental assistance programs and activities
in the State Department and USAID under the auspices of the countering violent
extremism framework (Aldrich, 2014; U.S. Department of State, n.d.b.; U.S. Department
of State, n.d.c.; U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016).
State Sponsorship
Traditional or orthodox political perspectives on the cause of terrorism, directly
linking political violence by rebels, insurgents, or terrorists, to state sponsorship are
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provided by Arendt (1953), Richardson (1998, 1999), Sterling (1981), and more recently,
Byman (2007). In this theory, nation-states provide the backing, funding, guidance, and
motivation to terrorist groups and individuals, which are then encouraged or utilized to
target opposing states or groups in order to indirectly influence political decisions and
achieve political ends (Arendt, 1953; Byman, 2007; Richardson, 1998 & 1999; Sterling,
1981). Coming out of World War II, many academics and political theorists in the West
viewed the totalitarian communist regime in the Soviet Union as the principal sponsor of
guerrilla and insurgent movements across the world, working to undermine and
destabilize democratic countries friendly with the West (Arendt, 1953; Sterling, 1981). It
was no secret that the foreign policy goal of the Soviet Union and its communist client
states, such as Cuba, were openly directed towards world domination (Arendt, 1953;
Sterling, 1981). The view of the Soviet Union as a destabilizing actor against democracy
was a prevailing image up to and through the 1980s, clearly evident in both academic
studies as well as in political rhetoric, such as President Reagan’s repeated references to
the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’ (Busch, 1997; Byman, 2007; Goodnight, 1986;
Richardson, 1999).
Over time, other nations were identified as state sponsors of terrorism, principal
among these including Iran, Libya, the Palestinians, and Syria (Byman, 2007;
Richardson, 1999; Sterling, 1981). In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union in
1989, and the coincident end of the Cold War, a further evolution occurred (Hoyt, 2000;
Richardson, 1998). Evolving through the 1990s, Iraq, Sudan, and North Korea were
recognized as also becoming main sponsors of terrorists and their attacks, in what some
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referred to as a transition from the communist ‘Reds’ to the up and coming ‘Rogue’ states
(Hoyt, 2000; Krebs & Lobasz, 2007. By the late 1990s there were seven states identified
by the U.S. government as official state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (Richardson, 1998).
State sponsorship as a key cause of terrorism is evident in the political rhetoric of
the last several administrations (Haass, 2013; Krebs & Lobasz, 2007; Shear & Sanger,
2017). One of the key political justifications for the U.S. attack against Afghanistan
following 9/11 was over its refusal to apprehend and turn over al-Qaeda fighters,
allowing official safe haven to al-Qaeda to operate from its territory in the execution of
their terrorist planning, training, and launching of global attacks (Krebs & Lobasz, 2007).
In addition, being a state sponsor of terrorism was also one of the political justifications
used by the Bush administration for the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Haass, 2013; Krebs &
Lobasz, 2007). In the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings across the Middle East and
North Africa in 2011, President Obama designated Syria under the Bashir Assad regime
as a ‘state sponsor of terror’ of groups conducting attacks in the region and used this in
2012, as well as Assad’s brutal crackdown against his own population, to initiate
economic sanctions (Haass, 2013). Most recently, the Trump administration designated
North Korea as a state sponsor of terror in late 2017, using this and other coercive efforts
to punish North Korea for its continued development of nuclear weapons and aggressive
testing of ballistic missile upon which to deliver them (Shear & Sanger, 2017). There
remain four countries that are officially identified by the U.S. government as ‘state
sponsors of terrorism,’ which are Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (Shear & Sanger,
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2017; U.S. Department of State, n.d.d.). Being so designated means that each are
sanctioned from receiving any U.S. foreign assistance, no defense exports or sales, and
severe financial and economic restrictions (U.S. Department of State, n.d.d.).
There are a multitude of qualitative research studies that address why states seek
to sponsor terrorist groups (Bapat, 2011; Berkowitz, 2017; Cunningham, 2010; Regan,
2002; Salehyan, 2010). Research indicates that states use terrorist groups, usually on a
covert basis (but not always), to apply coercion on other states in areas where cooperation
or diplomacy fails to achieve political objectives (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce,
2008; Bapat, 2007; Bapat, 2011). States are more likely to employ terrorist proxies
against their enemies when they assess the strategic benefits outweigh the potential risks
of exposure or retaliation (Berkowitz, 2017; Cunningham, 2010; Regan, 2002; Salehyan,
2010). Some qualitative studies indicate that the states that are most likely to sponsor
terrorists groups against their enemies are those that are moderately weak or those that
are major powers (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce, 2008; Bapat, 2007; Bapat, 2011;
Berkowitz, 2017). Terrorist groups also actively seek state sponsors as well, for
numerous reasons, not least being to obtain financial resources (Bapat & Bond, 2012;
Freeman, 2011; Regan, 2002; Salehyan, 2010). Terrorist groups can also obtain
intelligence and weaponry from state sponsors, in many cases much more easily than they
can obtain it through other means (Bapat & Bond, 2012; Carter, 2012). By aligning with
a state sponsor, terrorists are able to increase their lethality and thereby their impact and
influence (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce, 2008; Bapat, 2007; Bapat & Bond, 2012;
Freeman, 2011). Some research findings demonstrate that the more vulnerable the
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terrorist group, the higher the probability it will seek to align itself with a state sponsor
(Bapat & Bond, 2012; Carter, 2012). State sponsorship can also have its drawbacks,
however, in loss of some autonomy (Carter, 2012). It can even seriously backfire, and
data from some research demonstrates cases where a state sponsor may be pressured by a
stronger state to betray individual terrorists, their plots, or even enable broader retaliatory
action (Carter, 2012).
Research into specific states that sponsor terrorism is also plentiful. Data shows
that terrorist groups from certain countries have a higher likelihood to attack American
targets or citizens (Carter, 2012; Neumayer & Plümper, 2011). This appears to be due to
numerous factors, including in countries that receive significant U.S. military aid, or
places where there are U.S. military personnel stationed or operating (Neumayer &
Plümper, 2011). There is also plentiful research into specific states that sponsor terrorist
groups (Byman, 2007). Libya’s role as a state sponsor of terror in the 1970s and 1980s,
and the factors that were leveraged to advance its political and economic interests,
provides a good example (Ani & Uzodike, 2015). Another example of a long-term state
sponsor of terrorism is Iran, which remains a designated state sponsor of terrorist by the
U.S. government (Byman, 2008; U.S. Department of State, n.d.d.; Wigginton et al.,
2015). Iran has used its al-Qods Force to support, fund, and train terrorist groups across
the Middle East (Wigginton et al., 2015). However, research indicates that over time Iran
has become more cautious and circumspect in its overt support to terrorist organizations,
with data showing this may be due to an evolving attempt to avoid United Nations
condemnation and appear more normalized in the international environment (Byman,
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2008; Wigginton et al., 2015). While not officially sanctioned by the U.S., both Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia appear as nations that research has demonstrated are examples of
apparent U.S. allies that also support terrorist groups to achieve political interests,
sometimes even against the U.S. (Byman, 2008; Riedel, 2008).
Quantitative studies into state sponsorship of terrorism also highlights several key
research results. Research findings conclude that rivalries between medium or weak
states in close proximity is a reliable predictor for states that sponsor terrorism (Findley,
Piazza, & Young, 2012; Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham, 2011). Findings also
indicate that the willingness of terrorist groups to accept support from a state sponsor is
more likely in countries that suffer from existing internal discord, have ongoing and open
conflicts underway, or where the local government receives significant security or
military support from a foreign power (Morgan, Bapat, & Krustev, 2009; Salehyan et al.,
2011). Quantitative research also indicates economic ramifications for states that are
sanctioned as state sponsors of terrorism (Breuer, Felde, & Steininger, 2017; Byman,
2007; Morgan et al., 2009). Findings indicate that the stock prices for companies that
withdraw business from countries declared ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ rise, however,
there is also evidence that some businesses that remain in these countries over a longerterm period may also benefit from positive stock results (Breuer et al., 2017). Some
researchers disagree that overt state sponsorship remains a viable tool, due mostly to the
negative international reaction for it being a means to achieve political objectives,
combined with the apparent growing lack of state control over the groups they do sponsor
(Hamilt & Gray, 2012; O’Sullivan, 2010).
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Evidence of the impact of the theory of state sponsorship of terrorist on U.S.
policy exists beyond statements and rhetoric of senior U.S. political leaders (Haass, 2013;
Krebs & Lobasz, 2007; Shear & Sanger, 2017). With the end of the Cold War and U.S.
dominance in the international environment, sanctions became a clear tool used by U.S.
policymakers to coerce ‘problem’ states, particularly those identified as state sponsors of
terrorism (Eckert, 2008; O’Sullivan, 2010; Tucker, 1998). In many cases, the use of
economic sanctions is the way for political leaders to appear tough without having to
cross into more coercive methods, such as military action (Maller, 2010). Economic
sanctions against states identified by the U.S. State Department as ‘state sponsors of
terrorism’ is evident in current policy towards the four countries currently on this list:
Syria (since 1979), Iran (since 1984), Sudan (since 1993), and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK, i.e., North Korea, since 2017) (U.S. Department of State,
n.d.d.).
Failed States
Research regarding failed states as a theory for explaining the cause of terrorism
is provided by Crocker (2003), Hamre and Sullivan (2002), Rotberg (2002), and Takeyh
and Gvosdev (2002). Foundations for this perspective can be found in the concept of the
‘quasi-state’ as outlined by Jackson (1990). He studied the creation of Third World
nations post World War II, where in many cases in post-colonial regions (e.g., Africa, the
Middle East) weak states were established and fostered by the broader international
community in spite of whether they were or were not ready for independence or selfgovernance (Jackson, 1990). These ‘quasi-states’ as he called them were areas of
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‘negative sovereignty,’ or places that had the trappings of a nation but lacked the basic
elements necessary for true governance or control (Jackson, 1990). Dorff (1996)
continued this theme regarding ‘weak states,’ arguing that the inability of a state to
control violence, specifically terrorism, would lead to the use of more violence, in
addition to other problems such as gross violations of human rights. Fukuyama (2004) is
a well-known and more recent proponent within the field of international relations that
expanded on this theory (i.e., quasi- or weak-states as ‘failed’ or ‘failing states’) for
explaining terrorist violence.
In general, this theory posits that a lack of effective governance, in many cases
combined with multi-ethnic tensions or conflict and a repressive security regime, fosters
the development, use, and export of terrorist violence by groups out of these weak states
(Crocker; 2003; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Rotberg, 2002). It is the weakness of state
institutions across functions related to security, finance, health, education, and commerce,
among others, that serves to draw terrorists (and criminal elements) to these locations
(Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002). It becomes a predictable cycle of
violence fueled by the breakdown of civil institutions and authority (Mallaby, 2002;
Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002). Terrorists and their groups are drawn to these ‘safe havens,’
precisely because the lack of central authority provides them the freedom and autonomy
to recruit, organize, fund, train, and stage operations, without the risk of any real
interference (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Mallaby, 2002; Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002). At the
same time, being a terrorist group located within a ‘sovereign state’ also provides a
semblance of protection under international norms, since it is difficult for a stronger state
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to directly interfere in another weaker state absent a justification and authorization under
international principles and law (Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002). This is the real-world
ramification of ‘negative sovereignty’ (Jackson, 1990). Proponents of the failed state
theory as the primary cause of terrorism point to the need, therefore, of strengthening the
institutions of weak or failing (or even failed) states in order to begin to address the ‘root
cause’ of terrorism (Crocker, 2003; Mallaby, 2002; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Rotberg,
2002).
The view regarding weak or failing states and linkages to terrorism can be seen in
statements by U.S. administration officials over the last several decades. President
Clinton used as justification the lack of governance for his involvement in Somalia
(Rieff, 1999). While this intervention was primarily justified as a humanitarian initiative,
it also had a security aspect, which over time led to increased U.S. military
counterterrorism efforts that ultimately led to the failed ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident
while attempting to capture Faraka Aideed, a Somali warlord (Ibrahim, 2010). In the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the National Security Strategy published by the George W.
Bush administration in 2002 clearly stated that “America is now threatened less by
conquering states than we are by failing ones” (Bush, 2002b, p. 1). Condoleezza Rice,
Secretary of State in the Bush administration, also made it clear that nations that could
not exercise appropriate sovereignty and control over their territory had ‘spillover effects’
on neighboring and regional states in the form of terrorism (Garfinkle, 2005). In his last
State of the Union speech in 2016, President Obama also highlighted the threat of
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terrorism posed by failing states, a more serious threat to American security that that
posed by ‘evil empires’ (Patrick, 2016).
There are distinct qualitative findings that demonstrate links between failed or
failing states and the prevalence of terrorism (Chenoweth, 2013; George, 2016; Howard,
2016). Failed states are viewed as a magnet for terrorism and other forms of political
violence, with research indicating local citizens are driven to violence when chronic
deprivation and corruption close normal pathways to success and security (George, 2016;
Howard, 2016). Studies show that failed states experience a higher level of violence and
terrorism that stable states (Chenoweth, 2013; George, 2016). There are country-specific
examples and other case studies that provide qualitative evidence of the link between
failed states and terrorism (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Patrick, 2007; Piazza, 2008). Boko
Haram in northern Nigeria is in great part enabled by the corruption and failure of the
Nigerian government (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). Research demonstrates that other
weak or failing states, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, or other African nations across
the Trans-Sahara, or failed states like Somalia, are much more likely to both host terrorist
groups as well as suffer inordinately from these groups’ attacks (Piazza, 2008). Some
research has even mapped the intersections between failed governance and terrorism
(Patrick, 2007).
Research into the factors indicating a failed state are numerous, but usually
highlight state authority, capacity for basic services, and legitimacy (Grävingholt, Ziaja,
& Kreibaum, 2015; Howard, 2010). Other key contributing factors include ethnic
divisions, corruption, porous borders and migration flow, and changes due to climate or
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environment (Howard, 2010). These factors for failure are complex, however, with
conflicting research results apparent across the literature (Jones, 2008; Krieger &
Meierrieks, 2011; Newman, 2007). Some findings call for increased research into broader
foundational flaws, such as socioeconomics and political underdevelopment, and even the
legacy impacts of post-colonial transformation (Jones, 2008; Krieger & Meierrieks,
2011). A failed state may be a contributing reason but may not be the singular causal
factor for terrorism some researchers imply, since terrorist attacks also occur in strong,
stable states, including Western democracies, indicating that state failure may not be a
sufficient explanation for the presence of, and attacks by, terrorists (Newman, 2007).
Some findings indicate perspectives within wealthy, strong, and stable states may
be biased and unduly influence how the link between failed states and terrorism is viewed
(Bueger & Bethke, 2014; Chenoweth, 2013; Newman, 2007). Some research outright
questions the validity of the claim that failed or failing states are linked to terrorism at all
(Call, 2008; Coggins, 2015; Hehir, 2007). A study of data over ten years from 153
countries found quantitative evidence that prevailing research studies often disregard
broader political context (Coggins, 2015). When other violence is included, some
research indicates limited statistical differences between strong and weak states regarding
acts of terrorism (Hehir, 2007). Many studies demonstrate that terrorist groups can and do
emerge from states viewed as strong, stable, advanced, and democratic, indicating the
‘strength’ of the state doesn’t necessarily correlate with the presence of terrorist groups
and terrorist attacks (Call, 2008; Mazarr, 2014; Newman, 2007). These researchers rather
see undue influence of a broader, post 9/11 ‘state-building narrative’ that has biased how
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failed states are viewed, being more supportive of strategic objectives rather than analytic
rigor (Hehir, 2007; Mazarr, 2014).
The challenges posed by ‘failed’ or ‘failing states,’ in the context of a theory for
the cause of terrorism, is evident in statements by senior U.S. policymakers from both
parties across the last several administrations. The National Security Strategy authored by
the George W. Bush administration in 2002 highlighted the dangers of ‘weak states’
being ‘vulnerable to terrorist networks’ and posing “as great a danger to our national
interests as strong states” (Bush, 2002b; Cover Letter, para. 7; see also Rice, 2003). A
specific example of the impact of this guidance is seen in the creation (in 2004) of the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization within the State
Department to lead U.S. government efforts to respond effectively to address failing
states, with a special focus on Afghanistan and Iraq (Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein,
2005; Krasner & Pascual, 2005). This office has evolved over time, but still exists as the
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations within the State Department, working to
address the causes of violent conflict and terrorism through targeted, in-country
development assistance programs (U.S. Department of State, n.d.e.). Another specific
example was the creation (also in 2004) of the Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC), established to help weak states build the elements of basic services to help avoid
internal conflicts that have the potential of destabilizing neighbors and provide
ungoverned territory as safe havens for terrorists (François & Sud, 2006; Millennium
Challenge Corporation, n.d.). The MCC collaborates with poor countries, creating
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compacts for long term development projects, often in the hundreds-of-millions of dollars
over many years (Millennium Challenge Corporation, n.d.).
The theme regarding the potential dangers of terrorism being caused by ‘failing
states’ was continued by the Obama administration in the 2010 National Security
Strategy of the United States (Obama, 2010). The theory of failed states as a cause of
terrorism is most recently reflected in the 2017 National Security Strategy of the United
States approved by the Trump administration, which states “the United States will also
assist fragile states to prevent threats to the U.S. homeland. Transnational threat
organizations, such as jihadist terrorists and organized crime, often operate freely from
fragile states and undermine sovereign governments. Failing states can destabilize entire
regions” (Trump, 2017, p. 39).
Rational Choice
Crenshaw (2003), Hoffman (2011), and Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), are key
proponents of rational choice terrorism theory, where the use of violence to achieve
political objectives is assessed to be primarily based on a rational cost-benefit calculation,
with violence used against civilians when other avenues for achieving political ends are
deemed unavailable or ineffective. There are many aspects or academic perspectives
within rational choice theory regarding terrorism that relate the terrorists criteria to items
such as economic, political, institutional, and even demographic factors (Hoffman, 2011;
Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). When assumed to be ‘rational actors,’ terrorists make
conscious and deliberate decisions regarding objectives, targets, and timing for the use of
violence in order to maximize the utility towards the outcomes they desire (Sandler &
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Enders, 2004). Unfortunately, as a tactic for achieving political objectives, violence
targeted against civilians by terrorists has been shown to be very effective (Hoffman,
2011).
The aspects of rational choice for the use of violence within the field of
international relations and political science is traditionally derived from state-on-state
theory (Crenshaw, 2003; Hoffman, 2011, Jackson, 2008). The ‘rational’ factors used to
influence the actions of states fall into numerous categories (Drezner, 2011; Pouliot,
2016). Diplomats use demarches and other forms of official statements of protest to
highlight problems and build diplomatic pressure (Pouliot, 2016). Sanctions are also
leveraged to bring economic hardship and therefore coercive influence to bear to alter the
cost-benefit calculation and influence behavior (Drezner, 2011; Roehrig, 2009; Seliktar,
2011). Military actions are also a form of ‘coercive diplomacy’ to compel changes in
state behavior (Jakobsen, 2011; Wilner, 2011). Examples of the use of these types of
coercive tools in the terrorist context are numerous, at least where the U.S. has tried to
alter other states rational cost-benefit calculus regarding the sponsorship or use of
terrorism (Crenshaw, 2003). Examples include: U.S. military attacks in 1993 against Iraq
following its attempt to assassinate President George H. W. Bush during his visit to
Kuwait; severe economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. against Iran when its
involvement in the 1996 Khobar Towers attack was revealed; and the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001 following the 9/11 attack, when the Taliban refused the U.S.
ultimatum to hand over Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda fighters (Crenshaw, 2003;
Seliktar, 2011 Seliktar, 2011; Tarzi, 2005).
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As with nation-states, when rational decision theory is applied to terrorist groups,
similar cost-benefit calculations can be observed (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; Sandler &
Enders, 2004). As rational actors, terrorist use violence directed at both state institutions
as well as against civilian targets in order to maximize the political and societal impacts
to achieve particular goals and objectives (Crenshaw, 2003; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011;
Sandler & Enders, 2004). The factors used by individual terrorists and terrorist groups
span numerous elements, including economic, political, institutional, and even
demographic or ethnic criteria, however, while all of these play a role, it remains difficult
to apply single motivational models broadly to explain or predict violent acts by terrorists
(Sandler & Enders, 2004). Rationality regarding terrorists use of violence appears
focused, and although terrorists do move beyond narrow self-interest in some cases, the
use of terrorist violence remains a calculated tactical act with the goal of achieving
strategic goals (Caplan, 2006; Frey & Luechinger, 2004). This view of rationality leads
some to conclude that counterterrorism policies that aim to reduce the potential benefits
of the use of violence against civilians rather than attempting to increase the cost of its
use may be more effective within the rational act theoretical frame (Frey & Luechinger,
2004; Sprinzak, 2000; Victoroff, 2005).
There is a range of both qualitative and quantitative research that provide insights
into rationality as it relates to terrorism. A large body of evidence indicates that terrorists
are rational individuals who consciously use violence against civilians to achieve
objectives (Abrahms, 2008; Shughart & William, 2011). While terrorism can be
considered a tactic, it has a well-recognized strategic affect (Chenoweth et al., 2009;
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Shughart & William, 2011). It has been shown that the use of terrorism by individuals is
undeniably rational from both a ‘means-ends’ sense as well as for how it is employed
(Abrahms, 2008; Littler, 2017; Shughart & William, 2011). Individual or collective
terrorist groups manage tradeoffs between obtaining the resources and the amount of
damage or death inflicted, whether from a bombing, a shooting, or running people down
with trucks (Abrahms, 2008; Chenoweth et al., 2009; Littler, 2017). Terrorists have also
been shown to be adept at dealing with defenses or countermeasures, finding ‘safe
havens’ from which to arm and train, and maneuvering through or around police or
security forces in order to reach civilian targets (Phillips, 2009; Shughart & William,
2011).
Rationality as a component of motivation is central if terrorists themselves and the
death and destruction they inflict are to be deterred in any meaningful way by states
(Crenshaw, 2003; Kallberg & Thuraisingham, 2014; Miller, 2013). Deterring terrorism is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, if a baseline of the potential motivation is not well
understood (Crenshaw, 2003; Kallberg & Thuraisingham, 2014; Miller, 2013). One area
of particular interest for understanding rationality and motivation is that of suicide
terrorists – those individuals or groups that knowingly plan to kill themselves in the
conduct of their terrorist attack (Hoffman & McCormick, 2004; Pape, 2003; Van Um,
2011). It is this area where researchers struggle to find analytic explanations, especially
since research indicates that terrorist groups that employ suicide operations gain more by
way of political concessions that those groups that don’t use it as part of attack operations
(Hoffman & McCormick, 2004; Pape, 2003).
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Opposing views in research regarding ‘rational choice’ theory as a cause of
terrorism typically are based on the extreme complexity of the environment, or even
biased subjectivity by the observer, in defining what is actually ‘rational’ (Hewitt, 2003;
Nalbandov, 2013). Some studies content that true rationality may or may not be
determinable in the conduct of terrorist attacks, and that studies that indicate otherwise
are inherently biased (Jackson, 2008; Nalbandov, 2013). Rationality may also be
situational dependent or change dynamically from time to time depending on the
influence of multiple, competing priority variables (Nalbandov, 2013). Some research
indicates it may be psychological factors, even mental illness, that causes what is deemed
‘irrational’ terrorist attacks (Corner & Gill, 2015; Merari, 2010). Research findings
indicate, for example, that a high prevalence of mental health disorders exists for some
‘lone-actor’ terrorists, which contradicts the notion that terrorist are ‘normal’ (Corner,
Gill, & Mason, 2016; Weenik, 2015). These and other research findings contend that
select behavioral aspects or cues regarding individual terrorists can be profiled, and
possibly serve as predictors of impending violence (Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich,
2013; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). Others claim these types of profiles cannot be
usefully leveraged at the individual level, only generally across groups or organizations
(Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014).
In some respects, the ‘rational choice theory’ for describing the cause of terrorism
underpins many of the theories discussed previously (Hewitt, 2003). Each of these
theories represent different frames or potential decision criteria that influence or drive
terrorists’ decisions, whether it be religion, poverty, lack of education or opportunity,
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political ideology, or repression or persecution (Berman, 2004; Betts, 2002; Byman,
2007; Crocker; 2003; Frum & Perle, 2003; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Huntington, 1996;
Newman, 2006; Richardson, 1998 & 1999; Sterling, 1981; Tandon, 2000). Evidence of
senior leaders and policymakers assuming various forms of ‘rational choice’ theory as a
driver of terrorism exist across many of the policies, programs, and pronouncements
highlighted in previous sections. Counter narrative campaigns against Islamist religious
messaging that justifies violence assume religion is the motivating rationality (Aly, 2013;
Holtmann, 2013). Many development, reconstruction, and stabilization programs by the
U.S. government are allocated in the context of alleviating poverty and despair, assuming
to influence the rational decision criteria of terrorists (Acosta, 2015; Aldrich, 2014;
Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein, 2005; Krasner & Pascual, 2005; Sterman, 2015).
Group Dynamics
Kuzner (2007), Piazza (2006, 2007), and Berrebi (2009), have outlined key
aspects of group dynamics terrorist theory, where individual perspectives, influencers,
and motivations due to inter-group relationships and interactions underpin decisions for
the use of violence against civilians for political ends. This approach has legacy analytic
roots in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Social
identity theory is based on the concept that people define themselves in terms of their
relationships to others and to social groups (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Tajfel & Turner,
1979). It is membership within a social group that is a primary influence of how an
individual views context, the value criteria that is used for assessing situations, and
selection of available choices for final decisions (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Huddy,
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2001). Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) stated that people need to belong, judge their
group in contrast with other groups, which serves as a reinforcing commitment to both
the group as well as to self-identity. This group commitment and solidarity is of
particular importance during conflict (Melucci, 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The greater
the perceived differences between the groups in the eyes of the individual, as well as how
potential threats to the group are perceived, determines the intensity of the conflict
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Huddy, 2001; Melucci, 1995).
Applied to terrorism, group dynamics as a motivator for violence is usually in the
context of a reaction to a perceived threat to a group (Berrebi, 2009; Wright, 2015). In
this sense, the use of violence is ‘justified’ to right a perceived wrong, whether for pure
revenge, or as a means of defense, or in a broader attempt to achieve a better or stronger
position for the group (Fischer, Haslam, & Smith, 2010; Ginges & Atran, 2009; Wright,
2015). Group dynamics theory plays a central role to many in defining the
‘radicalization’ process’ (Doosje et al., 2016; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Doosje et
al. (2016) and others generally break this down into three primary steps, all of which are
closely linked to perceived impacts to a ‘group.’ First is the sensitivity or grievance
phase, where injustices are observed, and resentments are built up (Borum, 2011; Doosje
et al., 2016; Klandermans, 2014). Second is the membership phase, where resentment
transitions into collective solidarity with an identified movement or organization (Doosje
et al., 2016; Klandermans, 2014; Kruglanski et al., 2014; Silke, 2008). Finally comes the
action phase, where resentment, combined with membership, leads to action, which can
span efforts from simple resistance to more serious confrontations or attacks (Borum,
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2011; Doosje et al., 2016; Klandermans, 2014). As such, group radicalization for
whatever the cause is based on growing extremes of identity, belief, commitment, and
behavior in support of what in the end is conflict or violence between identifiable groups
(McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Kuzner, 2007; Strelan & Lawani, 2010). Whatever way
the group is quantified and defined, it serves within the group dynamic frame as the
underlying basis for understanding and explaining terrorism, what Piazza (2006) defines
in his ‘social cleavage theory.’
There is a body of research that provides both qualitative and quantitative
evidence for group dynamics being a cause of terrorism. Analysis of terrorists’
statements, narratives, and post-attack interviews provides keen insights into terrorists
perceptions, motivations, and the impact of group dynamics (Altier, Horgan, &
Thoroughgood, 2012; Bartlett & Miller, 2012). As such, the use of terrorism has been
demonstrated to be a ‘social’ phenomenon, with individuals motivated by their status
within a particular group, as well as how they perceive their fellow group members view
them individually (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Simi, Bubolz, & Hardman, 2013). The sense
of self and identity within the ‘in group’ influences behavior and decision making, with
terrorist groups showing significantly higher motivational factors when compared to nonterrorist groups (Gunning, 2009; Smith, 2008a; van de Linde & van der Duin, 2011). The
group dynamic is also shown to be influenced by how individuals view themselves in the
context of being in an ‘out group’ as well, and this view also contributes to the intensity
of the ‘in group’ motivation (Bohorquez et al., 2009; Desmarais & Cranmer, 2013;
Smith, 2008a). Group dynamics even play a role with what are termed ‘lone wolf’
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terrorists, where even self-identified communities of interest or belief absent actual group
membership or interaction has been repeatedly shown to be a factor in the justification for
terrorist violence (Spaaij, 2010).
There is broad research related to understanding group dynamics theory as a
primary cause of terrorism, and opposing research views are few (Murdoch, 2016).
Within the psychological community there are those, however, who urge caution
(Murdoch, 2016; O’Hara, 2007). While they will agree that there is solid research
evidence that group dynamics play a role in radicalization and even the use of terrorist
violence, they also point to other dynamics that influence individual behaviors (Hulme,
2014). As demonstrated in earlier sections, there is a large body of research that provides
evidence that other possible contributing factors, such as poverty, globalization, racism
and discrimination, even climate change impacts, can influence how individuals view
their situation, referred to by some as psychological literacy, being determinate for costbenefit criteria that drive how they make decisions (Hulme, 2014; Banyard & Hulme,
2015). Those researchers who appear to oppose viewing group dynamics as a primary
driver of terrorism seem less concerned with the concept of group dynamics itself than
they are with the potential misunderstanding or bias in research that may attempt to
oversimplify the situation or context within the terrorist’s environment (Murdoch, 2016;
O’Hara, 2007). To these researchers, inaccurate or misguided psychological knowledge
about an individual terrorist or larger terrorist group may be worse than a lack of
psychological literacy, as it would bias the research results just the same (Hulme, 2014;
Murdoch, 2016; O’Hara, 2007).
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Evidence of senior leaders and policymakers articulating aspects of ‘group
dynamics’ theory as a driver of terrorism exist across many of the strategies, policies, and
programs, highlighted in previous sections. The most recent U.S. National Security
Strategy, published by the Trump Administration in 2017, still highlights “transnational
threat organizations” posing a serious threat to the United States, along with Russia,
China, Iran, and North Korea (Trump, 2017, p. 39). This document acknowledges that
America continues to wage war against jihadist terrorist groups, such as ISIS and al
Qaeda, and that the threat from these groups will continue for the foreseeable future
(Trump, 2017). This language continues the strategic theme articulated by the Obama
Administration, which also highlighted the threats to the U.S. and its interests due to
terrorists, their organizations, networks, and affiliates (Obama, 2010). The ‘Global War
on Terror’ initiated under President George W. Bush in the immediate aftermath of the
9/11 attacks was focused on Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and its affiliates (Bush, 2002b).
President Bush also put in place a policy structure to identify and counter ‘Foreign
Terrorist Organizations’ in Executive Order (EO) 13224 (U.S. Department of State,
n.d.f.). EO 13224 provides a means to disrupt financial support networks for terrorists by
formally designating terrorist organizations and then blocking the assets of foreign
individuals who are members of the designated entity (U.S. Department of State, n.d.f.).
Under EO 13224 there are currently 65 separate groups designated as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTO) by the U.S. State Department, clearly indicating that groups are
viewed by the U.S. government as playing a central role in terrorist violence (U.S.
Department of State, n.d.g.).
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Conceptual Constructs That Influence Perspectives on Terrorism
This section adds a third lens, specifically a conceptual framework, to the
literature review from which to help understand why individual policymakers may have
particular perspectives regarding the causes of terrorism. First, individual factors related
to policymakers’ background, education, training, or experiences may be found to
influence their perspectives on the causes of terrorism towards a particular theory. Social
cognitive theory (Bandura 1989, 2001, & 2011) and cultural theory (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982; Douglas, 1985; Wildavsky, 1987) have both been used to describe,
assess, and understand factors that influence how individuals view their surroundings,
ascribe context to events, weigh select criteria, and make decisions. Insights from both
these theories may help provide a conceptual construct to understand individual influence
relative to the phenomenon of interest.
Second, assessing individual perspectives within the context of unique
organizational bureaucracies might also explain particular influences or biases that may
help in understanding particular alignment of an individual policymaker’s views with a
specific theory regarding the cause of terrorism. Specific organizational theories may
therefore provide additional perspectives from which to view and understand the
phenomenon. Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), groupthink theory
(Janis, 1971; Janis, 1972), and the organizational processes model (Allison, 1971; Allison
& Zelikow, 1999), may also be applicable as conceptual constructs for understanding
organizational influence on policymakers views regarding the causes of terrorism. The
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underlying academic elements of each of these theories are briefly outlined in this
section.
Social Cognitive Theory
Developed by Bandura (1989, 2001), the foundational element of social cognitive
theory is that individuals learn by observing others. Behaviors that are learned, whether
due to self-efficacy, positive reinforcement, or placement within specific environmental
settings, become central to an individual’s personality over time (Bandura, 1989;
Bandura, 2001; Wood & Bandura, 1989). Self-efficacy is driven by the individual’s
beliefs in their ability to complete the replicated task or effort successfully (Bandura,
1989; Bandura, 2001). The attempted task is reinforced overtime when the task is
recognized in a positive manner (Bandura, 1989; Bandura, 2001). The specific
environmental setting of the individual provides repeated examples for correct behavior,
a social context for positive recognition and reinforcement, and even appropriate social
support and materials (Bandura, 1989; Bandura, 2001; Wood & Bandura, 1989).
Learning within the social cognitive theory construct is motivated through processes such
as the setting of goals, evaluations of progress, value judgements, social comparisons,
and achievement of objectives (Bandura, 2011; Schunk & Usher, 2012). All of these
structures and processes operate interactively as determinates that serve to influence,
shape, and mold individual perspectives over time (Wood & Bandura, 1989).
There are research results where social cognitive theory has been applied to public
sector employees. Self-efficacy has been demonstrated to be enhanced where public
employees are given clear goals, offered training, coached and mentored during the
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performance of tasks, and given evaluation feedback on their progress towards achieving
an assigned objective (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008; Rehg, Gundlach, & Grigorian,
2012). The impacts of positive reinforcement of individual actions overtime, through
such mechanisms as coaching, mentoring, and recognition of performance, is another
element of social cognitive theory that has been shown to positively motivate public
sector employees (Fernandez & Moldogaziev, 2015; Latham et al., 2008; Wright, 2004).
The environmental settings, or organizational context and culture, can also provide strong
motivations to the unity of effort and execution of public service (Taylor, 2014). Over
time, these environmental or organizational structures fundamentally shape how public
employees react to situations, building a disciplined context for influencing individuals
within organizational practices and performance effectiveness (Salas, Rosen, &
DiazGranados, 2010; Taylor, 2014). While this research is not directed specifically at the
counterterrorism policy environment, the general lessons from applying social cognitive
theory research may help provide useful insights for understanding why U.S. government
employees working in counterterrorism policy may view terrorism and its causes in
particular ways.
If as according to Bandura (1989, 2001, 2011) perspectives and behaviors of
individuals are shaped through their learning by observing others, then the analysis of
what individual U.S. policymakers believe is the primary cause of terrorism can be
informed by including participant questions that help put their views in context of their
social environment. Their longevity within an organization, or their self-identification
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within specific groups (e.g., professional, academic, political, religious, social), may
provide useful insights for understanding the phenomenon under study.
Cultural Theory
First articulated by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), the primary perspective that
underlies cultural theory is that individuals use a cultural lens, or filter, from which to
view situations. This cultural lens provides a particular ‘worldview’ that influences not
only how situations are perceived, but also impacts decisions made in response to
situations (Douglas, 1985; Wildavsky, 1987). Cultural perspectives are shaped over time
through people’s socialization and daily interactions in two primary dimensions, which
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) called the ‘group’ and ‘grid’ dimensions. The ‘group’
dimension sets up the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ or in the in-group and outgroup, and defines the criteria for interactions, whether positive or negative, between
various groups (Douglas, 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Wildavsky, 1987). The
‘grid’ dimension sets up the conditions by which individuals interact within the groups to
which they belong, including the in-group constraints as well as freedoms for social
behavior and interactions groups (Douglas, 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982;
Wildavsky, 1987). Since culture is the primary, foundational element that defines these
group and grid interactions, according to cultural theory there can be no individual
perceptions absent a cultural framework (Douglas, 1985).
Looking at individual and societal challenges through a cultural perspective is not
new and is recognized within the research community as falling under the constructivist’s
paradigm (Bigo, 2008). The application of the tenets of cultural theory in national
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security policy has a classical legacy, with the writings of Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and
Clausewitz, leveraged by those teaching military strategy to demonstrate the moral and
physical attributes necessary to success in conflict (Lantis, 2009). It is also evident in the
‘clash of civilizations’ approach outlined by Huntington (1996). Beyond just conflict
studies, cultural implications for broader public administration is also recognized as both
a challenge as well as an opportunity (Bigo, 2008; Durodié, 2017; Tansey & O’riordan,
1999; Wright, 2015). It is used in the positive sense to help build a sense of community
(group) that can influence motivation towards achievement of collective goals (Durodié,
2017; Tansey & O’riordan, 1999). In contrast, it can also be a negative factor, driving
wedges between communities, particularly related to ethnicity, that can cause fear and
distrust, which are also clearly demonstrated as powerful influencers and motivators to
action (Tansey & O’riordan, 1999; Wright, 2015). There are academic examples of this
cultural perspective applied in the counterterrorism policy area (Coaffee, 2006; Mythen
& Walklate, 2006). Research shows that how terrorism is framed can have significant
implications for how counterterrorism strategies are developed and applied, and a narrow
cultural lens can be an overly simplistic construction when used to understand terrorism
(Coaffee, 2006; Mythen & Walklate, 2006).
As with social cognitive theory, aspects of cultural theory as outlined by Douglas
and Wildavsky (1982) can be applicable to understanding why particular U.S.
policymakers view the causes of terrorism the way that they do. Research questions that
solicit how policymakers view culture, their own as well as others, may assist in viewing
responses regarding terrorism in context. Cultural awareness, whether through an
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individual’s background, exposure to other cultures besides their own, even foreign
travel, may help provide valuable context regarding individual policymaker’s views on
terrorism and how they might perceive the best approaches to addressing the terrorism
challenge.
Resource Dependency Theory
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) developed resource dependency theory, which has
been used to define and understand the cultures and constraints of organizations
developing and implementing policy options. With theoretical roots in power dependence
relations by Emerson (1962), resource dependency theory is premised on the foundation
that external resources of organizations both bound and influence their activities (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). Since organizations depend on resources, they are the ultimate source
of their structure, functions, operations, and power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Since
rarely do organizations control every aspect of their required resources, they are
dependent on, and interconnected with, other organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Successful business executives and managers are those who understand the linkages
between criticality and scarcity, with the critical resources being those that the
organization must have to function (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Resource dependence theory is not just relevant to the private sector, and its
effects on the nonprofit sector have also been studied (Carroll & Stater, 2008; Kerlin &
Pollak, 2011; Ruggiano & Taliaferro, 2012; Sowa, 2009). Scholars argue that it is one of
the main reasons nonprofit organizations have become more commercialized in recent
times, with increasing competition between private and nonprofit sector, nonprofits are
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using marketization techniques to compete for resources (Carroll & Stater, 2008; Kerlin
& Pollak, 2011; Ruggiano & Taliaferro, 2012; Sowa, 2009). The principles of resource
dependency theory also apply to the public sector and government organizations as well,
where for example at the U.S. federal level, resources are authorized and appropriated by
Congress and managed by and through various Federal departments and agencies (Kraft
& Marks, 2011; George, 2017; Marvel & Marvel, 2008; Seidman, 1998).
Resource dependency theory has been leveraged across a wide spectrum of
organizational research. It has been used in assessing the effects of reorganizations on
companies and non-profits (Kerlin & Pollak, 2011; Seidman, 1998). In addition to
research on private and public-sector organizations, resource dependency theory has also
been applied in the international environment as well (Brechin & Ness; Ren, Gray, &
Kim, 2009). The impact of resource dependency on executive or employee training,
learning, and development, in order to address particular company challenges, is also
well researched (Akrofi, 2016; Macagno, 2013; Menon, 2012). Aspects of leadership,
including for senior executives, board members, managers, and team leaders, has also
been analyzed by researchers through the lens of resource dependencies (Chen, Treviño,
& Hambrick, 2009; Terry, 2015; Vandewaerde et al., 2011; Yar Hamidi & Gabrielsson,
2014). Beyond addressing those in leadership or management of organizations,
understanding the decision-making factors and processes of general employees has also
been reviewed through aspects of resource dependency theory, including on how these
individual decisions impact broader organizational initiatives (Drees & Heugens, 2013;
Huse, 2008; Nemati et al., 2010; Nienhüser, 2008). Finally, understanding potential
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organizational influences on policy development has also leveraged resource dependency
theory, addressing how government can offset or augment organizations ability to
diversify across their resource base (Rivas, 2012; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012)
U.S. government departments and agencies depend on resources obtained in order
to function. The U.S. Congress serves as the resource provider to federal public
institutions, with financial resources distributed and overseen through the annual
authorization and appropriation process. As such, key elements of Pfeffer and Salancik’s
(1978) resource dependency theory can directly apply to U.S. government policymakers,
and Congressional resource constraints may influence executive branch decision making,
including in counterterrorism. Research questions that solicit individual knowledge
regarding their own organizations counterterrorism authorities can help provide insights
into whether individual perceptions on the cause of terrorism might be influenced by the
authorities and tools available in the policymaker’s organizational environment.
Groupthink Theory
Many non-academics may recognize the term ‘groupthink’ from George Orwell’s
(1950) classic fictional tale of the dystopian future, and it was further highlighted by
Whyte (1952) as ‘rationalized conformity’ where the values of the group become
inherently right and true precisely because it is the group’s position. Within the academic
community, however, it is Janis (1971, 1972, 1982, 1989) who refined the concept and
further developed it as groupthink theory as a lens used to define and understand
individuals functioning within bureaucracies that limit policy development and
evaluation of options. Janis defines groupthink as a psychological phenomenon where
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individuals in a group setting faced with a collective challenge drive to build harmony
and consensus, while at the same time minimizing in-group conflict and suppressing
dissent (Janis, 1972, 1982). Individuals in the group unconsciously (or are pressured
consciously) to avoid identifying alternative options to the group for fear of being outside
the norm (Janis, 1972, 1982). This can result in decisions that do not consider critical
alternatives or viewpoints, blinding the group to potential disastrous consequences (Janis,
1972, 1982). In his original work on groupthink theory, Janis used a case study research
approach to review several key foreign policy failures of the U.S. government, initially
addressing the Roosevelt administration’s failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the Kennedy administration’s Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961
(Janis, 1971, 1972). He subsequently analyzed the Johnson administrations policy for the
Vietnam war from 1964-1967 and other foreign policy failures (Janis, 1982).
Groupthink theory is well known across the organizational research community. It
appears routinely as both a theoretical and a conceptual framework in research seeking to
describe and understand organizational dynamics, particularly the dynamics related to
decision making processes. Growing out of how Janis first used the groupthink
theoretical approach, much of this research is focused on decision making in international
relations (Kertzer & Tingley, 2018; Morin & Paquin, 2018; Schafer & Crichlow, 2010).
However, it has also been expanded to other non-public bureaucratic organizations (Klein
& Stern, 2009; Lunenburg, 2010). Groupthink principles have been used extensively by
researchers to analyze and assess numerous types of organizations beyond just the public
sector, including across a wide variety of private business entities, as well as
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organizations as varied as education, academia, health care, construction, etc. (Hassan,
2013; Klein & Stern, 2009; Lunenburg, 2010; Rose, 2011; Straus, Parker, & Bruce, 2011;
Tuuli, Rowlinson, & Koh, 2010). Groupthink has helped organizational researchers
understand dynamics due to an organization’s size, age, culture, and diversity (Atiyah,
2016; Chung-An, 2014; Sahin, 2014). It is also of note that the particulars of groupthink
theory are not always negative in the foreign policy environment, at least to some
researchers (Monroy & Sánchez, 2017). Sometimes the group cohesiveness and
concurrence-seeking tendencies that are key to groupthink tenants may also be useful for
explaining successful foreign policy decision outcomes (Monroy & Sánchez, 2017).
Janis (1972, 1982) described three basic factors that lead to groupthink:
overestimation of the group and its capabilities, closed-minded rationalizing of opposing
options or warnings, and pressures toward uniformity and the illusion of unanimity. All
of these basic factors have unique symptoms (Janis, 1972, 1982). These symptoms,
should they appear during the interview phase of this research, can help explain why
particular views by U.S. counterterrorism policymakers on the causes of terrorism may
exist, especially where common themes or trends are observed within the differing U.S.
government agencies that work in the counterterrorism environment.
Organizational Process Model
The organizational process model is one of three political decision-making
models developed by Graham Allison (1969, 1971) in his assessment of the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis (the others being the rational actors model and the governmental politics
model). The organization process model posits that existing governmental organization,
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structure, and bureaucratic processes limits a nation’s actions, often biasing the final
policy decision outcome (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). In many cases,
decisions by individuals in government are typically constrained to the first proposed
course of action that adequately addresses the issue, successfully achieves consensus, and
best limits short-term uncertainty (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). There are
several key factors indicative in this model. First, leaders break challenges down into
composite parts, usually along organizational lines within the bureaucracy, rather than
deal with the whole challenge (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Second, the first
course of action identified that satisfies the immediate challenge is usually selected,
putting off longer term (and sometimes harder) solutions (Allison, 1971; Allison &
Zelikow, 1999). Third, due to time constraints during a crisis, preexisting structures and
processes govern how the challenge is addressed, which can limit innovation and
creativity in developing possible solutions (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999).
Finally, and in a similar manner, decisions are also effectively limited to pre-existing
plans and pre-developed responses (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999).
Allison’s (1969, 1971) approach for understanding decision making is well
known in the organizational research community (Guilhot, 2016; McConnell, 2016). The
fundamentals of the organizational process model are used in a variety of studies as a key
framework for understanding how foreign policy is made, particularly during crisis
situations (Guilhot, 2016; McConnell, 2016; Redd & Mintz, 2013). Of particular note are
the limitations imposed on decision makers by established bureaucratic structures and
processes (Kuwashima, 2014; Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011). In some cases, processes are
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demonstrated to be both rigid and entrapping, which are self-reinforcing in how they are
used and implemented over time (Kuwashima, 2014; Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011). The
data available to decision makers can also drive decision making into a particular process,
or to a set of planned response options (Masha, 2014; Amason & Mooney, 2008). The
processes used can also be very specific to, and limited by, the type of organization
designated as the lead for option development by the interagency (Barbuto, 2016).
There are many modern examples of Allison’s organizational process model
being used to explain and understand perceived policy failures (Allison, 1969; Allison,
1971). These examples include the George W. Bush administration’s decision-making
process leading to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Mitchell & Massoud, 2009; Smith,
2008b). The Obama administration’s decisions regarding the troop surge into
Afghanistan in 2009 and the Libyan intervention in 2011 have also been assessed using
the organizational process model (Blomdahl, 2016; Marsh, 2014). Other foreign policy
environments, such as in southeast Asia between India and Pakistan, Japan’s security
policymaking, and even policy decision making in the European Union, have all been
assessed using Allison’s model (Allison, 1969; Allison, 1971; Chowdhury & Islam, 2017;
Howe, 2010; Zahariadis, 2013). Allison himself applied his organizational process model
in 2012 by assessing the U.S. policy towards Iran in the area of Obama administration
efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (Allison, 2012).
U.S. government departments and agencies depend on organizational structures
and policy processes to address policy challenges, whether long-term and enduring or
emergent or in a crisis. Therefore, Allison’s (1969, 1971) organizational process model
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can be useful in understanding perspectives of U.S. policymakers within the various
departments and agencies that work counterterrorism policy. The individual perspectives
on the causes of terrorism of these policymakers may be impacted by the organizational
factors outlined by Allison (1969, 1971). These factors, such as sub-dividing the
challenge among different organizations, or a focus on immediate versus longer-term
solutions, or use of pre-existing options, lend themselves to tailored research questions to
help provide contextual insights into individual study participant perceptions on the cause
of terrorism.
Gap in Research
Insights into senior decision making relative to counterterrorism policy exist
(Klaidman, 2012; Mann, 2012; Sanger, 2012; Wolff, 2018; Woodward, 2007;
Woodward, 2011). The policy decision making by the George W. Bush administration in
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, including the decisions to conduct military operations in
Afghanistan and the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003, were addressed by well know
authors (Woodward, 2007; Woodward, 2011). Several books provided interviews and
insights into the workings of the Obama administration, covering critical foreign policy
decisions related to Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the counterterrorism decision making
surrounding drone strikes in Africa and the Middle East (Klaidman, 2012; Mann, 2012;
Sanger, 2012). The latest example of such insight is that into the Trump administration
following its first year in office (Wolff, 2018). While these sources may be based on firsthand accounts and contain rich detail, journalistic standards are not the same as those
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necessary for a scholarly approach and do not use acceptable research methodologies
(Kassop, 2013).
There is academic research into U.S. counterterrorism policies. Of particular
interest is the policy for the use of drone strikes in Africa and the Middle East (Cronin,
2010; Desch, 2010). The policies for aggressively engaging threats posed by terrorists
against Americans and U.S. interests were very similar between the George W. Bush and
Obama administrations (Desch, 2010; Goldsmith, 2009; Jackson, 2015a; Pilecki, Muro,
Hammack, & Clemons, 2014). These and other counterterrorism policies demonstrates
empirical evidence of some consistency among the U.S. political elite regarding
perspectives on terrorism over the last decade (Cronin, 2010; Cronin, 2013; Goldsmith,
2009; Stern, 2015). Most studies related to U.S. counterterrorism policy use historical
archival research, or textual analysis from speeches, policy pronouncements, or policy
documents, including little or no analysis of actual qualitative interviews of U.S.
government counterterrorism policy experts (Jackson, 2011; Jackson, 2015a; Jackson,
2015b Pilecki, Muro, Hammack, & Clemons, 2014; Sageman, 2014).
There are research studies in specific areas of counterterrorism policy where
interviews of government or military officials have been conducted. As an example,
Jordan, Kosal, and Rubin (2016) conducted extensive interviews with U.S. government
officials regarding views on counterterrorism policy, finding that ‘kinetic activity’ (i.e.,
military strikes against terrorist targets) is the predominant, sometimes default option.
Interview data from government officials suggest that the Internet’s value to terrorists as
a source of practical knowledge is overblown (Kenney, 2010). Current and former
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military drone pilots who have participated in executing strikes against terrorists in Africa
and the Middle East have been queried regarding their personal experiences (Bentley,
2018). Federal, state, and metropolitan police officials who work in counterterrorism
programs have also been interviewed to understand their perspectives on the
effectiveness of various counterterrorism initiatives (Nussbaum, 2012; Ortiz, Hendricks,
& Sugie, 2007).
However, real questions still exist for scholars as to what factors influence the
development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies (Jackson, 2011;
Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). A gap in research existed at the intersection where
academic theories meet the reality of individual U.S. government employees who
develop, influence, and implement counterterrorism policy. Most studies related to this
area use historical archival research and little analysis of actual field interviews
(Sageman, 2014). Kassop (2013) suggested that scholars need to conduct detailed
research, including collecting data from current and past government counterterrorism
officials, to confirm and explain actual factors that may influence the decision process
regarding counterterrorism policy more fully.
Summary
The purpose of this literature review was to examine in depth the academic
research available to help frame the understanding of individual perspectives on the
causes of terrorism of U.S. government policymakers who work in key U.S. government
organizations that develop and shape counterterrorism policy, programs, and initiatives.
This literature review first provided a baseline description of the policymaking process
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within the U.S. government, focusing on particular implications to counterterrorism
efforts. It then systematically addressed the key elements of who, what, and why that is
necessary to fully understand the selected phenomenon of interest. The scope of who
describes the four key organizations that are the focus of this study—State Department,
Defense Department, USAID, and the NCTC—including details about their unique
histories, organizational structures, cultures, roles, and responsibilities within the U.S.
counterterrorism policymaking process. Several additional key outside influencers of
U.S. policymaking were also described to provide additional context for this research—
Congress, think tanks, lobbyists, and the media.
The what leverage six generally recognized theories used within academia to
understand the causes of terrorist—religious ideology, root causes, state sponsorship,
failed states, rational choice, and group dynamics—each of which contain a wide body of
academic writing and research regarding their unique assumptions, underlying factors,
and suggested approaches and tools for mitigation. These six theories provide the
theoretical framework upon which is study is based. The broader issue as to why
individual policymakers have particular perceptions regarding specific causes of
terrorism provides the conceptual framework of this study. This conceptual framework
leverages five theories recognized in academia for their applicability to understanding
either individual or organizational influence on decision making—social cognitive
theory, cultural theory, resource dependency theory, groupthink theory, and the
organizational process model.
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This literature review clearly demonstrates the research gap that exists at the
intersection where academic theories on the causes of terrorism meets the reality of the
actual perceptions of individual U.S. policymakers. Qualitative data collected from
current U.S. government counterterrorism officials, particularly at the mid-to-senior
levels of the career civil service, sheds important light on the actual perspectives that
inform and influence the current decision-making process regarding U.S.
counterterrorism policy. The nature of this study is therefore based on a qualitative
research methodology, since it is a solid approach for exploring and understanding the
meaning derived by individuals or groups associated with a social or human
phenomenon. The next chapter describes in detail how a phenomenological research
strategy of inquiry allowed the investigation, analysis, and understanding of these
individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism and helped frame them within the
broader context of individual or organizational influences.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
The purpose of this study is to understand the linkages between theory and
application, specifically the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories
regarding the causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism
policymaking organizations. To address this gap, I used a qualitative approach through
individual interviews and a participant questionnaire to analyze U.S. policymakers’
perspectives within organizational cultures and assess the impact on U.S.
counterterrorism policy. The first section of the chapter provides an overview of the
research design, including a rationale for why this type of research approach was selected
for this study. The second section outlines the role of the researcher as the observer,
which includes how potential researcher perspectives and biases were minimized and
mitigated. The third section outlines the study methodology, including participant
selection, the basis for instrument development and deployment, details regarding
recruiting participants, the collection of qualitative data through individual interviews and
a survey questionnaire, a detailed data analysis plan, and issues of trustworthiness,
including ethical procedures. This chapter concludes with a brief summary and transition.
Research Design and Rationale
Research Questions
To bridge the gap in knowledge by exploring, understanding, and
explaining the perspectives regarding the causes of terrorism of professionals working in
key U.S. counterterrorism policymaking organizations, this phenomenological research
study addressed one central research question: To what extent do individual perspectives
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on the causes of terrorism among U.S. policymakers, and the possible influences on these
views due to personal factors, organizational cultures, and interagency bureaucracies,
impact the shaping of U.S. counterterrorism policy? The following five subquestions
were also considered, further amplifying the central research question:
SQ1: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align
with existing academic theories?
SQ2: To what extent can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be
understood through individual factors related to personal experience?
SQ3: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced
by existing bureaucratic cultures in specific U.S. counterterrorism policymaking
organizations?
SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected
between and among the key policymaking organizations?
SQ5: To what extent do these perspectives impact the shaping of U.S.
counterterrorism policy?
Central Concept of the Study
Recommendations regarding U.S. counterterrorism policy are developed within
the principal foreign policymaking organizations of the U.S. government’s executive
branch. Specific worldviews and diverse terrorism theories emphasize different
fundamental approaches, activities, and tools necessary to achieve success in mitigating
the threats posed by terrorism. Which theory regarding the causes of terrorism a
particular policymaker or policy professional holds is influenced by personal experience,
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including factors such as professional expertise, academic education, career progression,
cultural awareness, and personal relationships. The effects of individual perspectives
regarding the causes of terrorism may also be impacted when these views are not merely
personal but are influenced by broader organizational cultures and bureaucratic structures
that are reflected across institutions.
How personal factors and organizational cultures impact career policymakers’
decision-making is unclear, with potentially significant implications for the development
and implementation of U.S. national counterterrorism policies and programs. Incorrectly
applying counterterrorism tools to address terrorism based on one theoretical frame could
be ineffective and may exacerbate the terrorist problem if different organizations attempt
to apply tools from conflicting theoretical frames simultaneously.
Research Tradition and Rationale
The nature of this study was a qualitative, which provided a solid approach for
exploring and understanding the meaning derived by individuals or groups associated
with a social or human problem (see Creswell, 2014). I explored individual
counterterrorism policy professionals’ worldviews regarding how they define the
underlying causes of terrorism. A naturalistic approach associated with a social
construction perspective provided an appropriate research design to focus on how
individuals perceive the world and how they interpret meaning based on their experiences
(see Rubin & Rubin, 2012).
A qualitative phenomenological research design allowed me to investigate,
analyze, and understand policymakers’ worldviews and potential organizational biases.
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Viewing study participants both individually and organizationally, factoring in shared
participant experiences, authorities, and resources, allowed me to observe unique
bureaucracies and provided insights into the impact of the phenomenon on U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
Role of the Researcher
My role in this study was to serve as an observer-participant conducting one-onone interviews and administering queries and probes as necessary (see Ravitch & Carl,
2016; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). I also deployed a one-page survey questionnaire to each
interview participant prior to the start of each data collection session. I had the sole
responsibility for performing the study, including selecting participants, gaining and
documenting their informed consent, conducting interviews, collecting and processing
the data, analyzing the results, and preparing the findings. All participants were presented
with the same interview questions and questionnaire, and I served as the sole instrument
for obtaining their verbal and written responses (Knox & Burkard, 2009; Lavis, 2010). I
leveraged my familiarity and experience with the topic to create a climate of familiarity
that enabled participants to provide insightful and nuanced responses (see Moustakas,
1994).
I am a career member of the federal civil service and have worked for the U.S.
government in various capacities for over 32 years, including the last 17 years in
Washington, D.C. working in policy development and implementation in the area of
counterterrorism. I actively participated in interagency policymaking during the last 15
years. This experience assisted me during individual interview sessions because I am
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knowledgeable about policy processes, procedures, vocabulary, organizations, and
bureaucratic interactions, which enabled me to develop trust and confidence with
participants. There are benefits in selecting a topic or setting in which the researcher
identifies and participates (Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999).
I recognize that as a former member of the U.S. counterterrorism policy
community I have a particular worldview and personal perspective regarding causes of
terrorism, and that I may have had inherent bias in my role as a researcher. Care was
taken to ensure balance and objectivity in the interviewing and data collection process.
The bias risk was mitigated through several careful procedures, including recording and
transcribing verbatim all interviews, and by using the same interview questions with
limited and constrained probes with every participant. Given my background in the field,
it was possible that some study participants knew about me, and some had worked with
me in various official capacities related to policy topics. However, I did not have any
relationship with participants outside of the standard work-related engagement or beyond
the normal interactions conducted within the professional policy environment. I did,
however, leverage my access, placement, and previous professional relationships across
the interagency, which helped me recruit suitable participants.
Methodology
Participants and Selection Logic
The purpose of the study was understanding perspectives of current U.S.
government policymakers working in key offices within the principal foreign policy
organizations responsible for developing and implementing counterterrorism policy.
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These include the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for
International Development, and the National Counter-Terrorism Center. Although the
names of participants were included as part of the data collection process, individual
names were not included when transcripts were made from the recorded interview
sessions. In addition, individual participant names were not recorded in the process of
deploying and collecting the individual survey questionnaires. No participants are
identified by name in this study. Themes and findings arising from the data analysis are
only characterized based on organization, not individual names.
The participant selection criteria were individuals employed in one of the four
U.S. federal organizations responsible for developing and implementing counterterrorism
policy. The sampling for participants for interviews was not random but was targeted to
include interested and cooperative employees with more than 8-10 years of government
experience whose work included development and implementation of counterterrorism
policies within these organizations. The criteria for exclusion were political appointees,
because of their short-term experience within government.
The sample included participants from the four organizations that lead U.S.
counterterrorism policymaking. Between six and eight individual interviews were
conducted per organization, translating into 31 total participants across all four
organizations. Although the broader policymaking entities of these organizations consist
of 300-400 individuals each, those working specifically on counterterrorism policy is a
subset within these policy organizations. I assumed that the sample of 31 participants
would enable data saturation (see Mason, 2010).
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Given my current position, I had unique access and placement to enable me to
contact the subject counterterrorism organizations, identify and recruit participants, and
collect the data. Participants were identified through a three-step process. In Step 1, I
contacted former professional colleagues in each of the four organizations. This
engagement was conducted in person so the scope and purpose of the research could be
fully explained. Colleagues’ advice was solicited in identifying the appropriate office
managers or supervisors. Step 2 was contacting the identified office managers or
supervisors to obtain permission to address them and their staff via e-mail to explain the
scope and purpose of the research, build interest and cooperation, and recruit participants.
Those interested then responded with their contact information, enabling follow-up
engagement for scheduling individual interviews.
Step 3 was contacting the list of potential study candidates via e-mail using a
study invitation template (see Appendix C) that was tailored to match details for each
organization. Once suitable and willing participants for the study were identified,
individual consent was then obtained to ensure transparency in how the information
collected in the research project was to be managed. This consent required approval by
the Walden University institutional review board (IRB). The Walden University’s
approval number for this study is 11-21-18-0545148. Informed consent was required
from each study participant and was obtained in writing using a consent form template.
As a qualitative research project, it was difficult to predict exactly how many
interviews and participants were required for this study to be statistically significant,
since a standard used for quantitative research doesn’t directly apply for qualitative
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methods (see Baker, Edwards, & Doidge, 2012). For a qualitative research methodology,
Baker, Edwards, and Doidge (2012) stress that researchers should solicit data from
interviews until different answers to research questions are no longer received (Baker,
Edwards, & Doidge, 2012). Some research suggests that saturation can occur in a typical
qualitative research study within six to twelve interviews (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson,
2006). The research goal of this study followed the concept that saturation occurred when
the collection of new data did not add any additional input to the qualitative themes
identified as part of this project (see Mason, 2010).
Instrumentation
Two researcher-developed instruments were used for data collection in this study.
The first instrument was a series of structured but open-ended questions that relate to
each of the five subquestions that amplify the central research question. The interview
questions consisted of several questions to address each of the five research subquestions.
The interview questions were deployed in a semi-structured manner, with probes used
only as necessary to provide clarification to participant responses (Creswell, 2014; Knox
& Burkard, 2009; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999). Use of
a semi-structured format for interviews allowed participants to respond to the questions in
a full narrative based on their unique perspective and experience, and therefore did not
limit responses to pre-determined answers (Knox & Burkard, 2009; Morse & Field,
1995). I conducted all interview sessions as the researcher in face-to-face settings, and all
were fully audio recorded for later transcription and analysis (Creswell, 2014; Rubin &
Rubin, 2012; Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999).
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The second data collection instrument was a survey questionnaire that was also
deployed to each interview participant. This secondary instrument collected information
related to the participant’s individual background (see Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte,
1999). The questionnaire included information related to organization of employment,
years of service, work experience (e.g., career field, amount of service overseas), scope
of international travel, cultural awareness, level of education (e.g., level of degree(s),
academic field), and level of religiosity. This secondary instrument provided broader
context to assist in understanding the factors that lead to the development of individual
worldviews and perspectives regarding the causes of terrorism due to individual or
organizational influence (Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999).
A small pilot study involving two participants was conducted prior to the formal
data collection to assist in refining the interview questions and questionnaire (see
Creswell, 2012). This pilot involved two professional peers from my organization’s
leadership and professional development office. The pilot study was used to determine
whether the planned questions for the interviews were ambiguous, leading, or
insufficiently open to address the fundamental aspects of the five research subquestions
and the central research question.
Data Collection Plan
Rooms were arranged and scheduled at three of the four departments or agencies
selected for this study within which the individual interview sessions were conducted.
The rooms were all small conference rooms or training rooms, each with chairs as well as
small, classroom type tables upon which the recording equipment was placed. Special
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permission was obtained to use recording equipment. This wasn’t problematic, as each of
the departments or agencies identified had facilities already dedicated for the execution of
professional development and training, or for public affairs interviews with the media.
The recording equipment consisted of a laptop computer with an external microphone in
order to enhance the quality of audio recordings. I operated this recording equipment in
my role as the researcher, having successfully tested and deployed it during the pilot
study discussed above.
The entire interview data collection occurred over a period of 13 weeks, from
February through May 2019, with each of the four departments or agencies occurring on
separate weeks. A week or two separated the interviews between organizations, allowing
for the collation and management of the data recordings and survey questionnaires.
Arrangements were made with each department or agency to conduct the individual
interviews during normal work hours (i.e., 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.) over two to three
consecutive days. This minimized the impact on the organizations as well as simplified
the data collection by the researcher. The average duration of each of the individual
interview sessions was 30-45 minutes.
As expected, the existing pool of U.S. counterterrorism policy professionals
within each of the four selected departments or agencies provided a robust pool of
participants that were interested and willing to volunteer for the study. Office managers
proved extremely helpful in recruiting a suitable number of participants from the
organizations identified. Other than re-iterating the parameters and confidentiality of the
consent agreement during each interview, no debriefings or exit procedures from the
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study were conducted. There was no requirement for follow-up procedures or follow-on
interviews with the participants.
Data Analysis Plan
The data analysis plan for this research consisted of two parts. First was the
analysis of the transcript data collected from the individual interviews. The interview
questions were divided into three general parts, each part consisting of a series of
questions: individual perspectives, collective influences and biases, and interdepartmental similarities and differences. Each of the three parts were initially analyzed
separately through qualitative methods, with results compared as appropriate. Transcript
data from each interview session was organized by question and response, with each
individual answer sentence coded for descriptive identifiers (i.e., first cycle), further
coded for concept identifiers (i.e., second cycle), and then grouped by categories (i.e.,
third cycle) that emerged from the qualitative analysis. General themes were then
identified (i.e., fourth cycle) and assessed, first within the parameters of each subresearch
question (e.g., individual views on terrorism, potential individual or organizational
influences) to identify analytic trends, with assessed similarities, differences, or gaps,
identified for further analysis.
As discussed above, the sample size consists of six to eight individual participants
within each organization, for a total sample size of 31 individuals. As planned, each
individual interviews lasted on average 30-45 minutes, which translated into
approximately 25 hours of recorded transcript data. The volume of data did not preclude
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the use of a manual coding process, but the commercially available software tool NVIVO
12 was also used to assist the qualitative analysis process.
Additional data was also collected from each participant prior to each interview
through a short, written survey questionnaire. These questions, numbering 20, solicited
background information, such as information related to education level and type, years of
employment, work experience, amount of international travel or service overseas, cultural
awareness, and level of religiosity. This quantitative data was collected and organized in
a combined data set and analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics 25. The quantitative data
from the survey questionnaire was organized by organization (i.e., individuals were
anonymized in the data set), and it provided context for the collected qualitative interview
data. Use of the survey questionnaire assisted in a fuller understanding of the factors that
lead to the development of individual worldviews and perspectives regarding the causes
of terrorism, as well as organizational factors or biases, and other educational or
experiential influence.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness was addressed through the four standard factors described by
Anney (2014), Bitsch (2005), and Shenton (2004). Regarding credibility, which is
focused on the internal validity of this research, there is clear and credible alignment
between this study’s problem statement, research purpose, research questions, and
methodology (see Anney, 2014; Shenton, 2004). This ensured that the qualitative data
collected and analyzed actually addressed what was intended (Anney, 2014, p. 276). The
use of multiple participants within a single organization, and then including participants

103
from multiple organizations, provided a level of triangulation that strengthened the
analytic results and conclusions of this study (Toma, 2014; Tracy, 2010). For
transferability, although individual study participants were not identified by name in this
study, participants are appropriately described to sufficiently highlight their collective
involvement in the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy. This
demonstrated the specific context of the data collection and allows other researchers or
readers of this study to be able to compare and contrast the analytic results with other
relevant research studies (Anney, 2014, p. 276; Bitsch, 2005, p. 75; Shenton, 2004, p.
70).
To ensure dependability, strong data collection and management techniques were
used throughout this process, including audio recordings of all interview sessions,
documented transcripts from each audio file, digitally scanned copies of every survey
questionnaire, demonstrating for subsequent research a level of confidence that a similar
research project would yield similar analytic results (see Anney, 2014; Bitsch, 2005;
Shenton, 2004). Finally, confirmability was addressed through the research plan,
demonstrating the manner in which interviews were conducted, the process and
procedures used to collect and process the qualitative data, and logic used in the analysis
of the data and development of findings and recommendations, mitigated risk of
researcher bias tainting the analytic results (Anney, 2014, p. 279; Shenton, 2004, p. 72;
Tobin & Begley, 2004, p. 392).
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Ethical Procedures
Once participants for the study were identified, consent was formally obtained in
writing to ensure transparency in how the information collected in this research was
managed. Research did not proceed until formal approval by the Walden University IRB
was obtained. In accordance with the highest standards of qualitative research methods,
the identities, rights, and needs of each study participant were respected and protected
(see Creswell, 2013). After IRB approval, each participant was fully informed of the
objectives of the research in writing on the consent form and reminded verbally prior to
the start of every individual interview session. The fact that study participation was
voluntary was stressed, as was the fact that participation and interview responses would
remain anonymous, with individuals only identified by a numeric participant code. A
single digital master file linking individual participant names with their assigned numeric
participant code was kept by the researcher on a single password-protected laptop, and
this file was deleted once the requirements of the dissertation was completed.
Audio files from every interview was stored on the single password-protected
laptop computer belonging to the researcher. The individual audio files were only
identified by the participant code and were transmitted to the commercial online service
REV for transcription into Word documents. At no time did transcript files identify a
particular individual, neither in the file name nor in the document text. Each participant
was also provided a digital copy of their respective transcript if requested, enabling them
to review, verify, and approve its use in the research. Digital copies of all audio files were
deleted once the requirements of the dissertation were fully completed.
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The handwritten survey questionnaire data also did not identify a particular
individual by name, but were only identified using the participant code discussed above.
Each handwritten survey was scanned into an individual PDF digital file for storage, with
hardcopies of the surveys destroyed once this scanning was completed. Data from these
surveys was subsequently input manually by the researcher into a quantitative data set
using IBM SPSS Statistics 25, where it was collectively stored, organized, and analyzed.
All individual interview transcripts, as well as the digitally stored survey questionnaires,
remain on the researcher’s password-protected laptop for a period of five years as
required by Walden University.
Summary
The methodology described in this chapter summarizes the research steps that
were taken for data collection, organization, analysis, and protection, to enable research
to understand the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories regarding the
causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism policymaking
organizations. The qualitative approach described, informed by the collected quantitative
survey questionnaire data, enabled well-grounded academic research into individual
policymakers perspectives, within the context of organizational bureaucracies and
cultures, to quantify impacts on U.S. counterterrorism policy.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this study was to understand the linkages between theory and
application, specifically the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories
regarding the causes of terrorism among professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism
policymaking organizations. To address this gap, I used a qualitative approach through
individual interviews and participant questionnaires to analyze individual perspectives
within and across organizational cultures and to assess the impact on U.S.
counterterrorism policy. The research question addressed in this study was as follows: To
what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism among U.S.
policymakers, and the possible influences on these views due to personal factors,
organizational cultures, and interagency bureaucracies, impact the shaping of U.S.
counterterrorism policy? There were five subquestions that were used to amplify the
central research question:
SQ1: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align
with existing academic theories?
SQ2: To what extent can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be
understood through individual factors related to personal experience?
SQ3: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced
by existing bureaucratic cultures in specific U.S. counterterrorism policymaking
organizations?
SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected
between and among the key policymaking organizations?
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SQ5: To what extent do these perspectives impact the shaping of U.S.
counterterrorism policy?
The first section of this chapter provides the analytic context, including the setting
for the participants and organizations, key demographics of those interviewed, an
overview of the data collected, and highlights from the data analysis process. The second
section addresses trustworthiness through evidence of credibility, transferability,
dependability, and confirmability. The third section presents the study’s results and
provides a summary of the emerging themes from the data analysis. These results are
then discussed in more detail, highlighting the observed themes for how terrorism is
viewed, the potential impact of personal and organizational influences, commonality and
differences across the interagency, and overall U.S. counterterrorism policy. This chapter
concludes with a brief summary and transition.
Analytic Context
The analytic context includes the setting for the participants and organizations,
key demographics of those interviewed, an overview of the data collected, and highlights
from the data analysis process.
Setting
I conducted one-on-one interviews with study participants from four separate U.S.
government organizations involved in counterterrorism policy in the Washington, D.C.
area over a period of 13 weeks from February through May 2019. I used a semistructured
interview format, including 11 standardized questions (see Appendix A) to enable study
participants to describe their perspectives on a range of terrorism-related issues. To
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provide a sense of familiarity, comfort, and privacy, I conducted the interviews at
participants’ respective home agency in small conference rooms. Interviews lasted
between 30 and 45 minutes, although a few went over 1 hour. Probes and follow-up
questions were used sparingly to gather deeper insights and clarity on initial responses.
Four interviews were conducted over the phone due to the unavailability of a suitable
facility or the participant’s inability to participate in a sit-down, face-to-face interview.
Each participant also provided data from a survey questionnaire that consisted of
20 questions (see Appendix B). These data provided broader individual-specific
background information related to education level and type, years of employment, work
experience, amount of international travel or service overseas, cultural awareness, and
level of religiosity, which provided a broader context from which to analyze the interview
data.
Demographics
A purposeful sampling strategy was employed to identify and recruit current U.S.
government employees and military officers working in counterterrorism policy offices
with at least 8-10 years of overall experience. Of the approximately 100 individuals
contacted, 31 volunteered to participate in the study. Almost 70% were 40 years old or
older, and more than 75% had worked for the federal government more than 10 years.
Half had more than 5 years working counterterrorism policy. Three quarters of the study
participants were male. The sample had a strong academic background, with over 80%
having master’s degrees, multiple master’s degrees, or doctorates. A summary of study
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participant demographics is shown in Table 1. The full demographic data set from the
entire 20-question survey questionnaire is shown in Appendix D.
An overview of the organizational demographics is provided in Table 2. These
data showed that 87% of State Department participants were older than 41 years, and
almost 40% had served in the federal government more than 20 years. Half of the State
Department participants (50% or 4 individuals) had doctoral degrees, almost 90% had
been in more than 16 countries, and almost 40% had served in a foreign post for more
than 10 years. For participants from USAID, 75% were older than 41 years, and 75% had
a master’s degree. The gender split in the USAID participants was 50/50; 75% had served
in the federal government more than 10 years, and 25% had served in a foreign post more
than 10 years. Within OSD, 56% were older than 41 years, and 85% had a master’s
degree. The gender split in OSD was 71% male, 28% female. For the Joint Staff, half of
those participating were under 40 years, and more than 80% had one or more master’s
degrees. There were no women participants from the Joint Staff. Two thirds of the Joint
Staff participants had been in more than 16 countries, and two thirds had been deployed
overseas for more than 5 years. The full demographic data set from the entire 20-question
survey questionnaire is shown in Appendix D.
Data Collection
Interviews were conducted with 31 participants. These included eight from the
State Department, eight from USAID, two from NCTC and from within DoD, seven from
OSD, and six from the Joint Staff. Each study participant signed a consent form and
completed the one-page survey questionnaire. Interviews with the State Department
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Table 1
Study Participant General Demographics
DoD
Category

TOTAL

State

USAID

NCTC

OSD

JS

#

%

20 to 30

1

0

0

1

0

2

6.45

31 to 40

0

2

1

2

3

8

25.81

41 to 50

5

2

1

1

2

11

35.48

51 to 60

2

4

0

2

1

9

29.03

>60

0

0

0

1

0

1

3.23

Male

7

4

1

5

6

23

74.19

Female

1

4

1

2

0

8

25.81

No College

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.00

BA/BS

2

0

1

1

1

5

16.13

MA/MS

2

6

0

6

3

17

54.84

Multiple MA/MS

0

1

1

0

2

4

12.90

PhD/JD

4

1

0

0

0

5

16.13

1 to 10

1

2

1

3

0

7

22.58

11 to 20

4

4

1

1

3

13

41.94

21 to 30

3

2

0

0

2

7

22.58

>30

0

0

0

3

1

4

12.90

0 (None)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.00

1 to 5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.00

6 to 10

0

0

1

1

1

3

9.68

11 to 15

1

0

1

2

1

5

16.13

>16

7

8

0

4

4

23

74.19

Age Range

Gender

Education Level

Years of Federal Service

Number of Countries Visited

Cumulative Years Living/Serving Abroad
0 (None)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.00

1 to 5

4

4

2

5

2

17

54.84

6 to 10

1

2

0

2

3

8

25.81

11 to 15

2

1

0

0

1

4

12.90

>16

1

1

0

0

0

2

6.45
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Table 2
Organizational Demographics Results Overview
State Department Participants
Age Range

Gender
%

Education Level

Years of
Federal Service

Data

#

%

Data

#

Data

#

%

Data

#

%

20-30

1

12.5

Male

7 87.5

No College

0

0

1-10

1 12.5

31-40

0

0

Female

1 12.5

BA/BS

2

25

11-21

4

41-50

5

62.5

MA/MS

2

25

21-30

51-60

2

25

+MA/MS

0

0

>30

>60

0

0

PhD/JD

4

50

Years Living
or Serving
Abroad
Data # %
None

0

0

1-5

4

50

3 37.5

6-10

1 12.5

0

11-15

2

50
0

>16

25

1 12.5

USAID Participants

Data

#

%

Data

#

%

Data

#

%

Data

#

%

Years Living
or Serving
Abroad
Data # %

20-30

0

0

Male

4

50

No College

0

0

1-10

2

25

None

0

0

31-40

2

25

Female

4

50

BA/BS

0

0

11-21

4

50

1-5

4

50

41-50

2

25

MA/MS

6

75

21-30

2

25

6-10

2

25

51-60

4

50

+MA/MS

1

12.5

>30

0

0

11-15

1 12.5

>60

0

0

PhD/JD

1

12.5

>16

1 12.5

Age Range

Gender

Education Level

Years of
Federal Service

NCTC Participants

Data

#

%

Data

#

%

Data

#

%

Data

#

%

Years Living
or Serving
Abroad
Data # %

20-30

0

0

Male

1

50

No College

0

0

1-10

1

50

None

0

31-40
41-50
51-60
>60

1
1
0
0

50
50
0
0

Female

1

50

BA/BS
MA/MS
+MA/MS
PhD/JD

1
0
1
0

50
0
50
0

11-21
21-30
>30

1
0
0

50
0
0

1-5
6-10
11-15
>16

2 100
0 0
0 0
0 0

Age Range

Gender

Education Level

Years of
Federal Service

0

(continued)
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OSD Participants
Age Range

Gender

Data

#

%

Data

20-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
>60

1
2
1
2
1

14.3
28.6
14.3
28.6
14.3

Male
Female

#

%

5 71.4
2 28.6

Education Level

Years of
Federal Service

Data

#

%

Data

#

No College
BA/BS
MA/MS
+MA/MS
PhD/JD

0
1
6
0
0

0
14.3
85.7
0
0

1-10
11-21
21-30
>30

3 42.9
1 14.3
0 0
3 42.9

%

Years Living
or Serving
Abroad
Data # %
None
1-5
6-10
11-15
>16

0 0
5 71.4
2 28.6
0 0
0 0

Joint Staff Participants
Age Range

Gender

Data

#

%

Data

20-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
>60

0
3
2
1
0

0
50
33.3
16.7
0

Male
Female

#

%

6 100
0 0

Education Level

Years of
Federal Service

Data

#

%

Data

#

No College
BA/BS
MA/MS
+MA/MS
PhD/JD

0
1
3
2
0

0
16.7
50
33.3
0

1-10
11-21
21-30
>30

0 0
3 50
2 33.3
1 16.7

%

Years Living
or Serving
Abroad
Data # %
None
1-5
6-10
11-15
>16

0 0
2 33.3
3 50
1 16.7
0 0

participants occurred over three days (February 6, 7, and 12, 2019), and were conducted
in small conference or training rooms in the Harry S. Truman building in Washington,
D.C., the headquarters of the U.S. Department of State. Interviews with the USAID
participants occurred over four days (March 14, 20, 21, and 22, 2019); seven were
conducted in their library in the Ronald Reagan Building & International Trade Center,
the headquarters of USAID in Washington, D.C., and one was conducted over the phone.
Interviews with the two NCTC participants were conducted over the phone on April 22
and 26, 2019. Interviews with the DoD participants from OSD and Joint Staff occurred
over four weeks (April 12 to May 10, 2019), and all but one were conducted in a small
conference room in the Pentagon Library & Conference Center, located adjacent to the
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Pentagon, the headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense in Washington, D.C. One
OSD interview was conducted over the phone on May 6, 2019.
Given my current position, I had unique access and placement that enabled me to
contact the subject counterterrorism organizations, identify and recruit study participants,
and collect the necessary data. Participants were identified and invited through a threestep process. In Step 1, former professional colleagues in each of the four organizations
were contacted by phone, and the scope and purpose of the research were explained.
Colleagues’ advice was then used to identify the appropriate office managers or
supervisors.
The next step was contacting the identified office managers or supervisors to
obtain their permission to conduct the study within their organizational offices. First
contact was made by phone to set up subsequent face-to-face meetings from which to
explain the scope and purpose of the research. Permission from each office manager or
supervisor was obtained via signed letters of cooperation. These were then submitted to
the Walden University’s IRB to obtain formal academic authorization to recruit and
interview study participants.
Once formal IRB authorization was obtained, follow up phone calls or face-toface meetings were conducted with each office manager or supervisor to alert them that
staff recruiting was ready to commence, allowing them to shape how best to recruit
participants from within their respective offices. For the State Department, USAID, and
the Joint Staff, office managers or supervisors had me prepare a group recruiting email
which they then forwarded to their own staff on my behalf. For OSD, office managers or
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supervisors provided me a list of names and contact information for me to e-mail directly
from among their staff to recruit participants. My recruiting e-mails leveraged the
template shown in Appendix C, with minor deviations to personalize it for individuals
and organizations. Participants then responded directly to me via e-mail or phone
indicating their willingness to participate.
Recruiting at NCTC posed a challenge. Office managers were contacted directly,
and while supportive, none were willing to sign a letter of cooperation. Their referrals to
the NCTC public affairs office ended with no follow through, and numerous attempts to
gain support and approval failed. A follow up recruitment plan for NCTC was
subsequently developed and approved by the Walden University IRB, authorizing me to
contact NCTC employees directly outside of business hours. Eight NCTC employees
were contacted by phone, but only two were willing to volunteer to be participants.
Once volunteers for the study were identified, interviews were scheduled using
both phone and e-mail. Scheduling emails included the consent form, survey
questionnaire, and instructions regarding the conduct of the interview. Prior to the start of
all interviews, the consent form was reviewed, and a signature obtained, the completed
survey questionnaire (at Appendix B) was collected, and the basics of the interview
recording was reviewed. The audio recording then started, and the interviews were
conducted using the questions shown in Appendix A. Upon completion of the interview,
the audio recording was terminated, and the participant thanked. Audio files were
uploaded to the commercial transcription service REV at the end of the day, resulting in
interview transcriptions in MS Word file format being received within 12 to 24 hours. A
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“thank you” e-mail (shown at Appendix C) was sent to each participant within one to two
days of the interview, with a digital copy of the audio transcription MS Word file
attached for those participants who had requested a copy be provided.
Although the venue for interviews changed by organization, basic parameters
remained the same, either using a small conference or training room that enabled private,
one-on-one discussions, or having a private, one-on-one phone conversation. No unusual
or unexpected circumstances were encountered in the data collection process.
Data Analysis
In completing the goals of this phenomenological study, the analysis of data
collected was critical in understanding the perspectives of current U.S. government
policymakers regarding the causes of terrorism and the impacts on the development and
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Data analysis was conducted in four
specific phases. First was the preparation phase to prepare the raw data, in the form of
recorded audio files, to a format enabling qualitative analysis (see Patton, 2014; Richards
& Morse, 2013; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). Audio files were transcribed using REV, a webbased commercial transcription service, which converted the audio MP4 digital files into
Microsoft Word documents (see Rubin & Rubin, 2012). These Word documents were
then organized in two formats for later analytic processing: individual interview files,
maintained in file folders corresponding to the organization of the participant; and
individual question files, where all the interview responses for every participant within
each organization for each interview question were combined into a single narrative file.

116
This phase also included the conversion of data results from the individual survey
questionnaires into a dataset created using the IBM SPSS Statistics 25 software tool.
Creation of this dataset was done manually. This dataset enabled broader context from
which to analyze the collected qualitative interview data, which assisted in deeper
understanding of factors related to participants’ perspectives on the causes of terrorism,
including organizational factors or biases, and other educational or experience-related
influence.
Second was the coding phase, which was done manually using Microsoft Excel
spreadsheets organized by participant, their organization, and interview question. The
first coding pass on the data reviewed the text from every interview in detail (see Miles,
Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Saldaña, 2016; Yin, 2011). Key
words and phrases from each of the 11 interview questions were identified and recorded
in the Excel spreadsheet. In the second coding pass, identified key words and phrases
across participants within specific organizations for each question were reviewed and
refined, resulting in the identification of specific categories to summarize or generalize
first coding pass results (see Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014; Rubin & Rubin, 2012;
Saldaña, 2016; Yin, 2011). The third coding pass addressed identified categories, pulling
out noted themes for each of the interview questions, structured within organizations (see
Richards & Morse, 2013; Rossman & Rallis, 2003; Saldaña, 2016). The fourth coding
pass focused on the interview question files, where, as discussed above, all the participant
responses within a single organization were blended and combined into a single narrative
file.
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Third was the review phase, where analysis moved above the individual data and
codes and focused exclusively on categories and themes identified within organization
for each interview question (see Richards & Morse, 2013; Rossman & Rallis, 2003;
Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Saldaña, 2016). Using the NVIVO 12 software tool, identified
categories and themes from the manual coding process outlined above were further
reviewed to highlight particular word counts, as well as assess word linkages and
associations. This additional analysis was performed leveraging the capabilities provided
by NVIVO 12, using the combined narrative files created for each question, which were
organization based. This further analysis reassessed and refined identified categories and
themes highlighted in the manual coding process described above (see Richards &
Morse, 2013; Rossman & Rallis, 2003; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Saldaña, 2016). Categories
and themes were modified as necessary to accommodate the additional analytic insights
identified through the use of NVIVO 12.
Fourth and finally was the results phase, where themes identified for each of the
three research subquestions were presented as the analytic interpretation of the research
findings to increase understanding into the perspectives of current U.S. government
policymakers on the causes of terrorism and impacts on development and implementation
of U.S. counterterrorism policy. These results are presented in the analytic results section
that follows.
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Evidence of Trustworthiness
As outlined in chapter 3, trustworthiness was addressed through the four standard
factors described by Anney (2014), Bitsch (2005), and Shenton (2004). How each factor
was addressed and successfully achieved is discussed below.
Credibility
Regarding credibility, the internal validity of this research, there is clear and
credible alignment between this study’s problem statement, research purpose, research
questions, and methodology, which was maintained throughout the course of the data
collection and analysis process (see Anney, 2014, p. 276; Shenton, 2004). This ensured
that qualitative data collected throughout the one-on-one interviews with participants, as
well as the quantitative data collected via the survey questionnaires, fully addressed what
was intended for this study (see Anney, 2014). The use of multiple participants within
each organization, and including participants from across the multiple organizations,
provided a strong level of triangulation that strengthened the analytic results and
conclusions of this study (Toma, 2014; Tracy, 2010).
Transferability
For transferability, although individual study participants were not identified by
name in this study, participants were appropriately described with a suitable level of
detail to sufficiently highlight their collective involvement in the development and
implementation of counterterrorism policy. This demonstrated the specific context of the
data collection and allows other researchers or readers of this study to be able to compare
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and contrast the analytic results with other relevant studies (Anney, 2014, p. 276; Bitsch,
2005, p. 75; Shenton, 2004, p. 70).
Dependability
To ensure dependability of the study, strong data collection and management
techniques were used throughout this process, including audio recordings of all interview
sessions, documented transcripts from each audio file, and digitally scanned copies of
every survey questionnaire (see Anney, 2014, p. 278; Bitsch, 2005, p. 86; Shenton, 2004,
p. 71). These actions demonstrate to future researchers a level of confidence that a similar
research project would yield similar analytic results (see Anney, 2014; Bitsch, 2005;
Shenton, 2004).
Confirmability
Finally, confirmability was addressed through the research plan, demonstrating
the manner in which interviews were conducted, the process and procedures used to
collect and process the qualitative data, and the logic used in the analysis of the data and
development of findings and recommendations, mitigated risk of researcher bias tainting
the analytic results presented in this study (Anney, 2014, p. 279; Shenton, 2004, p. 72;
Tobin & Begley, 2004, p. 392).
Analytic Results
This study was designed to address a single research question: To what extent do
individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism among U.S. policymakers, and the
possible influences on these views due to personal factors, organizational cultures, and
interagency bureaucracies, impact the shaping of U.S. counterterrorism policy? Five
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subquestions were developed to amplify the central research question, and 11 specific
interview questions were deployed to each participant to gain their individual insights and
perspectives. The interview questions are shown in Appendix A, which also shows how
these interview questions align within the five research subquestions. An overview of the
qualitative themes observed by organization are shown below in Table 3, with a full list
of detailed data categories and themes resulting from the results phase of the data
collection process shown in Appendix E.
An overview of the key analytic themes that emerged is presented below, with
views and quotes from specific study participants (e.g., 104, 302, 505) identified using
the following numeric series structure in order to protect individual identities: 100’s for
the State Department, 200’s for USAID, 300’s for NCTC, 400’s for OSD, and 500’s for
the Joint Staff. A comprehensive presentation of the detailed participant responses to
every interview question from which the analytic themes emerged is also shown in
Appendix F.
Themes Regarding How Terrorism Is Viewed
An individual’s sense of grievances was the theme most expressed across the
majority of participants as the primary cause of terrorism, especially from those within
USAID, OSD, and the Joint Staff (204, 206, 208, 403, 404, 503, 505). Participants
expressed numerous variations on this theme, and stressed that the sense of grievance
could be due to many differing factors, such as perceptions over inequities in status (204,
406, 503, 505), housing (205, 207), or economic opportunity (105, 204, 406, 407).
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Table 3
Summary of Qualitative Themes Observed
Interview Question

State

USAID

NCTC

Important

Medium
Overblown

Medium
Not
Existential

DoD

OSD
JS
SQ1: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align with existing
academic theories?
PersonalGrievances
Inequities
2. What do you feel are
Marginalization
Complex
Motivation
Ideology
Governance
the primary causes of
Grievances
Depends
IndividualNeed
Grievances
terrorism today?
Frustration
Factors
Purpose
Ideology
1. How does the threat of
terrorism equate to other
threats to U.S. national
security?

Not
Existential
Medium
High

Medium

SQ2: To what extent can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be understood through
individual factors related to personal experience?
3. What has had the
greatest influence on
your own understanding
regarding the causes of
terrorism?

Reading
Experience
Living
Abroad

Experience
Reading
Studying

Experience

Experience
Living
Abroad

Experience

SQ3: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced by existing
bureaucratic cultures in specific U.S. counterterrorism policy making organizations?
7. Have your own
perspectives on the
causes of terrorism been
influenced by your
organization?
6. How widely shared is
your view regarding the
causes of terrorism
among others across
your organization?

Somewhat

Very Much

Generally

Very Well
Fairly Well

Not Much
Somewhat

Definitely

*

Somewhat

Very Well
Fairly
Well Not
Sure

Generally

SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected between and
among the key policy making organizations?
5. How well do you
think your organization’s
counterterrorism policy
professionals understand
the causes of terrorism?

Generally
Very Well

Very Well

Somewhat
Incredibly
Well

Very Well
Not Much

Very Well
Medium
(Continued)
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DoD

Interview Question

State

USAID

NCTC

9. How well do you
think counterterrorism
policy professionals that
you work with outside
your organization
understand the causes of
terrorism?

Generally
Very Well

*

Good
Generally

Good

Generally
Varied

10. How much common
understanding regarding
the underlying causes of
terrorism do you see
across the organizations
who work
counterterrorism policy?

Generally

Generally
Somewhat

Somewhat

Generally

Generally
Common
View

OSD
JS
SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected between and
among the key policy making organizations?

SQ5: To what extent do these perspectives impact the shaping of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
4. How could the U.S.
best address the threat of
terrorism?

Consistency

Prevention

Less Strikes
Via Partners

*

Via
Partners
Coalitions

8. How is your
organization enabled or
hindered by its existing
authorities and resources
in addressing terrorism?

Constrained
Limited
Hindered

Hindered

Both
Adequate

Limited

Limited

11. How much do you
think other organizations
working
counterterrorism policy
are enabled or hindered
by their own existing
authorities and resources
in addressing terrorism?

Imbalances
Overlapping

Hindered
Imbalances

Both
Adequate

Hindered

Hindered
Limited

* Note. No Emerging Theme Noted.
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Participant 406 succinctly expressed this as overall “…disenfranchisement and feeling
socially excluded, economically disadvantaged and politically disenfranchised in your
community with no options,” which open populations up to recruitment to terrorist
groups and organizations. Participant 205 referred to broader forces that precluded
normal options, a sense “…that there are forces that they can’t change through the current
system. The only way to really affect the change is to do something drastic.”
Marginalization, whether due to race, ethnicity, language, location, etc., was also
expressed by those interviewed (203, 206, 207, 405, 506) as causing perceptions of
grievance. Several views were like participant 206, who expressed it as “…a sense of
marginalization, lack of inclusion in the political system, grievances, whether they be
individual or whether it’s a group affinity type grievance, seems to be one of the major
drivers.” Lack of governance and personal security was also expressed (206, 406, 503) as
being a major cause of grievance, particularly when combined with physical repression
and arbitrary abuse or punishment threatening individuals’ sense of safety (207, 402,
404). Participants discussed how these grievance factors lead to growing frustrations, a
sense of helplessness, with limited options for improvement, leading in the views of a
majority of participants to the consideration for, and use of, terrorist violence.
However, the view regarding perceived causes of terrorism was not unanimous.
Of note were the views expressed by participants from the State Department, where the
common theme noted (101, 103, 105, 107, 108) was the complexity of the problem set
and its dependence on the unique situations due to local or regional dynamics. Responses
were like that expressed by participant 101: “I think it’s a really complicated process that
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involves everything from economics, sociology, political circumstances, history. In some
cases, it’s not genetic, but family related.” State Department participants also pushed
back on the basic assumption of the question of terrorist causes itself (402 expressed this
view as well), stressing instead that the complexities of the phenomenon of terrorist
violence was set within an elaborate and dynamic structure of individual and family (106,
402), local (104), even regional dependencies (108). Participant 105 said “It’s not just
one or two factors that go into it. It’s more complex than that…” One State Department
participant (101) highlighted examples of extreme differences in terrorist behavior by
siblings growing up in the same situation – one choosing a violent path with the other
not.
The theme of ideology as a cause of terrorism was mentioned by five OSD and
Joint Staff participants (401, 404, 501, 502, 504). A few others (105, 201, 207, 301) also
mentioned the role of ideology in radicalization to terrorist violence. However, ideology
was specifically challenged by several State Department participants as being overly
simplistic an explanation regarding terrorism (101, 103, 107, 108).
Regarding perceived seriousness of the terrorism threat, views by participants
varied. An observed theme that the overall threat of terrorism is medium, but definitely
not existential, was noted in the commonality of responses by participants from USAID,
OSD, and the Joint Staff (203, 205, 206, 207, 401, 403, 405, 406, 501 through 506). The
view expressed by participant 203 was representative of others, who said terrorism is
“Something to keep an eye on, but not something to be so consumed with that all of your
resources flow in that direction.” Both NCTC participants also agreed with this view
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(301, 302). The outliers were again participants from the State Department, where a
variety of perspectives were expressed, with no noted commonality of theme. Some (102,
107) viewed the terrorist threat as high, even existential, but others differed, with one
(108) even having the perspective that the seriousness is “vastly exaggerated.” This last
perspective was shared by two participants from USAID (202, 208), who expressed the
view that the issue is “well overblown.”
Themes Regarding Personal Influences
The most common theme observed from participants regarding what influenced
their own views regarding terrorism was that of experience. Responses were similar to
that of participant 108, who said “Key to my views is the field experience I have had, I
think…” Participant 208 expressed it in a similar manner: “I guess it’s my lived
experience. Interacting with people, both those on, what I would say are extremist
spectrums, or people who have held extreme views on either side of it.” However, the
exact nature of experience was further qualified or refined by participants, who expressed
additional details in numerous ways. The first refinement noted was that highlighting
their professional experience serving in their official capacities, working foreign policy
related portfolios across their careers (105, 107, 302, 401, 404, 406, 501). Participant 401
expressed it as: “Professional experience of studying terrorists and just being involved in
the problem for so long, just that longevity of it…” A nuance on this theme was observed
in responses from USAID participants, who identified their travel experience, specifically
serving in overseas posts, which provided them rich cultural exposure through close
interactions with local populations (202, 203, 204, 205, 206).
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Another variation on the theme of experience was that of living abroad as having
an identified influence on participants in how they viewed terrorism (102, 105, 108, 403,
405). Participant 405 talked about the lived experience: “I think it has to be living abroad
and seeing it, being in these cultures. And living around the people who are fighting it
kind of on the front lines is the biggest one.” In each of these cases, the participants had
served overseas in conflict-prone areas and discussed how this experience living in areas
experiencing terrorist violence influenced their perspectives. The responses from most
the Joint Staff participants (502 through 506 but expressed as well by 201) also discussed
how living abroad influenced their views regarding terrorism, although for each of them
it was specific to their own combat experiences in the context of their deployments
throughout their personal military careers. Participant 502 said: “I would say just my
experience overseas deployed to environments obviously that are ripe for terrorist
organizations because they lack security, because they lacked any sort of government,
and a group.” This view was shared by Participant 504: “I think experience. Seeing it
firsthand, …both in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
While not a common theme, several participants highlighted experience from
violence as having a significant influence on how they view terrorism. Two (106, 207)
related personal experiences related to the 9/11 attack that they said greatly influenced
how they view terrorism. Two others (301, 401) highlighted other firsthand experience
observing terrorist violence with greatly influencing their views on the topic. Two others
(206, 402) related unique childhood experiences as having influenced their views on
terrorism. One (206) discussed the experience of growing up poor in an economically
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challenged region of the U.S., and how this provided unique insight and understanding
into how stressed populations deal with their government. The other (402) talked about
how growing up hearing his father and other Vietnam veterans talk about that conflict
influenced how he looks at foreign policy, especially regarding conflict and terrorism.
Another lesser observed theme was the influence of reading on views regarding
terrorism. This theme was observed in the responses from State Department and USAID
participants (103, 107, 201, 205, but also 407). A couple of participants (104, 206)
refined the theme of reading to that gained through their own academic study. References
to the influence of reading was articulated in ways such as doing “…a lot of reading. I
think just trying to be open to all of the opinions that are out there and being able to
assess it together” (205). One (208) stressed their extensive personal interest and reading
in the subject of history as having a large influence on their views regarding terrorism: “I
guess, I’m a student of history, so that first and foremost as an amateur historian, I am
able to take a long view where terrorism has always been part of the human condition…”
Themes Regarding Bureaucratic or Organizational Influences
Two distinct themes were observed regarding the influence of organizations on
personal views of terrorism. On one hand were the views of 16 participants, who
expressed the perspective that their views had definitely or very much been influenced by
their organizations (102, 107, 201 through 208, 404, 405, 406, 501, 503, 505). The view
expressed by participant 204 was common to many in this group, saying: “Yeah, I think
how it got framed in my head with drivers, etc. It was definitely influenced by the agency
because that was sort of the framework through which to process. So, I think that did
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influence it a lot.” This positive theme was also reflected in the number of participants
(again, a total of 16) who felt their own views regarding terrorism were shared across
their organization very well (102, 106, 202 through 206, 401, 402, 406, 501, 503, 505,
506). While these two groups did not overlay exactly one-to-one, the overlap between
these two views was significant (i.e., 11 of the 16 participants).
Two interesting discrepancies within this theme were noted, with participant 203
stating their views were shared with fellow career civilian coworkers, but not with their
political leadership. Participant 204 expressed a generational difference, with a common
view among younger employees, but not as much common view with their older
colleagues. Three from OSD (403, 405, 407) were not sure whether their own views
regarding the causes of terrorism were shared among their colleagues.
In contrast was the theme by many of the other participants (a total of nine) that
there was not much perceived influence on their individual views on terrorism resulting
from their organization, or at most only somewhat of an influence (101, 103, 104, 105,
301, 403, 502, 504, 506). Participant 105 thought external factors were more important:
“My initial reaction would be to say, it’s probably more shaped by external factors than
internal factors.” In a similar manner, participant 301 answered this question with: “Not
much, no. I feel I actually brought more from the outside based on my personal
experience than what I gained from the bureaucratic experience.” From the broader
perspective, 11 participants also had the more negative view that their own views
regarding terrorism were only somewhat or generally shared among their colleagues
(101, 103, 104, 107, 108, 201, 206, 207, 302, 502, 504). Only one participant (301) said
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that their views regarding terrorism were definitely not shared across their organization:
“I do not believe they share my view very much.”
These views regarding the influence of their organization on their own
perspectives were set within the general context that their coworkers understand the
causes of terrorism very well, a view expressed by a majority (19 total) of participants
(102, 105, 107, 201 through 208, 302, 401, 402, 403, 406, 502, 504, 506). Seven felt their
colleagues generally understood the causes of terrorism (101, 103, 104, 106, 407, 501,
503). There were only three participants (403, 404, 505) who had a divergent view, that
being their counterterrorism policy colleagues did not well understand the causes of
terrorism.
Themes Regarding the Interagency
An overall positive theme emerged from study participants regarding their
perceptions on the level of understanding on the causes of terrorism by their interagency
colleagues. A total of 15 participants had the perception that their counterterrorism policy
colleagues across the interagency understand the causes of terrorism good or very well
(102, 106, 107, 201, 207, 301, 302, 401, 402, 405, 406, 407, 501, 503, 505). Many of
these perspectives were like that expressed by participant 407: “I think there’s a lot of
folks that do have a good understanding.” Several, like participant 207, expressed
perspectives that their interagency colleagues had extensive understanding on the causes
of terrorism – “The level of knowledge, expertise, and also tolerance in the community is
really striking, and I think is underappreciated outside of the community.” Nine
additional participants had the view that their interagency colleagues had a general
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understanding (101, 103, 104, 105, 201, 204, 205, 208, 502). These views were very
similar to how participants assessed the level of understanding regarding terrorism among
colleagues within their own organization. The outlying, divergent views regarding their
interagency colleagues were expressed by several USAID colleagues, but not as a
specific theme. Participant 203 said they didn’t know, and participant 204 had the
perspective that the level of understanding varied across organizations. Participant 206
felt things were improving over time.
Another theme emerged that indicated study participants had the overall
impression that there is a common level of understanding regarding the causes of
terrorism amongst their interagency colleagues. A total of 11 study participants expressed
perceptions that there is generally a common understanding across the interagency
regarding the causes of terrorism. (104, 106, 201, 202, 203, 404, 405, 406, 502, 503,
504), with two additional (301, 506) expressing that there was somewhat of a common
understanding across the interagency. Participant 401 stated this as “I think there’s
symmetry, it’s not bad,” which was a view expressed by many. Several others in this
group expressed it like participant 404: “I mean I think on a macro level, yeah, I mean
people realize that these are incredibly complex problem sets…” The noted divergent
views were from Joint Staff participants, two of whom also expressed perspectives that a
common understanding is not there (501, 505), or the view expressed by participant 504,
who felt that counterterrorism policy professionals are just fatigued after dealing with the
challenge for 18 years: “I think people are at fatigue. I’m not sure there’s much else we
can do that we aren’t already doing.”
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Themes Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism Policy
Unlike the areas discussed above, no common theme emerged on the topic of how
the U.S. could best address the threat of terrorism. Responses from study participants
were extremely varied on this topic, both within and between organizations. Only within
USAID was there some internal commonality, with five of the eight respondents (202,
204, 205, 206, 208) expressing prevention activities being among the best ways to
address the threats posed by terrorism. A few, such as participant 101, spoke in
generalities: “I think the best way to deal with it, is to be aware that it’s not a one size fits
all kind of thing.” Participant 401 highlighted terrorism as a condition to be managed, not
a problem that could ever be solved. “We can get to a point where it is a condition we’ve
mitigated, it’s a condition that we can live with, but…it’s probably not something [we
can eliminate completely].” Participant 406 said the U.S. approach should be much less
that what it’s been doing: “Maybe we should take a more backseat, hands off approach by
empowering and supporting the local governments… I feel like the U.S. should take a
less prominent role in the counter terrorism programming that it’s doing, and that’s on all
fronts.”
Regarding organizational empowerment, whether their own or their view of other
entities, the overwhelming theme was U.S. organizations are constrained, limited, and
hindered, by existing authorities and available resources in their ability to address
terrorism. This negative theme of constraint or hinderance was observed in a total of 26
study participants, making it the predominate perspective across the board (101 through
108, 201 through 208, 401 through 407, 501, 502, 505). Comments such as the following
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were typical responses. “So, [resources are] totally inadequate to take anything to
scale…” (from participant 202). “But you know, you can always do more with more…”
(from participant 203). Participant 208 felt their full potential is hindered: “So it means
that we’re never able to truly meet our potential in this space because it’s under
resourced.” Participant 404 said: “I think we’re largely hindered from engaging
effectively.”
However, there were a few outliers from this last theme. Both NCTC participants
(301, 302) felt their organizations and others in the interagency had adequate authorities
and resources. A few Joint Staff participants also shared this divergent view, with three
respondents (503, 504, 506) reflecting that their and other organizations are not hindered
in their efforts to address terrorism.
Summary
The first section of this chapter provided the analytic context of this research
project, including a review of the setting for the participants and organizations addressed,
highlighting key demographics of those interviewed. It also provided an overview of the
data collected and summarized the data analysis process. The second section addressed
trustworthiness, highlighting the demonstrated evidence of credibility, transferability,
dependability, and confirmability. The third section presented the study’s analytic results,
first by restating the research question, and then providing a summary of the emerging
themes from the data collection interviews of study participants. These results were then
discussed in greater detail, highlighting the observed themes for how terrorism is viewed,
the potential impacts of personal and organizational influences, commonality and
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differences across the interagency, and overall U.S. counterterrorism policy. The final
chapter presents the study’s analytic findings, draws conclusions, and makes
recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to understand the linkages between theory and
application, specifically the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories
regarding the causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism
policymaking organizations. I used qualitative methodology, including individual
interviews and data from participant questionnaires, to analyze individual perspectives
within and across organizational cultures and to assess the impact on U.S.
counterterrorism policy. Unlike other studies related to this area, which included
historical archival data and little analysis of field interviews (Kassop, 2013; Sageman,
2014), this study included insights provided by current government counterterrorism
officials to address their views on the causes of terrorism and their reflections on the
factors that influence their decision-making process regarding counterterrorism policy
development.
In addressing the primary research question and its five subquestions, the
following key findings were observed. First was the predominance among study
participants of root causes theory as the primary cause of terrorism. Second was personal
experiences are a dominant influence in views on terrorism. Third was perspectives
regarding organizational influence on participants’ views of terrorism varied by
organization. Fourth, participants viewed their colleagues as well versed in the causes of
terrorism. Finally, individual views had a minimal impact on U.S. counterterrorism
policy.
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The first section of this chapter provides the interpretation of the key findings.
The second section addresses the limitations of the study, which is followed by a series of
recommendations, including areas that would benefit from further research. Potential
implications of the research are then reviewed, including areas in which this research can
influence positive social change in the development and implementation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy. Final reflections on the study are then presented. The chapter
closes with an overall conclusion to the research project.
Interpretation of the Findings
Qualitative thematic analysis of the interviews, supported by analysis of data
gathered from the survey questionnaire, resulted in five key findings. These findings are
set within the broader context of who, what, and why for understanding the selected
phenomenon of interest defined by the research question: To what extent do individual
perspectives on the causes of terrorism among U.S. policymakers, and the possible
influences on these views due to personal factors, organizational cultures, and
interagency bureaucracies, impact the shaping of U.S. counterterrorism policy?
The who was a static baseline purposely selected as the target of this research,
including four primary organizations in the executive branch of the U.S. government
responsible for developing and implementing counterterrorism policy: the State and
Defense Departments, USAID, and NCTC. The first key finding addressed what U.S.
policy professionals think causes terrorism. The next three key findings addressed why
based on policy professionals’ personal experiences, bureaucratic cultures, or interagency
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similarities and differences in views. The last key finding addressed how these factors
impact U.S. counterterrorism policy.
Predominance of ‘Root Cause’ Theory Perspectives
The first subquestion of this study was the following: To what extent do
individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align with existing academic theories?
This issue was the foundational baseline of this entire study, which is why it appeared at
the beginning of the main research question and all five of the research subquestions. The
theoretical framework of this research (primary theories on the causes of terrorism) was
the lens through which the emerging themes from the study participants were interpreted.
One finding from this study was that most study participants viewed grievances as
the primary cause of terrorism. Participants reported that these grievances could be due to
many factors, such as inequities in status, housing, or economic opportunity.
Marginalization was also mentioned, as was lack of governance, personal security,
repression, and arbitrary abuse or punishment by the authorities. Participants discussed
how these grievance factors lead to growing frustrations, a sense of helplessness, and
limited options for improvement, causing affected individuals to consider and then
resorting to terrorist violence.
The emerging theme that grievances, due to chronic inequities, marginalization,
repression by authorities, lack of recourse, and overall helplessness, are the primary cause
of terrorism aligns with the fundamental elements of root causes theory (see Betts, 2002;
Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000). Root causes theory as it relates to the
motivations of terrorism stresses key underlying factors related to economic, educational,
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demographic, and political issues as the fundamental reasons individuals use violence to
achieve political objectives (see Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000).
In addition, participants’ identification of arbitrary actions and physical abuse by
government military or security services and a lack of opportunities for betterment or
advancement as key factors among the grievances further aligns with root causes research
by Betts (2002), Feldman (2009), and Krueger and Malecˇkova´ (2003).
The view of grievance being the primary cause of terrorism was not unanimous,
however. Some participants expressed the complexity of the problem set and its
dependence on the unique situations due to local or regional dynamics. These participants
discussed how complex dependencies are usually set within an elaborate and dynamic
structure of individual, family, local, and regional dependencies. This view regarding the
causes of terrorism aligns with group dynamics theory described by Berrebi (2009),
Kuzner (2007), and Piazza (2007), in which individual perspectives and influences due to
intergroup relationships underpin decisions for the use of violence against civilians for
political ends. Within group dynamics theory, Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) discussed
how individuals need a sense of group belonging and judge their group in contrast with
other groups. These types of group commitment and solidarity are of particular
importance during conflict and have been shown to be a powerful motivator to violence
(Melucci, 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
This finding provides unique research-based insights into the views on the causes
of terrorism among current U.S. counterterrorism policymakers. The finding extends
knowledge within the academic community, as called for by Kassop (2013) and Sageman
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(2014), who highlighted the need for researchers to collect data from current and previous
U.S. government officials regarding their views on terrorism, moving beyond textual or
narrative-based analysis of official U.S. policy speeches and documents. Insights that
policymakers view grievances as a primary cause of terrorism, which aligns with root
causes theory, and that differences in views also exist, namely aligning with group
dynamics theory, provided for a better understanding of how U.S. policymakers shape
and implement counterterrorism policy.
Personal Experiences Are a Dominant Influence in Views on Terrorism
The second research subquestion of this study was the following: To what extent
can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be understood through individual factors
related to personal experience? Participant perspectives regarding personal experience
were viewed through the conceptual framework of this study to understand how
individuals view their surroundings, ascribe context to events, weigh select criteria, and
make decisions. Notable among these theories that address the role of individual factors
as influences on decision-making are social cognitive theory (Bandura 1989, 2001, 2011)
and cultural theory (Douglas, 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Wildavsky, 1987). Key
aspects of these theories were reflected in participants’ perspectives regarding the
influence of their experiences on their views.
Data analysis indicated that participants’ views regarding terrorism are
significantly influenced by their personal experience. One important factor mentioned by
many participants was professional experience serving in their official capacities and
working on foreign-policy-related portfolios throughout their careers. Another factor
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reported was travel experience, specifically serving in overseas posts or on deployment,
which provided participants with cultural exposure through close interactions with local
populations. Finally, the experience of living abroad was also highlighted by study
participants as having a significant influence on how they view terrorism, especially
those who had served overseas in conflict-prone areas.
Study participants’ identification of professional experiences as the primary
influence on their perspectives regarding terrorism aligns within the social cognitive
theoretical framework. Developed by Bandura (1989, 2001), the foundational element of
social cognitive theory is that individuals learn by observing others. Behaviors that are
learned, including those from placement within specific environmental settings, are
central to an individual’s personality and perspectives over time (Bandura, 1989, 2001;
Wood & Bandura, 1989). The data collected from the survey questionnaire (see Table 1
and Appendix D) showed the length of service among the study sample. Almost 70%
were 40 years old or older, and more than 75% had worked for the federal government
more than 10 years. More than 50% had worked in counterterrorism policy for more than
5 years. Taylor’s (2014) research regarding social cognitive theory demonstrated that
organizational context and culture provide strong motivations to the unity of effort and
execution of public service. Over a period of time, the work environment and
organizational structures shape how public employees view and react to situations (Salas
et al., 2010; Taylor, 2014). These factors were demonstrated in my participants’
description of the importance of their personal experiences in how they view the causes
of terrorism.
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Participants in the current study also highlighted the role of travel (i.e., personal
and business) and living abroad as key elements of their experience influencing their
views on terrorism, a finding that directly aligns within cultural theory. As articulated by
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), the primary perspective that underlies cultural theory is
that individuals use a cultural lens, or filter, from which to view situations. This cultural
lens provides a particular worldview that not only influences how situations are viewed,
but also impacts how decisions are made in response to situations (Douglas, 1985;
Wildavsky, 1987). The additional data collected from participants via the survey
questionnaire (see Table 1 and Appendix D) demonstrated the significant cultural
awareness among the study sample. More than 80% of study participants assessed their
cultural awareness at High or Expert, with 75% having been to more than 15 countries,
50% having lived abroad more than 5 cumulative years, and almost 20% having lived
abroad more than 10 years. Almost 75% speak one or more languages. Research by
Coaffee (2006) and Mythen and Walklate (2006) showed how terrorism is framed by
individuals, which has significant implications for how counterterrorism strategies are
developed and applied. An overly narrow cultural lens can result in an overly simplistic
construction when used to understand terrorism (Coaffee, 2006; Mythen & Walklate,
2006). A lack of cultural awareness was not observed in the current study’s sample.
This finding provides unique research-based insight into the importance of
personal experience as a key influence on U.S. policymakers’ views of terrorism.
Elements from social construction theory and cultural theory are present in their views,
given their rich descriptions of their working experience within the federal
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counterterrorism policy community, or more broadly from their extensive travel or
experiences living abroad in areas plagued by terrorist violence. This research filled a gap
in academic knowledge by demonstrating the importance of personal experience as an
influence on how the causes of terrorism are viewed and addressed.
Regarding Organizational Influence, It Depends
The third research subquestion of this study asked – To what extent are these
perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced by existing bureaucratic cultures in
specific U.S. counterterrorism policymaking organizations? Participant perspectives
regarding organizational influence was viewed through the conceptual framework of this
study to understand how individuals view their surroundings, ascribe context to events,
weigh select criteria, and make decisions. Three organizational theories were used to shed
insights into participants views: resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978),
the organizational processes model (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999), and
groupthink theory (Janis, 1971, 1972).
The finding from this research is that views by participants regarding
organizational influences on how they perceive the causes of terrorism depends on the
organization. Two distinct, conflicting themes were observed regarding the potential
influence of organizations on personal views regarding terrorism. On one hand, 50% of
participants had the perspective that their views had been influenced by their
organization. This group entailed all the participants from USAID and half each from the
OSD and Joint Staff. Most of these participants also had the perspective that their own
views regarding terrorism were shared across their organization. On the other hand, 30%
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of the participants, half from the State Department and half from the Joint Staff,
expressed perceptions that their individual views regarding terrorism had not been
influenced by their organization. With a few additions, this same cohort also expressed
the perspective that their own views regarding terrorism were only somewhat shared
among their colleagues.
In addition to the expressed benefits of experienced colleagues and ability for
recurring foreign travel, USAID participants also had the view that their organization
provided the framework from which they view the terrorism problem. Many specifically
referred to the ‘prevention framework,’ discussing their organization’s efforts to get
ahead of possible causes of terrorism with vulnerable populations. In this sense, this
perspective is reflective of the organization process model, since the stated prevention
framework by so many participants indicates it is inherent in USAID’s structure and
programming processes (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Kuwashima, 2014;
Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011). A well-established organizational structure can overly focus
on particular responses and can be self-reinforcing in how they are used and implemented
over time (Kuwashima, 2014; Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011).
These participants didn’t articulate this prevention framework was specifically
limiting. However, other responses to interview questions indicated they (as well as the
majority of all participants) did feel strongly that their organization’s efforts were
hindered by both authorities and resources. Perceptions regarding bureaucratic limitations
are indicative of not only Allison’s (1971) organization process model, but also that of
resource dependency theory premised by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). The overwhelming
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commonality in the views by participants that their organizations are fundamentally
hindered in their activities, both due to authorities and appropriations from Congress,
aligns within the foundational element described by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), where
external resources of organizations both bound and influence their activities, functions,
and operations.
Only within USAID participants was an organizational alignment apparent, with
perspectives their organization did influence their employees’ views regarding terrorism.
While 30% of the participants expressed the perception that their individual views
regarding terrorism had not been influenced by their organization, this view was not
expressed by a majority from any other organization, being shared by half of the
participants from the State Department and the Joint Staff, respectively. These views run
counter to the elements of both Allison’s (1971) organization process model and Pfeffer
and Salancik’s (1978) resource dependency theory. There is no apparent analytic reason
for these differences in views regarding organizational influences from the participant
interviews or the collected survey data. The entire participant sample indicated
similarities in length of service, with 75% having worked for the federal government
more than 10 years, and more than 50% working specifically in counterterrorism policy
for more than 5 years (see Table 1 and Appendix D).
The level of data collected from the interviews and the survey data does not
appear to be sufficient to reasonably determine whether elements of Janis’ (1972, 1982)
groupthink theory can be applied to the observed results regarding organizational
influences. As discussed above, there seemed to be correlation within the participant
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cohort who expressed the perspective their organization had influenced their views
regarding terrorism, feeling that their views were shared with colleagues within their
organization as well. In contrast, the cohort who didn’t have perspectives of
organizational influence also didn’t assess their views were shared with colleagues. In
neither of these cohorts was any data observed indicating whether participants were
unconsciously or consciously pressured to modify their views, which is the underlying
element of the groupthink theory described by Janis (1972, 1982).
These findings regarding presence of organizational influence provides researchbased insight into the views of U.S. counterterrorism policymakers. The only observed
organizational alignment occurred within the participants from USAID, who were part of
the 50% of the study participants expressing the perspective that their views had been
influenced by their organizations. These views appear in alignment with key elements in
both the organization process model and resource dependency theory (Allison, 1971;
Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The other 30% of participants,
however, had differing views, with perceptions their organization didn’t have influence
on their views of terrorism. This research demonstrates a continued gap in knowledge
regarding the presence of, and details regarding, organizational influence on U.S.
counterterrorism policymakers, requiring further academic research.
Participants Think Their Colleagues Understand Terrorism Well
The fourth research subquestion of this study asked – To what extent are these
perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected between and among the key
policymaking organizations? Participant views on the causes of terrorism are the
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foundational baseline of this study and are discussed in detail in the first research finding
above. However, the purpose of this research subquestion was to gain insight into
participants’ views regarding the level of perceived understanding of terrorism, both
within their own organization as well as more broadly across the interagency. The finding
from the data is clear that most participants view their colleagues working
counterterrorism policy, both within (83%) and without (75%) their own organization, as
having a very good understanding of the causes of terrorism. This result was consistent
across all the organizations included in this research, with no organizational-unique
dynamics or discrepancies noted.
As discussed previously, the view most prevalent across participants was that of
grievances being the primary cause of terrorism, a view that aligns with the fundamental
elements of root causes theory (Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000).
This perspective was not unanimous, however. Some participants expressed the overall
complexity of terrorism, being dependent on unique local or regional dynamics, a
perspective that aligns with group dynamics theory (Berrebi, 2009; Kuzner, 2007; &
Piazza, 2007). Regardless of these results, 83% of study participants expressed the
perspective that their colleagues within their own organization had a general or more
understanding of the causes of terrorism. Looking across their colleagues in their
interagency partner organizations, there was just a slightly lower response, with 75%
expressing the view that their interagency colleagues had a general or better
understanding of the causes of terrorism.
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Derived from responses from interviewing participants within the primary U.S.
counterterrorism policymaking organizations, this finding provided unique researchbased insights into how they view their colleagues understanding of the causes of
terrorism. These results extend knowledge within the research community interested in
counterterrorism policy issues and implications. As called for by Kassop (2013) and
Sageman (2014), the results provide a greater understanding of how U.S. policymakers
view and interact with their colleagues in developing and implementing counterterrorism
policy.
Individual Views Have Minimal Impact on U.S. Counterterrorism Policy
The fifth research subquestion of this study asked – To what extent do these
perspectives impact the shaping of U.S. counterterrorism policy? The finding from this
research indicate policymakers’ individual views do not appear to impact in any
meaningful way the development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
This finding is based on the view by participants that their own organization, as well as
their partner organizations across the interagency, are constrained, limited, and hindered
in their ability to address terrorism by existing authorities and available resources. This
perspective was observed from 83% of participants, making it the predominate
perspective across the board.
This finding appears independent of observing elements of both root causes
theory (Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000) and group dynamics
theory (Berrebi, 2009; Kuzner, 2007; & Piazza, 2007) in participants’ perspectives on the
causes of terrorism. The overwhelming view of organizational constraint among
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participants also reflects key elements fundamental to both the organizational processes
model (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999), and resource dependency theory
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
This finding confirmed fundamental elements of both Allison’s (1971)
organizational processes model and Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource dependency
theory, adding unique research-based insights into how counterterrorism policymakers
view their organizations ability to adequately address terrorism being hindered and
constrained. The results of this study extend knowledge within the research community
interested in counterterrorism policy issues and implications.
Limitations of the Study
Two potential limitations that might have impacted the trustworthiness of this
research were presented in Chapter 1. First was the scope of the participant pool to enable
a suitable sample from which to determine meaningful perspectives from across the
primary counterterrorism policymaking organizations in the U.S. government. Second
was the acknowledged researcher self-perspectives and possible biases on the subject
being studied.
The only unexpected limitation to this study was the number of participants
recruited from NCTC. While generally supportive, none of the NCTC office managers
contacted were willing to sign a letter of cooperation. Subsequent referrals to the NCTC
public affairs office ended up with no follow through, despite numerous attempts. As
subsequently approved by the Walden University IRB, I contacted NCTC employees
directly outside of business hours in an attempt to get them to volunteer to participate.
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Eight NCTC employees were individually contacted by phone, but only two were willing
to volunteer to be participants. Insights provided by these two NCTC volunteers were
valuable, but the lack of the planned six to eight participants precluded meaningful
extrapolation of qualitative results for NCTC.
There were no additional unexpected limitations to the study. I conducted the rest
of the study recruiting and interviews as planned, and I had no indication of any limits to
the trustworthiness of the participants. Potential researcher biases were carefully
managed through the deliberate and structured steps taken in the manner in which
questions were developed, how interviews were conducted, the process and procedures
utilized to collect and process the data, and the analytic logic used to analyze the results.
These steps, and the rigorous analytic development of findings and recommendations,
sufficiently mitigated the risks of researcher biases from tainting this research.
Recommendations
This study was conducted to fill the gap in knowledge regarding the factors
influencing the development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies
(Jackson, 2011; Kassop, 2013; Sageman, 2014). Moving beyond historical archival
research, this study incorporated qualitative data collected from current government
counterterrorism officials regarding their perspectives on the causes of terrorism and the
factors that influence their decision processes regarding counterterrorism policy. Even
with the analytic findings outlined above, several recommendations for future research
arise as a result of this study.
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First, although this research found a predominance of root cause theory
perspectives (Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000) among the
counterterrorism policy officials across the four key U.S. executive branch departments
or agencies, it is recommended that additional qualitative research would expand the
body of knowledge and provide further insights. Detailed research focusing within each
of the four organizations that were the focus of this study, including policy professionals
with other functional or regional expertise, would expand understanding on how
terrorism and its causes are viewed within and among other offices or bureaus. Particular
perspectives within the participants from the State Department, namely views aligning
with group dynamics theory (Berrebi, 2009; Kuzner, 2007; Piazza, 2007), might provide
further insight into how policy professionals working in the diplomatic service view
terrorism and its causes. Future researchers might also leverage an expanded data
sampling approach, using broader quantitative techniques, such as a detailed survey
instrument to a larger participant pool, to enable deeper statistical and trend analysis. This
type of expanded research would help broaden academic understanding and confirm the
research findings made in this study.
Second, while this study showed that personal experiences are a dominant
influence among U.S. counterterrorism policy officials in their views on terrorism,
findings regarding organizational influence were not as clear. Therefore, additional
research that specifically focuses on organizational factors, such as described in resource
dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and the organizational processes model
(Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999), might articulate key organizational factors
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within or between U.S. policymaking organizations. A qualitative approach focusing
solely on gaining insights into how policymakers are influenced in their views of
terrorism over time, using either a broader series of interview questions, or even a
longitudinal study of a selected group of participants within a particular organization over
a period of time, would provide broader and deeper understanding into the impacts of
organizations on employees views. Other organizational influence theories might also be
utilized, such as groupthink theory postulated by Janis (1971, 1972), as highlighted in this
study, or other relevant theories. Future researchers might also leverage a broader
quantitative research technique, leveraging a survey instrument to a larger participant
pool, to provide further statistical and trend analysis. This type of expanded research
would assist filling the continuing gap in knowledge regarding organizational influence
on how U.S. policymakers view the causes of terrorism.
Third, one of the findings of this study indicated individual views on the causes of
terrorism have minimal impact on U.S. counterterrorism policy. Participants in this study
expressed the overwhelming view that their ability to influence their organizations
policies and programs to counter terrorism are constrained, limited, and hindered by
existing authorities and available resources. This finding is worthy of additional research
to confirm its validity. It is recommended that additional qualitative research build upon
this study in order to further understand these perspectives. Research could focus on a
deeper understanding of whether these perceived constraints are due to factors related to
authorities or appropriations. This study used a phenomenological strategy of inquiry to
gather insights from study participants. Future researchers might leverage a similar
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approach, or use other techniques, such as a qualitative case study methodology focused
on a particular counterterrorism program or activity, or a broader narrative research
approach, using focus groups to gather deeper insights into how policymakers view
limitations in developing or implementing counterterrorism programs. Additional data
collection and research analysis could help shed further insights into this topic.
Fourth, one of the acknowledged limitations of this study was the lower number
than planned of participants from the intelligence community. While the intelligence
community is not a policymaking organization, it is keenly involved in the policymaking
process, including for counterterrorism. The views of intelligence analysts, such as those
who work at NCTC, are important to understanding how counterterrorism policy is
developed and implemented. It is therefore recommended that further research be
conducted into the perspectives of NCTC and other intelligence professionals regarding
how they view the causes of terrorism, and what may or may not influence their
perspectives. Current or previous government employees of the U.S. intelligence
community conducting research for higher academic degrees may be better positioned,
given their placement and access within the intelligence community, to understand both
the processes required and receive the necessary approvals to collect either qualitative or
quantitative data and conduct rigorous research to help fill the gap in knowledge in this
important area of U.S. policy.
Fifth and finally, political appointees were specifically excluded from this study
in order to focus specifically on the perspectives of career U.S. government employees
working in counterterrorism policy. It is recommended that future research be conducted
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into the views and perspective on the causes of terrorism by political appointees in the
key counterterrorism policymaking departments and agencies, such as the Defense
Department, State Department, and USAID. This further research, including on how
individual and organizational factors influence these views, would serve to complement
this study, and further fill the gap in knowledge outlined by Jackson (2011), Kassop
(2013), and Sageman (2014).
Implications
The insights gained from this study are beneficial to positive social change at the
national policy level in numerous ways. First, this is a topic of extreme relevance for
today, having significant ramifications for U.S. foreign policy and relationships with
foreign countries and international organizations (Jackson, 2011; Kassop, 2013,
Sageman, 2014). As articulated earlier, using six academic theories regarding the causes
of terrorism proved a valid lens from which to view and understand U.S. counterterrorism
policy professionals’ views on the causes of terrorism. At the individual level, root causes
theory was found to be the predominant view among counterterrorism policymakers as
the primary cause of terrorism, and participants expressed the view that their personal
experiences were the dominant influence on these views. These results were found by
obtaining direct, first-hand perspectives from individual U.S. counterterrorism
policymakers themselves, using a qualitative methodology. This approach provided more
detail and nuance than could have been gathered indirectly from analysis of policy
documents, public statements or pronouncements, or the language from policy speeches.
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Second, at the organizational level, the role of organizational influence on
counterterrorism policymakers varied between organizations, although policymakers
were found to have positive views of their colleagues understanding of the causes of
terrorism. Since the findings regarding organizational influence was not conclusive, the
implication is that a more focused qualitative approach is required, possibly augmented
by interviewing groups of individuals through a focus group setting, along with a more
detailed survey questionnaire to obtain deeper insights into how organizational factors
may work with individual factors to influence how terrorism is viewed within U.S.
policymaking organizations.
Finally, the qualitative methodology used in this study proved effective in
exploring and understanding the meaning derived by individuals or groups associated
with a social or human problem, such as views regarding the causes of terrorism by U.S.
counterterrorism policymakers. The implications of the approach, method, and process
used in this study provided a valid template for use by other researchers interested in
gaining deeper understanding on other significant policy issues effecting U.S. national
security.
Reflections
I was motivated to conduct research into this topic based on a desire to gain
deeper insights into a subject for which I have a keen personal interest and within which I
have dedicated almost a third of my professional career. I am a career member of the
federal civil service and have worked for the U.S. government in various capacities for
over 32 years, the last 17 years in Washington, D.C., working policy development and
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implementation, including the last 11 years in the area of counterterrorism. Many of the
policy discussions in which I’ve participated regarding U.S. policy responses to address
terrorism were passionate, with organizational positions strenuously stated and defended
by myself and my interagency colleagues.
Based on this experience I gathered what I believed was antidotal evidence into
what I perceived were individual biases aligning within bureaucratic cultures among my
counterterrorism policy colleagues. Although my research methodology used a
qualitative versus a quantitative approach, I had a perceived hypothesis going into this
project that I would observe distinct and different views regarding the causes of terrorism
from across the four organizations I selected to study. I’d also expected organizational
culture to be the primary influence on policymakers’ views regarding terrorism. It was to
gain further insights and understanding into this antidotal evidence that drove me to
select this topic and subject my own views to the rigors of scholarly research.
What I found through the course of this study turned out different than my
personal expectations when I started. The semi-structured conversations I conducted
during interviews with participants from across the interagency provided much deeper
insights into individual views and perceptions regarding the causes of terrorism than I’d
experienced before. I found that my previous experiences in policy discussions and
debates regarding terrorism were more superficial than I’d believed at the time. The
structure and rigor of the qualitative process allowed me to move beyond a given policy
topic or program, with the potential for a particular organizational approach or position
and dig deeper into participants’ personal views and perspectives. Many of these views
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were based on deep personal experiences, items that with the clarity of hindsight I’d
rarely seen arise during policy debates.
This scholarly process has helped me understand the significant role an
individual’s life journey can have on one’s views. As I’ve learned through this research,
personal experiences gained from life’s journey are not always apparent in the
policymaking process. This research has demonstrated to me how easy it can be absent a
rigorous approach to superficially extrapolate a policymaker’s stated position on
terrorism into an erroneous perception of their personal views.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to understand the linkages between theory and
application, specifically the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories
regarding the causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism
policymaking organizations. The research approach used a qualitative methodology
through one-on-one interviews and detailed participant questionnaires, analyzing
individual perspectives within the broader context of both personal experiences and
organizational cultures, in order to assess impacts on U.S. counterterrorism policy.
This research helps fill the gap in academic knowledge outlined by Jackson
(2011), Kassop (2013), Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), and Sageman (2014), who all
called for scholars to investigate what factors influence the development and
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies. Unlike other research on this topic,
many of which use historical archival research and little analysis of actual field
interviews, this study involved collecting qualitative data from current government
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counterterrorism officials to identify their actual views on the causes of terrorism and
their perceptions on how they’ve been influenced by personal experiences and
organizational cultures.
Five key findings were observed. First, root causes theory was a predominant
factor in participants’ understanding of the cause of terrorism. Second, personal
experiences are a dominant influence on these views. Third, organizational influence on
the views of terrorism varied by organization. Fourth, participants viewed their
interagency colleagues as well informed regarding the causes of terrorism. Finally,
individual views among U.S. policymakers have a minimal impact on U.S.
counterterrorism policy.

157
References
Abadie, A. (2006). Political freedom, and the roots of terrorism. American Economic
Review, 96(2), 50-56. doi:10.1257/000282806777211847
Abelson, D. E. (2006). Capitol idea: Think tanks and U.S. foreign policy. Montreal,
Canada: McGill-Queens University Press.
Abrahms, M. (2008). What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism
strategy. International Security, 32(4), 78-105. doi:10.1162/isec.2008.32.4.78
Abrams, E. (2017). Trump the traditionalist: A surprisingly standard foreign
policy. Foreign Affairs, 96, 10-18. Retrieved from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Acosta, J. (2015, February 19). Obama calls on world to focus on roots of ISIS, al Qaeda
extremism. CNN. Retrieved from
https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/19/politics/obama-isis-extremismspeech/index.html
Akhtar, S. (2017). The tripod of terrorism. International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 26(3),
139-159. doi:10.1080/0803706X.2017.1338356
Akrofi, S. (2016). Evaluating the effects of executive learning and development on
organizational performance: Implications for developing senior manager and
executive capabilities. International Journal of Training and Development, 20(3),
177-199. doi:10.1111/ijtd.12082

158
Aldrich, D. P. (2014). First steps towards hearts and minds? USAID’s countering violent
extremism policies in Africa. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(3), 523-546.
doi: 10.1080/09546553.2012.738263
Alesina, A., Ozler, S., Roubini, N., & Swagel, P. (1996). Political instability and
economic growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2), 189-211.
doi:10.1007/bf00138862
Allison, G. (1969). Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis. American Political
Science Review, 63(3), 689-718. doi:10.1017/s000305540025853x
Allison, G. (1971). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. New York,
NY: Little, Brown and Company.
Allison, G. (2012). The Cuban missile crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. foreign policy today.
Foreign Affairs, 91(4), 11-16. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Allison, G., & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile
crisis, 2nd Edition. London, United Kingdom: Longman Publishing.
Altier, M. B., Horgan, J., & Thoroughgood, C. (2012). In their own words?
Methodological considerations in the analysis of terrorist
autobiographies. Journal of Strategic Security, 5(4), 85-98. doi:10.5038/19440472.5.4.6
Aly, A. (2013). The policy response to home-grown terrorism: Reconceptualising prevent
and resilience as collective resistance. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and
Counter Terrorism, 8(1), 2-18. doi:10.1080/18335330.2013.789594

159
Amason, A. C., & Mooney, A. C. (2008). The Icarus paradox revisited: How strong
performance sows the seeds of dysfunction in future strategic decisionmaking. Strategic Organization, 6(4), 407-434. doi:10.1177/1476127008096364
Ani, K. J., & Uzodike, U. O. (2015). Anatomy of the Lockerbie bombing: Libya’s role
and reactions to al-Megrahi’s release. GLOCALISM: Journal of Culture, Politics
and Innovation, 1-15. Retrieved from http://www.glocalismjournal.net/
Anney, V. N. (2014). Ensuring the quality of the findings of qualitative research:
Looking at trustworthiness criteria. Journal of Emerging Trends in Educational
Research and Policy Studies, 5(2), 272-281. Retrieved from
http://jeteraps.scholarlinkresearch.com/
Antwi‐Boateng, O. (2017). The rise of pan‐Islamic terrorism in Africa: A global security
challenge. Politics & Policy, 45(2), 253-284. doi:10.1111/polp.12195
Arel-Bundock, V., Atkinson, J., & Potter, R. A. (2015). The limits of foreign aid
diplomacy: How bureaucratic design shapes aid distribution. International
Studies Quarterly, 59(3), 544-556. doi:10.1111/isqu.12191
Arendt, H. (1953). Ideology and terror: A novel form of government. Review of Politics,
15(3). doi:10.1017/s0034670500001510
Atiyah, L. A. R. (2016). The relationship between the diversity of employees and
organizational performance. Cross Cultural Management Journal, 2, 151-163.
Retrieved from http://cmj.seaopenresearch.eu/

160
Auerswald, D., & Maltzman, F. (2003). Policymaking through advice and consent:
Treaty consideration by the United States Senate. Journal of Politics, 65(4),
1097-1110. doi:10.1111/1468-2508.t01-1-00127
Avey, P. C., & Desch, M. C. (2014). What do policymakers want from us? Results of a
survey of current and former senior national security decision
makers. International Studies Quarterly, 58(2), 227-246. doi:10.1111/isqu.12111
Ayegba, U. S. (2015). Unemployment and poverty as sources and consequence of
insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram insurgency revisited. African Journal of
Political Science and International Relations, 9(3), 90-99.
doi:10.5897/ajpsir2014.0719
Bacchus, W. I. (2015). Foreign policy and the bureaucratic process: the state
department’s country director system. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Badea, C., Binning, K., Verlhiac, J. F., & Sherman, D. K. (2018). In the aftermath of
terrorism: Effects of self versus group affirmation on support for discriminatory
policies. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 76, 421–428.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2017.11.004
Baker, S. E., Edwards, R., & Doidge, M. (2012). How many qualitative interviews is
enough? Expert voices and early career reflections on sampling and cases in
qualitative research. Retrieved from National Centre for Research Methods
website: http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/2273/4/how_many_interviews.pdf

161
Balch-Lindsay, D., Enterline, A., & Joyce, K. (2008). Third-party intervention and the
civil war process. Journal of Peace Research, 45(3), 345-363.
doi:10.1177/0022343308088815
Bandura, A. (1989). Human agency in social cognitive theory. American
psychologist, 44(9), 1175-1184. doi:10.1037/0003-066x.44.9.1175
Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. Annual review of
psychology, 52(1), 1-26. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.1
Bandura, A. (2011). Social cognitive theory, in P. A. M. Van Lange, A. W., Kruglanski,
& E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, 2012, 349373. London, United Kingdom: SAGE Publications Ltd.
Banyard, P., & Hulme, J. A. (2015). Giving psychology away: How George Miller’s
vision is being realised by psychological literacy. Psychology Teaching
Review, 21(2), 93-101.
Bapat, N., (2007). The internationalization of terrorist campaigns. Conflict Management
and Peace Science, 24(4), 265-280. Retrieved from
https://www.bps.org.uk/publications/psychology-teaching-review
Bapat, N. A. (2012). Understanding state sponsorship of militant groups. British Journal
of Political Science, 42(1), 1-29. doi:10.1017/s000712341100007x
Bapat, N. A., & Bond, K. D. (2012). Alliances between militant groups. British Journal
of Political Science, 42(4), 793-824. doi:10.1017/s000712341100007x

162
Barbuto Jr, J. E. (2016). How is strategy formed in organizations? A multi-disciplinary
taxonomy of strategy-making approaches. Journal of Behavioral and Applied
Management, 3(1), 65-77. Retrieved from https://jbam.scholasticahq.com/
Barron, B., & Maye, D. (2017). Does ISIS satisfy the criteria of an apocalyptic Islamic
cult? An evidence-based historical qualitative meta-analysis. Journal of Terrorism
Research, 8(1), 18-33. doi:10.15664/jtr.1264
Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012). The edge of violence: Towards telling the difference
between violent and non-violent radicalization. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 24(1), 1-21. doi:10.1080/09546553.2011.594923
Bean, H. (2009). Organizational culture and US intelligence affairs. Intelligence and
National Security, 24(4), 479-498. doi:10.1080/02684520903069413
Becker, G. S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political
influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 371-400. doi:10.2307/188601
Bentley, M. (2018). Fetishised data: Counterterrorism, drone warfare and pilot
testimony. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(1), 88-110.
doi:10.1080/17539153.2017.1399787
Berkowitz, J. M. (2017). Delegating terror: Principal–agent based decision making in
state sponsorship of terrorism. International Interactions, 44(4), 709–748.
doi:10.1080/03050629.2017.1414811
Berman, P. (2004). Terror and liberalism. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.

163
Bernard, A. (2016). Navigating uncertainty: A hard look at ‘soft counterterrorism’ in
West Africa and the Sahel. Journal of Public & International Affairs, (1), 24-42.
Retrieved from https://jpia.princeton.edu/
Berrebi, C. (2009). The economics of terrorism and counterterrorism: What matters and
is rational-choice theory helpful?” in P. K. Davis & K. Cragin (Eds.), Social
Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together, 151-208. Santa
Monica, CA: Rand corporation.
Best, R. A. (2011). National counter-terrorism center (NCTC): Responsibilities and
potential congressional concerns. Collingdale, PA: DIANE Publishing.
Betts, R. K. (2002). The soft underbelly of American primacy: Tactical advantages of
terror. Political Science Quarterly, 117(2), 19–36. doi:10.2307/798092
Betz, D. (2008). The virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and
counterinsurgency. Small wars & insurgencies, 19(4), 510-540.
doi:10.1080/09592310802462273
Bigo, D. (2008). International political sociology, in P. D. Williams (Ed.), Security
Studies, 140-154. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
Bird, G., Blomberg, S. B., & Hess, G. D. (2008). International terrorism: Causes,
consequences and cures. The World Economy, 31(2), 255-274.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01089.x
Bitsch, V. (2005). Qualitative research: A grounded theory example and evaluation
criteria. Journal of Agribusiness, 23(1), 75-91. Retrieved from
https://agecon.uga.edu/journal-of-agribusiness.html

164
Blomdahl, M. (2016). Bureaucratic roles and positions: Explaining the United States
Libya decision. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 27(1), 142-161.
doi:10.1080/09592296.2016.1137739
Bohorquez, J. C., Gourley, S., Dixon, A. R., Spagat, M., & Johnson, N. F. (2009).
Common ecology quantifies human insurgency. Nature, 462(7275), 911-914.
doi:10.1038/nature08631
Bongar, B., Brown, L. M., Beutler, L. E., Breckenridge, J. N., & Zimbardo, P. G. (Eds.).
(2007). Psychology of terrorism. New York, NY: Oxford University.
Borum, R. (2004). Psychology of terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida.
Psychology of terrorism. University of South Florida. ©2004 by Randy Borum.
Reprinted by permission of Randy Borum. Retrieved from
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208552.PDF
Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into violent extremism I: A review of social science
theories. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4), 7-36. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1
Branscombe, N. R., Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1999). The context and
content of social identity threat. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears & B. Doosje (Eds.),
Social identity: Context, commitment, content (pp. 35-58). Oxford, England:
Blackwell Science.
Brechin, S. R., & Ness, G. D. (2013). Looking back at the gap: International
organizations as organizations twenty-five years later. Journal of International
Organizations Studies, 4 (Special Issue), 14-39. Retrieved from http://journaliostudies.org/

165
Breuer, W., Felde, M., & Steininger, B. I. (2017). The financial impact of firm
withdrawals from “state sponsor of terrorism” countries. Journal of Business
Ethics, 144(3), 533-547. doi:10.1007/s10551-015-2814-y
Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this” We”? Levels of collective identity
and self representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(1), 8393. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.1.83
Bruijn, H. D. (2006). One fight, one team: The 9/11 commission report on intelligence,
fragmentation and information. Public Administration, 84(2), 267-287.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2006.00002.x
Bueger, C., & Bethke, F. (2014). Actor-networking the ‘failed state’—an enquiry into the
life of concepts. Journal of International Relations and Development, 17(1), 3060. doi:10.1057/jird.2012.30
Burstein, A. (2018). Armies of God, armies of men: A global comparison of secular and
religious terror organizations. Terrorism and Political Violence, 30(1), 1-21.
doi:10.1080/09546553.2015.1135424
Busch, A. E. (1997). Ronald Reagan and the defeat of the Soviet empire. Presidential
Studies Quarterly, 27(3), 451-466. Retrieved from http://psqjournal.com/psq/
Bush, G. W. (2002a, March 22). Remarks by Mr. George W. Bush, President, at
the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey,
Mexico. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. Retrieved
from http://www.un.org/ffd/2002/statements/usaE.htm

166
Bush, G. W. (2002b). The national security strategy of the United States of America.
Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C. Retrieved from
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a406411.pdf
Buzdar, M. A., Tariq, R. U. H., & Ali, A. (2018). Combating terrorism on intellectual
battlefields: Lenses on the potentials of universities in Pakistan. Higher Education
Policy, 1-20. doi:10.1057/s41307-018-0090-z
Byman, D. (2007). Deadly connections: States that sponsor terrorism. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Byman, D. (2008). Iran, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism, 31(3), 169-181. doi:10.1080/10576100701878424
Byman, D. (2015). Beyond counterterrorism. Foreign Affairs, 94, 11-18. Retrieved from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Call, C. T. (2008). The fallacy of the ‘failed state’. Third World Quarterly, 29(8), 14911507. doi:10.1080/01436590802544207
Campos, N. F., & Gassebner, M. (2013). International terrorism, domestic political
instability, and the escalation effect. Economics & Politics, 25(1), 27-47.
doi:10.1111/ecpo.12002
Cantir, C., & Kaarbo, J. (2012). Contested roles and domestic politics: reflections on role
theory in foreign policy analysis and IR theory. Foreign Policy Analysis, 8(1), 524. doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00156.x
Caplan, B. (2006). Terrorism: the relevance of the rational choice model. Public Choice,
128, 91-107. doi:10.1007/s11127-006-9046-8

167
Carr, C. A. (2016). Civil-Military Engagement Program: Enhancing the Mission of
Regionally Engaged Army Forces. Military Review, 96(2), 60-68. Retrieved from
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Military-Review/
Carroll, D. A., & Stater, K. J. (2008). Revenue diversification in nonprofit organizations:
Does it lead to financial stability?. Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, 19(4), 947-966. doi:10.1093/jopart/mun025
Carson, J. V., & Suppenbach, M. (2018). The global jihadist movement: The most lethal
ideology?. Homicide Studies, 22(1), 8-44. doi:10.1177/1088767917733783
Carter, D. B. (2012). A blessing or a curse? State support for terrorist
groups. International Organization, 66(1), 129-151.
doi:10.1017/s0020818311000312
Carter, R. G., & Scott, J. M. (2010). Understanding congressional foreign policy
innovators: Mapping entrepreneurs and their strategies. The Social Science
Journal, 47(2), p. 418-438. doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2009.12.003
Caruso, R., & Gavrilova, E. (2012). Youth unemployment, terrorism and political
violence, evidence from the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Peace Economics, Peace
Science and Public Policy, 18(2). doi:10.1515/1554-8597.1254
Chauhan, A., & Foster, J. (2014). Representations of poverty in British newspapers: A
case of ‘othering’ the threat?. Journal of Community & Applied Social
Psychology, 24(5), 390-405. doi:10.1002/casp.2179

168
Chen, G., Treviño, L. K., & Hambrick, D. C. (2009). CEO elitist association: Toward a
new understanding of an executive behavioral pattern. The Leadership
Quarterly, 20(3), 316-328. doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2009.03.003
Chenoweth, E. (2013). Terrorism and democracy. Annual Review of Political Science, 16,
355-378. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-221825
Chenoweth, E., Miller, N., McClellan, E., Frisch, H., Staniland, P., & Abrahms, M.
(2009). What makes terrorists tick. International Security, 33(4), 180-202.
doi:10.1162/isec.2009.33.4.180
Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. (2017). Support for terrorism: The role of beliefs in jihad and
institutional responses to terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 1-21.
doi:10.1080/09546553.2017.1313735
Chollet, D. (2016). The long game: How Obama defied Washington and redefined
America’s role in the world. New York, NY: Public Affairs.
Chowdhury, S. K., & Islam, S. (2017). Does terrorism matter in South Asian peace
process? A perspective of India-Pakistan. Journal of Liberty and International
Affairs, 3(2), 19-41. Retrieved from http://e-jlia.com/
Chung-An, C. (2014). Revisiting organizational age, inertia, and adaptability. Journal of
Organizational Change Management, 27(2), 251-272. doi:10.1108/jocm-102012-0166
Coaffee, J. (2006). From counterterrorism to resilience. European Legacy, 11(4), 389403. doi:10.1080/10848770600766094

169
Coggins, B. L. (2015). Does state failure cause terrorism? An empirical analysis (1999–
2008). Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(3), 455-483.
doi:10.1177/0022002713515403
Cohen, B. C. (2015). Press and foreign policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cohen, E. A. (2018). Trump’s lucky year: Why the chaos can’t last. Foreign Affairs, 97,
2-9. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Cohen, S. J., Kruglanski, A., Gelfand, M. J., Webber, D., & Gunaratna, R. (2018). AlQaeda’s propaganda decoded: A psycholinguistic system for detecting variations
in terrorism ideology. Terrorism and Political Violence, 30(1), 142-171.
doi:10.1080/09546553.2016.1165214
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic
Papers, 56(4), 563-595. doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064
Corner, E., & Gill, P. (2015). A false dichotomy? Mental illness and lone-actor
terrorism. Law and Human Behavior, 39(1), 23-34. doi:10.1037/lhb0000102
Corner, E., Gill, P., & Mason, O. (2016). Mental health disorders and the terrorist: A
research note probing selection effects and disorder prevalence. Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, 39(6), 560-568.
Cotter, M. W. (2017). How the presidential transition process works and why this one
will be like no other. American Diplomacy, 1-18.
doi:10.1080/1057610x.2015.1120099
Crenshaw, M. (2001). Counterterrorism policy and the political process. Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, 24(5), 329–337. doi:10.1080/105761001750434204.

170
Crenshaw, M. (2003). Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism, in R. J. Art &
P. M. Cronin (Eds.), The United States and Coercive Diplomacy. Washington,
DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.
Creswell, J.W. (2014). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods
approaches (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Crocker, C. A. (2003). Engaging failed states. Foreign Affairs, 82(5), 32-44. Retrieved
from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Cronin, A. K., (2010). The evolution of counterterrorism: Will tactics trump strategy?
International Affairs, 86(4), 837-856. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00915.x
Cronin, A. K. (2013). Why drones fail: when tactics drive strategy. Foreign Affairs, 92,
44-54. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Cronin, A. K. (2015). ISIS is not a terrorist group: why counterterrorism won’t stop the
latest jihadist threat. Foreign Affairs, 94, 87-98. Retrieved from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Cunningham, D. (2010). Blocking resolution: How external states can prolong civil wars.
Journal of Peace Research, 47(2), 115-127. doi:10.1177/0022343309353488
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). (n.d.). Programs. Retrieved from
http://www.dsca.mil/programs
Desch, M. C. (2010). The more things change, the more they stay the same: the liberal
tradition and Obama’s counterterrorism policy. PS: Political Science &
Politics, 43(3), 425-429. doi: 10.1017/s1049096510000673

171
Destler, I. M. (2015). Presidents, bureaucrats and foreign policy: The politics of
organizational reform. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Desmarais, B. A., & Cranmer, S. J. (2013). Forecasting the locational dynamics of
transnational terrorism: A network analytic approach. Security Informatics, 2(1),
2-8. doi:10.1186/2190-8532-2-8
Djankov, S., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2010). Poverty and civil war: Revisiting the
evidence. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(4), 1035-1041.
doi:10.1162/rest_a_00046
Donnithorne, J. W. (2017). Principled agents: The role of service culture in American
civil-military relations. Orbis, 61(4), 506-526. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2017.08.003
Doosje, B., Moghaddam, F. M., Kruglanski, A. W., de Wolf, A., Mann, L., & Feddes, A.
R. (2016). Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization. Current Opinion in
Psychology, 11, 79-84. doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2016.06.008
Dorff, R. H. (1996). Democratization and failed states: The challenge of
ungovernability. Parameters, 26(2), 17-25. Retrieved from
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/
Douglas, M. (1985). Risk acceptability according to the social sciences. London, United
Kingdom: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Douglas, M., & Wildavsky, A. (1982). Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of
technological and environmental dangers. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.

172
Drees, J. M., & Heugens, P. P. (2013). Synthesizing and extending resource dependence
theory: A meta-analysis. Journal of Management, 39(6), 1666-1698.
doi:10.1177/0149206312471391
Drezner, D. W. (2011). Sanctions sometimes smart: Targeted sanctions in theory and
practice. International Studies Review, 13(1), 96-108. doi:10.1111/j.14682486.2010.01001.x
Durodié, B. (2017). Theory informed by practice. Application informed by purpose. Why
to understand and manage risk, cultural context is the key. Safety Science, 99,
244-254. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2017.04.002
Eckert, S. E. (2008). The use of financial measures to promote security. Journal of
International Affairs, 103-111. Retrieved from https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/
Eisenfeld, B. (2017). The intelligence dilemma: Proximity and politicization–analysis of
external influences. Journal of Strategic Security, 10(2), 6-36. doi:10.5038/19440472.10.2.1583
Eizenstat, S. E., Porter, J. E., & Weinstein, J. M. (2005). Rebuilding weak states. Foreign
Affairs, 84, 134. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Emerson, R. (1962). Power-dependence relations. American Sociological Review, 27(1),
31-41. doi:10.2307/2089716
Emerson, S. (2014). Back to the future: The evolution of US counterterrorism policy in
Africa. Insight on Africa, 6(1), 43-56. doi:10.1177/0975087814532587
Entman, R. M. (2007). Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power. Journal of
Communication, 57(1), 163-173. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00336.x

173
Etzioni, A. (2010). Rational Actors: Neither Mad nor MAD: The Meanings of
Rationality, Rogue States and Terrorists. Defense & Security Analysis, 26(4), 431438. doi:10.1080/14751798.2010.534650
Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.). What we investigate: Terrorism. Retrieved from
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism
Feith, D. (2008). War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the war on
terrorism. New York, NY: Harper Collins.
Feldman, R. L. (2009). The root causes of terrorism: Why parts of Africa might never be
at peace. Defence & Security Analysis, 25(4), 355-372.
doi:10.1080/14751790903416707
Felle, T. (2016). Digital watchdogs? Data reporting and the news media’s traditional
‘fourth estate’ function. Journalism, 17(1), 85-96.
doi:10.1177/1464884915593246
Fernandez, S., & Moldogaziev, T. (2015). Employee empowerment and job satisfaction
in the US Federal Bureaucracy: A self-determination theory perspective. The
American Review of Public Administration, 45(4), 375-401.
doi:10.1177/0275074013507478
Fessenden, H. (2005). The limits of intelligence reform. Foreign Affairs, 84, 106.
Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Findley, M. G., Piazza, J. A., & Young, J. K. (2012). Games rivals play: Terrorism in
international rivalries. The Journal of Politics, 74(1), 235-248.
doi:10.1017/s0022381611001551

174
Fischer, P., Haslam, S. A., & Smith, L. (2010). “If you wrong us, shall we not revenge?”
Social identity salience moderates support for retaliation in response to collective
threat. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 14(2), 143-150.
doi:10.1037/a0017970
Francis, M. D. (2016). Why the “sacred” is a better resource than “religion” for
understanding terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 28(5), 912-927.
doi:10.1080/09546553.2014.976625
François, M., & Sud, I. (2006). Promoting stability and development in fragile and failed
states. Development Policy Review, 24(2), 141-160. doi:10.1111/j.14677679.2006.00319.x
Frazier, D. V., & Hutto, J. W. (2017). The socialization of military power: security
cooperation and doctrine development through multinational military
exercises. Defence Studies, 17(4), 379-397. doi:10.1080/14702436.2017.1377050
Freeman, M. (2011). The sources of terrorist financing: theory and typology. Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 34(6), 461-475. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2011.571193
Frey, B. S., & Luechinger, S. (2004). Decentralization as a disincentive for terror.
European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 509-515.
doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.03.001
Frum, D., & Perle, R. N. (2003). An end to evil: How to win the war on terror. New
York, NY: Random House.
Fukuyama, F. (2004). State building, governance and world order in the twenty first
century. London, United Kingdom: Profile Books.

175
Gabaccia, D. R. (2017). Diaspora lobbies and the U.S. government: Convergence and
divergence in making foreign policy. Refuge, 33(1), 109-111. doi:10.1163/24681733_shafr_sim290060017
Gadarian, S. K. (2010). The politics of threat: How terrorism news shapes foreign policy
attitudes. The Journal of Politics, 72(2), 469-483.
doi:10.1017/s0022381609990910
Garamone, J. (2018, February 12). President’s fiscal 2019 defense budget request calls
for $686.1 billion. DoD News, Defense Media Activity (online). Retrieved from
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1439211/presidents-fiscal-2019defense-budget-request-calls-for-6861-billion/
Blake E. Garcia, B. E., & Geva, N. (2016). Security versus liberty in the context
of counterterrorism: An experimental approach. Terrorism and Political Violence, 28(1),
30-48. doi: 10.1080/09546553.2013.878704
Garfinkle, A. (2005). A conversation with Condoleezza Rice. American Interest, 1(1),
47-50. doi:10.1002/abc.21185
Garicano, L., & Posner, R. A. (2005). Intelligence failures: An organizational economics
perspective. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 151-170.
doi:10.1257/089533005775196723
Gates, R. (2014). Duty: Memoirs of a secretary at war. New York, NY: Random House.
George, J. (2016). State failure and transnational terrorism: An empirical
analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(3), 471-495.
doi:10.1177/0022002716660587

176
George, R. Z. (2017). The national security enterprise: Navigating the labyrinth.
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014). Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest
groups, and average citizens. Perspectives on politics, 12(3), 564-581.
doi:10.1017/s1537592714001595
Gill, P. (2015). Lone-actor terrorists: A behavioural analysis. London, United Kingdom:
Routledge.
Gill, P., Horgan, J., & Deckert, P. (2014). Bombing alone: Tracing the motivations and
antecedent behaviors of lone-actor terrorists. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 59,
142–159. doi:10.1111/1556-4029.12312
Ginges, J., & Atran, S. (2009). What motivates participation in violent political action.
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1167(1), 115-123.
doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04543.x
Githens-Mazer, J., & Lambert, R. (2010). Why conventional wisdom on radicalization
fails: The persistence of a failed discourse. International Affairs, 86(4), 889-901.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00918.x
Golby, J., & Karlin, M. (2018). Why “best military advice” is bad for the military—and
worse for civilians. Orbis, 62(1), 137-153. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2017.11.010
Goldberg, J. (2016, June 15). What Obama actually thinks about radical Islam: The
president does not suffer illusions about the pathologies afflicting the broader
Muslim world. The Atlantic. Retrieved from

177
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/06/obama-radicalislam/487079/
Goldsmith, J. (2009, May 18). The Cheney fallacy. The New Republic (online). Retrieved
from http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-cheney-fallacy
Goodnight, G. T. (1986). Ronald Reagan’s re‐formulation of the rhetoric of war: Analysis
of the “zero option,”“evil empire,” and “star wars” addresses. Quarterly Journal
of Speech, 72(4), 390-414. doi: 10.1080/00335638609383784
Graber, D. A., & Dunaway, J. (2017). Mass media and American politics. Thousand
Oaks, CA: CQ Press.
Grävingholt, J., Ziaja, S., & Kreibaum, M. (2015). Disaggregating state fragility: A
method to establish a multidimensional empirical typology. Third World
Quarterly, 36(7), 1281-1298. doi:10.1080/01436597.2015.1038340
Grossmann, M. (2012). Interest group influence on US policy change: An assessment
based on policy history. Interest Groups & Advocacy, 1(2), 171-192.
doi:10.1057/iga.2012.9
Gruenewald, J., Chermak, S., & Freilich, J. (2013). Distinguishing ‘loner’ attacks from
other domestic extremist violence. Criminology & Public Policy, 12, 65–91.
doi:10.1111/1745-9133.12008
Guest, G., Bunce, A., & Johnson, L. (2006). How many interviews are enough? An
experiment with data saturation and variability. Field Methods, 18(1), 59–82.
doi:10.1177/1525822X05279903

178
Guilhot, N. (2016). The Kuhning of reason: Realism, rationalism, and political decision
in IR theory after Thomas Kuhn. Review of International Studies, 42(1), 3-24.
doi:10.1017/s0260210515000054
Gunning, J. (2009). Social movement theory and the study of terrorism, in R. Jackson, M.
B. Smyth, & J. Gunning (Eds.), Critical Terrorism Studies, 170-191. London,
United Kingdom: Routledge.
Gunning, J., & Jackson, R. (2011). What’s so ‘religious’ about ‘religious
terrorism’?. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4(3), 369-388. doi:
10.1080/17539153.2011.623405
Gvosdev, N. K. (2017). How U.S. national security decisions are made. Orbis, 61(1), 2733. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2016.12.005
Haass, R. N. (2013). The irony of American strategy: putting the Middle East in proper
perspective. Foreign Affairs, 92(3), 57-67. Retrieved from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Haass, R. (2017). A world in disarray: American foreign policy and the crisis of the old
order. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
Hain, S., & Pisoiu, D. (2017). Theories of terrorism: an introduction. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Halperin, M. H., & Clapp, P. (2007). Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy, 2nd Ed.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

179
Hamilt, N. B., & Gray, D. H. (2012). Decentralized terrorism: Ramifications for a
centralized international system. Global Security Studies, 3(2), 24-42. Retrieved
from https://academic.oup.com/jogss
Hamre, J., & Sullivan, G. (2002). Toward postconflict reconstruction. The Washington
Quarterly, 25(4), 83-96. doi:10.1162/016366002760252554
Hanitzsch, T., & Vos, T. P. (2016). Journalism beyond democracy: A new look into
journalistic roles in political and everyday life. Journalism, 19(2), 146-164.
doi:10.1177/1464884916673386
Hassan, G. (2013). Groupthink principles and fundamentals in organizations.
Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 5(8), 225-240.
Retrieved from https://ijcrb.webs.com/
Hehir, A. (2007). The myth of the failed state and the war on terror: A challenge to the
conventional wisdom. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1(3), 307-332.
doi:10.1080/17502970701592256
Hersman, R. K. (2010). Friends and foes: How congress and the president really make
foreign policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Hewitt, C. (2003). Understanding terrorism in America. New York, NY: Routledge.
Hills, A. (2006). Trojan horses? USAID, counter-terrorism and Africa’s police. Third
World Quarterly, 27(4), 629-643. doi: 10.1080/01436590600720843
Hirshleifer, J. (1991). The technology of conflict as an economic activity. The American
Economic Review, 81(2), 130-134. Retrieved from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/aer

180
Hoffman, B. (2011). The rationality of terrorism and other forms of political violence:
lessons from the Jewish campaign in Palestine, 1939-1947, Small Wars &
Insurgencies, 22(2), 258-272. doi:10.1080/09592318.2011.573394
Hoffman, B., & McCormick, G. (2004). Terrorism, signaling, and suicide attack. Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism, 27, 243-281. doi:10.1080/10576100490466498
Hoffman, F. G., & Neuhard, R. (2016). Avoiding strategic inertia: Enabling the national
security council. Orbis, 60(2), 217-236. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2016.01.003
Holtmann, P. (2013). Countering al-Qaeda’s single narrative. Perspectives on
Terrorism, 7(2). Retrieved from
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/262/html
Horne, C., & Bestvater, S. (2016). Assessing the effects of changes in British
counterterrorism policy on radical Islamist networks in the UK, 1999–
2008. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 8(2), 87-110.
doi:10.1080/19434472.2015.1054413
Howard, T. (2010). The tragedy of failure: Evaluating state failure and its impact on the
spread of refugees, terrorism, and war. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC.
Howard, T. (2016). Failed states and the origins of violence: A comparative analysis of
state failure as a root cause of terrorism and political violence. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Howe, B. (2010). Between normality and uniqueness: Unwrapping the enigma of
Japanese security policy decision-making. Modern Asian Studies, 44(6), 13131336. doi:10.1017/s0026749x09000043

181
Howell, J., & Lind, J. (2009). Changing donor policy and practice in civil society in the
post-9/11 aid context. Third World Quarterly, 30(7), 1279-1296.
doi:10.1080/01436590903134924
Hoyt, P. D. (2000). The ‘rogue state’ image in American foreign policy. Global
Society, 14(2), 297-310. doi:10.1080/13600820050008494
Huddy, L. (2001). From social to political identity: A critical examination of social
identity theory. Political psychology, 22(1), 127-156. doi:10.1111/0162895x.00230
Hulme, J. A. (2014). Psychological literacy: From classroom to real world. The
Psychologist, 27, 932-935. Retrieved from https://digest.bps.org.uk/thepsychologist/
Huntington, S. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New
York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Huse, M. (2008). Accountability and creating accountability: A framework for exploring
behavioural perspectives of corporate governance. In M. Huse (Ed.), The Value
Creating Board, 51-72). London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
Ibrahim, R. (2007). The Al Qaeda reader: The essential texts of Osama bin Laden’s
terrorist organization. New York, NY: Broadway Books.
Ibrahim, M. (2010). Somalia and global terrorism: A growing connection? Journal of
Contemporary African Studies, 28(3), 283-295.
doi:10.1080/02589001.2010.497350

182
Ideology. (2018). Oxford Dictionary – online. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ideology
Intriligator, M. D. (2010). The economics of terrorism. Economic Inquiry, 48(1), 1-13.
doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00287.x
Isaacs, M. (2017). Faith in contention: Explaining the salience of religion in ethnic
conflict. Comparative Political Studies, 50(2), 200-231.
doi:10.1177/0010414016655534
Jackson, R. (2008). The ghosts of state terror: Knowledge, politics and terrorism
studies. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 1(3), 377-392.
doi:10.1080/17539150802515046
Jackson, R. (2011). Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change
in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama. International Politics, 48(23), 390-411. doi:10.1057/ip.2011.5
Jackson, R. (2015a). Groundhog day and the repetitive failure of western
counterterrorism policy in the Middle East. Insight Turkey, 17(3), 35-44. retrieved
from https://www.insightturkey.com/
Jackson, R. (2015b). The epistemological crisis of counterterrorism. Critical Studies on
Terrorism, 8(1), 33-54. doi:10.1080/17539153.2015.1009762
Jackson, R. H. (1990). Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International relations and the third
world. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

183
Jackson, R., Toros, H., Jarvis, L., & Heath-Kelly, C. (2017). Introduction: 10 years of
critical studies on terrorism. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 10(2), 197-202.
doi:10.1080/17539153.2017.1338279
Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J., & Breen-Smyth, M. (2011). Terrorism: A critical
introduction. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jacques, K., & Taylor, P. J. (2013). Myths and realities of female-perpetrated
terrorism. Law and Human Behavior, 37(1), 35-44. doi:10.1037/h0093992
Jakobsen, P. V. (2011). Pushing the limits of military coercion theory. International
Studies Perspectives, 12(2), 153-170. doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00425.x
Janis, I. L. (1971). Groupthink: The desperate drive for consensus at any cost. Psychology
Today, 5, 43-44. Retrieved from
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/magazine/archive
Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy
decisions and fiascoes. Oxford, England: Houghton Mifflin.
Janis, I. L. (1982). Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy
decisions and fiascoes, 2nd Edition. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Janis, I. L. (1989). Crucial decisions: Leadership in policy-making and management.
New York, NY: Free Press.
Jarvis, L., & Lister, M. (2014). State terrorism research and critical terrorism studies: an
assessment. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(1), 43-61.
doi:10.1080/17539153.2013.877669

184
Jarvis, L., & Lister, M. (2016). What would you do? Everyday conceptions and
constructions of counter-terrorism. Politics, 36(3), 277-291.
doi:10.1177/0263395715613644
Jiries, T. D. (2016). Rise of radicalization in the global village. Online radicalization vs.
in-person radicalization-is there a difference?. Journal for Deradicalization, (6),
206-230. Retrieved from http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd
Johnson, R. (2002). Defending ways of life: The (anti-) terrorist rhetorics of Bush and
Blair. Theory, Culture & Society, 19(4), 211-231.
doi:10.1177/0263276402019004015
Johnson, J., & Hauslohner, A. (2017, May 20). ‘I think Islam hates us’: A timeline of
Trump’s comments about Islam and Muslims. The Washington Post. Retrieved
from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-thinkislam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-andmuslims/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.015df276a845
Jones, B. G. (2008). The global political economy of social crisis: Towards a critique of
the ‘failed state’ ideology. Review of International Political Economy, 15(2), 180205. doi:10.1080/09692290701869688
Jordan, J. (2009). When heads roll: Assessing the effectiveness of leadership
decapitation. Security Studies, 18(4), 719-755. doi:10.1080/09636410903369068
Jordan, J., Kosal, M. E., & Rubin, L. (2016). The strategic illogic of counterterrorism
policy. The Washington Quarterly, 39(4), 181-192.
doi:10.1080/0163660x.2016.1261564

185
Kallberg, J., & Thuraisingham, B. (2014). After the ‘war on terror’—how to maintain
long-range terrorist deterrence. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter
Terrorism, 9(1), 19-31. doi:10.1080/18335330.2013.877376
Kassop, N. (2013). Rivals for Influence on Counterterrorism Policy: White House
Political Staff Versus Executive Branch Legal Advisors. Presidential Studies
Quarterly, 43(2), 252-273. doi:10.1111/psq.12023
Kean, T. H., & Hamilton, L. (2004). 9/11 commission report: Final report of the national
commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States. National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office.
Keane, C., & Diesen. G. (2015). Divided we stand: The U.S. foreign policy
bureaucracy and nation-building in Afghanistan. International Peacekeeping,
22(3), 205–229. doi:10.1080/13533312.2015.1039456
Kenney, M. (2010). Beyond the Internet: Mētis, Techne, and the limitations of online
artifacts for Islamist terrorists. Terrorism and Political Violence, 22(2), 177-197.
doi:10.1080/09546550903554760
Kerlin, J. A., & Pollak, T. H. (2011). Nonprofit commercial revenue: A replacement for
declining government grants and private contributions?. The American Review of
Public Administration, 41(6), 686-704. doi:10.1177/0275074010387293
Kertzer, J. D., & Tingley, D. (2018). Political psychology in international relations:
Beyond the paradigms. Annual Review of Political Science, 21, 319-339.
doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-020042

186
Khan, M. M., & Azam, A. (2008). Root causes of terrorism: An empirical
analysis. Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 20(1/2), 65-86. Retrieved from
https://www.jis3.org/category/journal
Klaidman, D. (2012). Kill or capture: The war on terror and the soul of the Obama
presidency. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Klandermans, P. G. (2014). Identity politics and politicized identities: Identity processes
and the dynamics of protest. Political Psychology, 35(1), 1-22.
doi:10.1111/pops.12167
Klein, D. B., & Stern, C. (2009). Groupthink in academia: Majoritarian departmental
politics and the professional pyramid. The Independent Review, 13(4), 585-600.
Retrieved from http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/
Knox, S., & Burkard, A. (2009). Qualitative research interviews. Psychotherapy
Research, 19, 566-575. doi:10.1080/10503300802702105.
Kopp, H., & Gillespie, C. A. (2008). Career diplomacy: Life and work in the U.S. foreign
service. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Kraft, M., & Marks, E. (2011). U.S. government counterterrorism: A guide to who does
what, 1st Ed. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Krasner, S. D., & Pascual, C. (2005). Addressing state failure. Foreign affairs, 153-163.
Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Krebs, R. R., & Lobasz, J. K. (2007). Fixing the meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, coercion,
and the road to war in Iraq. Security Studies, 16(3), 409-451.
doi:10.1080/09636410701547881

187
Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2011). What causes terrorism? Public Choice, 147(1-2), 327. doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9601-1
Krueger, A., & Malecˇkova´, J. (2003). Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a
causal connection?. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 119-144.
doi:10.1257/089533003772034925
Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Bélanger, J. J., Sheveland, A., Hetiarachchi, M., &
Gunaratna, R. (2014). The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: How
significance quest impacts violent extremism. Political Psychology, 35, 69-93.
doi:10.1111/pops.12163
Kuwashima, K. (2014). How to use models of organizational decision making?. Annals of
Business Administrative Science, 13(4), 215-230. doi:10.7880/abas.13.215
Kuzner, L. A. (2007). Rationality wars and the war on terror: Explaining terrorism and
social unrest. American Anthropologist, 109(2), 318–329.
doi:10.1525/aa.2007.109.2.318
Lantis, J. S. (2009). Strategic culture: From Clausewitz to constructivism, in J. L.
Johnson, K. M. Kartchner, & J. A. Larsen (Eds.), Strategic Culture and Weapons
of Mass Destruction, 33-52. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Laqueur, W. (1987). The age of terrorism. Boston: Little, Brown.
Latham, G. P., Borgogni, L., & Petitta, L. (2008). Goal setting and performance
management in the public sector. International Public Management
Journal, 11(4), 385-403. doi:10.1080/10967490802491087

188
Lauren, P. G., Craig, G. A., & George, A. L., (2007). Force and statecraft: Diplomatic
challenges of our time, 4th Ed. London, United Kingdom: Oxford University
Press.
Lavis, V. (2010). Multiple researcher identities: Highlighting tensions and implications
for ethical practices in qualitative interviewing. Qualitative Research in
Psychology, 7, 316-331. doi:10.1080/14780880902929506
Lee, C. Y. (2016). Terrorism, counterterrorism aid, and foreign direct
investment. Foreign Policy Analysis, 13(1), 168-187. doi:10.1111/fpa.12087
Leedy, P. D., & Ormrod, J. E. (2010). Practical research: Planning and design (9th ed.).
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.
Littler, M. (2017). Rethinking democracy and terrorism: a quantitative analysis of
attitudes to democratic politics and support for terrorism in the UK. Behavioral
Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 9(1), 52-61.
doi:10.1080/19434472.2016.1245211
Lint, W., & Kassa, W. (2015). Evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy: Failure, fraud, or
fruitful spectacle? Critical Criminology, 23(3), 349-369. doi:10.1007/s10612-0149264-1
Lunenburg, F. C. (2010). Group decision making: The potential for
groupthink. International Journal of Management, Business, and
Administration, 13(1), 1-6. Retrieved from
https://www.scribd.com/document/221890082/International-Journal-ofManagement-Business-And-Administration

189
Macagno, T. (2013). A model for managing corporate sustainability. Business and
Society Review, 118(2), 223-252. doi:10.1111/basr.12009
Malatesta, D., & Smith, C. R. (2014). Lessons from resource dependence theory for
contemporary public and nonprofit management. Public Administration
Review, 74(1), 14-25. doi:10.1111/puar.12181
Mallaby, S. (2002). The reluctant imperialist: terrorism, failed states, and the case for
American empire. Foreign Affairs, 81(2), 2-7. Retrieved from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Maller, T. (2010). Diplomacy derailed: The consequences of diplomatic sanctions. The
Washington Quarterly, 33(3), 61-79. doi:10.1080/0163660x.2010.492341
Mann, T. (2010). A question of balance: The president, the Congress and foreign policy.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Mann, J. (2012). The Obamians: The struggle inside the White House to redefine
American power. New York, NY: Viking.
Marrin, S. (2007). At arm’s length or at the elbow? Explaining the distance between
analysts and decisionmakers. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 20, 401-414. doi:10.1080/08850600701249733
Marsh, K. (2014). Obama’s surge: a bureaucratic politics analysis of the decision to order
a troop surge in the Afghanistan war. Foreign Policy Analysis, 10(3), 265-288.
doi:10.1111/fpa.12000
Martin, G. (2017). Understanding terrorism: Challenges, perspectives, and issues.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

190
Marvel, M. K., & Marvel, H. P. (2008). Government-to-government contracting:
Stewardship, agency, and substitution. International Public Management Journal,
11(2), 171-192. doi:10.1080/10967490802095870
Masha, E. M. (2014). The case for data driven strategic decision making. European
Journal of Business and Management, 137-146. Retrieved from
https://www.ejbmr.org/index.php/ejbmr
Mason, M. (2010). Sample size and saturation in PhD studies using qualitative
interviews. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social
Research, 11(3), article 8. Retrieved from http://www.qualitativeresearch.net/index.php/fqs
Maxwell, J. A. (2013). Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Mazarr, M. J. (2014). The rise and fall of the failed-state paradigm: Requiem for a decade
of distraction. Foreign Affairs, 93(1), 113-121. Retrieved from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of political radicalization:
Pathways toward terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3), 415-433.
doi:10.1080/09546550802073367
McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2014). Toward a profile of lone wolf terrorists: What
moves an individual from radical opinion to radical action. Terrorism and
Political Violence, 26(1), 69-85. doi:10.1080/09546553.2014.849916

191
McConnell, A. (2010). Policy success, policy failure and grey areas in-between. Journal
of Public Policy, 30(3), 345–362. doi:10.1017/S0143814X10000152.
McConnell, A. (2016). A public policy approach to understanding the nature and causes
of foreign policy failure. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(5), 667-684.
doi:10.1080/13501763.2015.1127278
McCormick, J. M. (Ed.) (2012). The domestic sources of American foreign policy:
insights and evidence. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
McCrisken, T. (2013). Obama’s drone war. Survival, 55(2), 97-122.
doi:10.1080/00396338.2013.784469
McGann, J. (2007). Think tanks and policy advice in the U.S.: Academics, advisors and
advocates. New York, NY: Routledge.
McIntosh, C. (2015). Counterterrorism as war: Identifying the dangers, risks, and
opportunity costs of U.S. strategy toward al Qaeda and its affiliates. Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 38(1), 23-38. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2014.974408
Medvetz, T. (2012). Think tanks in America. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago
Press.
Meijer, I. C., & Bijleveld, H. P. (2016). Valuable journalism: Measuring news quality
from a user’s perspective. Journalism Studies, 17(7), 827-839. Retrieved from
https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rjos20/current
Melucci, A. (1995). The process of collective identity. Social Movements and Culture, 4,
41-63. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511520891.006

192
Menon, S. T. (2012). Human resource practices, supply chain performance, and
wellbeing. International Journal of Manpower, 33(7), 769-785.
doi:10.1108/01437721211268311
Merari, A. (2010). Driven to death: Psychological and social aspects of suicide
terrorism. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004). Economic shocks and civil conflict: An
instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4), 725-753.
doi:10.1086/421174
Miles, W. F. (2012). Deploying development to counter terrorism: Post-9/11
transformation of US foreign aid to Africa. African Studies Review, 55(3), 27-60.
doi:10.1017/s0002020600007198
Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldaña, J. (2014). Qualitative data analysis: A
methods sourcebook (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). (n.d.). Our impact. Retrieved from
https://www.mcc.gov/our-impact
Miller, G. D. (2013). Terrorist decision making and the deterrence problem. Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 36(2), 132-151. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2013.747075
Miller, P. D. (2013). The contemporary presidency: Organizing the national security
council: I like Ike’s. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 592-606.
doi:10.1111/psq.12047
Milner, H., & Tingley, D. (2015). Sailing the water’s edge: The domestic politics of
American foreign policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

193
Mintz, A., & Brule, D. (2009). Methodological issues in studying suicide
terrorism. Political Psychology, 30(3), 365-371. doi:10.1111/j.14679221.2009.00700.x
Mitchell, D., & Massoud, T. G. (2009). Anatomy of failure: Bush’s decision-making
process and the Iraq war. Foreign Policy Analysis, 5(3), 265-286.
doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2009.00093.x
Modirzadeh, N. K., Lewis, D. A., & Bruderlein, C. (2011). Humanitarian engagement
under counter-terrorism: A conflict of norms and the emerging policy
landscape. International Review of the Red Cross, 93(883), 623-647.
doi:10.1017/s1816383112000033
Monroy, M. C., & Sánchez, F. (2017). Foreign policy analysis and the making of plan
Colombia. Global Society, 31(2), 245-271. doi:10.1080/13600826.2016.1269057
Morello, C. (2015, January 23). Root causes of extremism must be addressed, Kerry tells
Davos crowd. The Washington Post. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/root-causes-of-extremism-must-beaddressed-kerry-tells-davos-crowd/2015/01/23/48502e98-a330-11e4-91fc7dff95a14458_story.html?utm_term=.eac9f7ceeadf
Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., & Krustev, V. (2009). The threat and imposition of economic
sanctions, 1971—2000. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26(1), 92-110.
doi:10.1177/0738894208097668
Morin, J. F., & Paquin, J. (2018). What Is the Influence of the Bureaucracy?. In Foreign
Policy Analysis: A Toolbox, 101-125. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

194
Morse, J. M., & Field, P. A. (1995). Qualitative research method for health professional
(2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2011). The psychology of lone-wolf terrorism.
Counseling Psychology Quarterly, 24(2), 115–126.
doi:10.1080/09515070.2011.581835
Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Mulgan, G. (2006). Thinking in tanks: The changing ecology of political ideas. The
Political Quarterly, 77(2), 147-155. doi:10.1111/j.1467-923x.2006.00757.x
Murdoch, D. D. (2016). Psychological literacy: proceed with caution, construction
ahead. Psychology Research and Behavior Management, 9, 189-199.
doi:10.2147/prbm.s88646
Mythen, G., & Walklate, S. (2006). Communicating the terrorist risk: Harnessing a
culture of fear?. Crime, Media, Culture, 2(2), 123-142.
doi:10.1177/1741659006065399
Nacos, B. L. (2012). Terrorism and counterterrorism (4th ed.). New York, NY: Pearson.
Nalbandov, R. (2013). Irrational rationality of terrorism. Journal of Strategic
Security, 6(4), 92-102. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.6.4.5
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). (2017, August). Today’s NCTC. Retrieved
from https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/features_documents/NCTCPrimer_FINAL.pdf

195
Nemati, A. R., Bhatti, A. M., Maqsal, M., Mansoor, I., & Naveed, F. (2010). Impact of
resource based view and resource dependence theory on strategic decision
making. International journal of business and management, 5(12), 110-115.
doi:10.5539/ijbm.v5n12p110
Neo, L. S., Khader, M., Ang, J., Ong, G., & Tan, E. (2017). Developing an early
screening guide for jihadi terrorism: A behavioural analysis of 30 terror
attacks. Security Journal, 30(1), 227-246. doi:10.1057/sj.2014.44
Neumayer, E., & Plümper, T. (2011). Foreign terror on Americans. Journal of Peace
Research, 48(1), 3-17. doi:10.1177/0022343310390147
Newhouse, J. (2009). Diplomacy, Inc.: The influence of lobbies on US foreign
policy. Foreign Affairs, 73-92. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Newman, E., (2006). Exploring the ‘root causes’ of terrorism. Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 29, 749-772. doi:10.1080/10576100600704069
Newman, E. (2007). Weak states, state failure, and terrorism. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 19(4), 463-488. doi:10.1080/09546550701590636
Nicander, L. (2015). The role of think tanks in the U.S. security policy environment,
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 28(3), 480-501.
doi:10.1080/08850607.2015.1022462
Nicander, L. (2016). The recipe for think tank success: The perspective of insiders.
International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence, 29(4), 738-759. doi:
10.1080/08850607.2016.1177397

196
Nienhüser, W. (2008). Resource dependence theory-How well does it explain behavior of
organizations?. Management Revue, 19(1/2), 9-32. doi:10.5771/0935-9915-20081-2-9
Nussbaum, B. (2012). From Brescia to Bin Laden: The NYPD, International Policing,
and “National” Security. Journal of Applied Security Research, 7(2), 178-202.
doi:10.1080/19361610.2012.656251
Obama, B. (2010). National security strategy of the United States (2010). National
Security Strategy Archive. Retrieved from http://nssarchive.us/national-securitystrategy-2010/
Office of the Director for National Intelligence (ODNI). (n.d.). The national
counterterrorism center. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctchome
O’Hara, M. (2007). Psychological literacy for an emerging global society: Another look
at Rogers’ “persons of tomorrow” as a model. Person-Centered & Experiential
Psychotherapies, 6(1), 45-60. doi:10.1080/14779757.2007.9688427
Omelicheva, M., Carter, B., & Campbell, L. B. (2017). Military aid and human rights:
assessing the impact of US security assistance programs. Political Science
Quarterly, 132(1), 119-145. doi:10.1002/polq.12575
Onapajo, H., & Uzodike, U. O. (2012). Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: Man, the state,
and the international system. African Security Review, 21(3), 24-39.
doi:10.1080/10246029.2012.687693

197
Ortiz, C. W., Hendricks, N. J., & Sugie, N. F. (2007). Policing terrorism: The response of
local police agencies to homeland security concerns. Criminal Justice
Studies, 20(2), 91-109. doi:10.1080/14786010701396830
Orwell, G. (1950). 1984. New York, NY: Signet Classics, Penguin Group, Inc.
O’Sullivan, M. L. (2010). Iran and the great sanctions debate. The Washington
Quarterly, 33(4), 7-21. doi:10.1080/0163660x.2010.516638
Owen, J. M. IV (2014). Confronting political Islam: Six lessons from the West’s past.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pape, R. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. American Political Science
Review, 97(3), 1-19. doi:10.1017/s000305540300073x
Patrick, S. (2007). “Failed” states and global security: Empirical questions and policy
dilemmas. International Studies Review, 9(4), 644-662. doi:10.1111/j.14682486.2007.00728.x
Patrick, S. M. (2016, January 13). States of failure and disunion, at home and abroad.
Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/blog/statesfailure-and-disunion-home-and-abroad
Patton, M. Q. (2014). Qualitative research & evaluation methods (4th ed.). Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G. (1978). The resource dependency of organizations: A resource
dependence perspective. New York, NY: Harper & Row Press.
Phillips, J. (2005, October 7). Bush speech clarifies the war against terrorism. The
Heritage Foundation (online). Retrieved from

198
https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/bush-speech-clarifies-the-war-againstterrorism
Phillips, P. J. (2009). Applying modern portfolio theory to the analysis of terrorism.
computing the set of attack method combinations from which the rational terrorist
group will choose in order to maximise injuries and fatalities. Defence and Peace
Economics, 20(3), 193-213. doi:10.1080/10242690801923124
Piaker, Z. (2016, March 16). Help wanted: 4,000 presidential appointees. Partnership for
Public Service, Center for Presidential Transition. Retrieved from
http://presidentialtransition.org/blog/posts/160316_help-wanted-4000appointees.php
Piazza, J. A. (2006). Rooted in poverty?: Terrorism, poor economic development, and
social cleavages. Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(1), 159-177.
doi:10.1080/095465590944578
Piazza, J. A. (2007). Draining the swamp: Democracy promotion, state failure, and
terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern countries. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(6),
521-539. doi:10.1080/10576100701329576
Piazza, J. A. (2008). Incubators of terror: Do failed and failing states promote
transnational terrorism?. International Studies Quarterly, 52(3), 469-488.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00511.x
Piazza, J. A. (2011). Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic
terrorism. Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), 339-353.
doi:10.1177/0022343310397404

199
Piazza, J. A. (2017). The determinants of domestic right-wing terrorism in the USA:
Economic grievance, societal change and political resentment. Conflict
management and peace science, 34(1), 52-80. doi:10.1177/0738894215570429
Pilecki, A., Muro, J. M., Hammack, P. L., & Clemons, C. M. (2014). Moral exclusion
and the justification of US counterterrorism strategy: Bush, Obama, and the
terrorist enemy figure. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 20(3),
285-299. doi:10.1037/pac0000030
Policy. (2018a). Merriam Webster Dictionary (online). Retrieved from
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy
Policy. (2018b). Oxford University Dictionary (online). Retrieved from
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/policy
Political Appointee Tracker. (2018, April 18). Partnership for Public Service. Retrieved
from https://ourpublicservice.org/issues/presidential-transition/politicalappointee-tracker.php
Pop, D. (2016). Misrepresentation of Muslims and Islamophobic public discourses in
recent Romanian media narratives. Journal for the Study of Religions and
Ideologies, 15(44), 33-51. Retrieved from https://www.jsri.ro/
Pouliot, V. (2016). Hierarchy in practice: Multilateral diplomacy and the governance of
international security. European Journal of International Security, 1(1), 5-26.
doi:10.1017/eis.2015.4
Powell, C. (2009, October 22). No country left behind. Foreign Policy (online). Retrieved
from http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/22/no-country-left-behind/

200
Prentice, S., Taylor, P. J., Rayson, P., & Giebels, E. (2012). Differentiating act from
ideology: Evidence from messages for and against violent extremism. Negotiation
and conflict management research, 5(3), 289-306. doi:10.1111/j.17504716.2012.00103.x
Priest, D., & Arkin, W. M. (2012). Top secret America: The rise of the new American
security state. New York, NY: Little, Brown, and Company.
Quiggin, T. (2009). Understanding al-Qaeda’s ideology for counter-narrative
work. Perspectives on Terrorism, 3(2), 18-24. Retrieved from
https://www.uml.edu/research/ctss/perspectives-on-terrorism.aspx
Qvortrup, M., & Lijphart, A. (2013). Domestic terrorism and democratic regime
types. Civil Wars, 15(4), 471-485. doi:10.1080/13698249.2013.853415
Ramakrishna, K. (2017). The Threat of Terrorism and Extremism: A matter of when, and
not if. Southeast Asian Affairs, 2017(1), 335-350. doi:10.1355/9789814762878022
Ravitch, S. M., & Carl, N. M. (2016). Qualitative research: Bridging the conceptual,
theoretical, and methodological. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Redd, S. B., & Mintz, A. (2013). Policy perspectives on national security and foreign
policy decision making. Policy Studies Journal, 41, S11-S37.
doi:10.1111/psj.12010
Regan, P. (2002). Third-party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 55-73. doi:10.1177/0022002702046001004

201
Rehg, M. T., Gundlach, M. J., & Grigorian, R. A. (2012). Examining the influence of
cross-cultural training on cultural intelligence and specific self-efficacy. Cross
Cultural Management: An International Journal, 19(2), 215-232.
doi:10.1108/13527601211219892
Reinwald, B. R. (2007). Assessing the national counterterrorism center’s effectiveness in
the global war on terror. Carlisle, PA: Army War College.
Ren, H., Gray, B., & Kim, K. (2009). Performance of international joint ventures: What
factors really make a difference and how? Journal of Management, 35(3), 805832. doi:10.1177/0149206308331165
Reveron, D. S. (2016). Exporting security: International engagement, security
cooperation, and the changing face of the US military. Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press.
Rice, S. E. (2003, February). The new national security strategy: Focus on failed states.
Brookings Institute, Policy Briefing #116. Retrieved from
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/pb116.pdf
Richards, L., & Morse, J. M. (2013). Readme first for a user’s guide to qualitative
methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Richardson, L. (1998). Global rebels. Harvard International Review, 20(4), 52-57.
Retrieved from https://worldwide.harvard.edu/harvard-international-review
Richardson, L. (1999). Terrorists as transnational actors. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 11(4), 209-219. doi:10.1080/09546559908427541

202
Riedel, B. (2008). Pakistan and terror: The eye of the storm. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 618(1), 31-45.
doi:10.1177/0002716208316746
Rieff, D. (1999). A new age of liberal imperialism?. World Policy Journal, 16(2), 1-11.
Retrieved from https://worldpolicy.org/journal/
Rivas, J. L. (2012). Co-opting the environment: an empirical test of resource-dependence
theory. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 23(2), 294311. doi:10.1080/09585192.2011.610952
Robinson, P. (2001). Theorizing the influence of media on world politics: Models of
media influence on foreign policy. European Journal of Communication, 16(4),
523-544. doi:10.1177/0267323101016004005
Rodman, P. (2009). Presidential command: Power and leadership and the making of
foreign policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush. New York, NY: Alfred
Knopf.
Roehrig, T. (2009). North Korea and the US State Sponsors of Terrorism List. Pacific
Focus, 24(1), 85-106. doi:10.1111/j.1976-5118.2009.01018.x
Rose, J. D. (2011). Diverse perspectives on the groupthink theory–a literary
review. Emerging Leadership Journeys, 4(1), 37-57. Retrieved from
https://www.regent.edu/acad/global/publications/elj/home.htm
Ross, D. (2007). Statecraft: And how restore America’s standing in the world. New York,
NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux

203
Rossman, G. B., & Rallis, S. F. (2003). Learning in the field: An introduction to
qualitative research (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Rotberg, R. (2002). The new nature of nation-state failure. The Washington Quarterly,
25(3), 85-96. doi:10.1162/01636600260046253
Rothkopf, D. (2014). National insecurity: American leadership in an age of fear. London
and New York: PublicAffairs.
Rubin, A., (2014, July 5). Militant leader in rare appearance in Iraq. The New York Times.
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/world/asia/iraq-abu-bakral-baghdadi-sermon-video.html
Rubin, H. J., & Rubin, I. S. (2012). Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data (3rd
ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Ruggiano, N., & Taliaferro, J. D. (2012). Resource dependency and agent theories: A
framework for exploring nonprofit leaders’ resistance to lobbying. Journal of
Policy Practice, 11(4), 219-235. doi:10.1080/15588742.2012.690841
Sageman, M. (2014). The stagnation in terrorism research. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 26(4), 565-580. doi:10.1080/09546553.2014.895649
Sahin, C. (2014). Managing communication in knowledge-intensive service teams:
Groupthink theory revisited. Business Management and Strategy, 5(2), 183-195.
doi:10.5296/bms.v5i2.6233
Saiya, N. (2017). Blasphemy and terrorism in the Muslim world. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 29(6), 1087-1105. doi:10.1080/09546553.2015.1115759

204
Salas, E., Rosen, M. A., & DiazGranados, D. (2010). Expertise-based intuition and
decision making in organizations. Journal of management, 36(4), 941-973.
doi:10.1177/0149206309350084
Saldaña, J. (2016). The coding manual for qualitative researchers (3rd ed). Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Salehyan, I. (2010). The delegation of war to rebel organizations. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 54(3), 493-515. doi:10.1177/0022002709357890
Salehyan, I., Gleditsch, K. S., & Cunningham, D. E. (2011). Explaining external support
for insurgent groups. International Organization, 65(4), 709-744.
doi:10.1017/s0020818311000233
Sandler, T. (2014). The analytical study of terrorism: Taking stock. Journal of Peace
Research, 51(2), 257-271. doi:10.1177/0022343313491277
Sandler, T., & Enders, W. (2004). An economic perspective on transnational terrorism.
European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 301-316.
doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.12.007
Sanger, D. (2012). Confront and conceal: Obama’s secret wars and surprising use of
American power. New York, NY: Crown Publishers.
Schafer, M., & Crichlow, S. (2010). Groupthink versus high-quality decision making in
international relations. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Schbley, A. (2004). Religious terrorism, the media, and international Islamization
terrorism: Justifying the unjustifiable. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27(3),
207-233. doi:10.1080/10576100490438273

205
Schensul, S. L., Schensul, J. J., & LeCompte, M. D. (1999). Essential ethnographic
methods. Observations, interviews, and questionnaires. Ethnographer’s toolkit 2.
Walnut Creek, CA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Schmid, A. P. (2005). Root causes of terrorism: some conceptual notes, a set of
indicators, and a model. Democracy and Security, 1(2), 127-136.
doi:10.1080/17419160500321139
Schreyogg, G., & Sydow, J. (2011). Organizational path dependence: A process view.
Organization Studies, 32(3), p, 321-335. doi:10.1177/0170840610397481
Schroden, J., Rosenau, W., & Warner, E. (2016). Asking the right questions: A
framework for assessing counterterrorism actions. Washington, DC: CNA.
Schunk, D. H., & Usher, E. L. (2012). Social cognitive theory, in R. M. Ryan (Ed.), The
Oxford Handbook of Human Motivation, 13-27. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford
University Press.
Scott, J. M., & Carter, R. G. (2002). Acting on the hill: Congressional assertiveness in US
foreign policy. Congress & the Presidency, 29(2), 151-169.
doi:10.1080/07343460209507732
Seidman, H. (1998). Politics, position, and power: The dynamics of federal organization.
5th ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Seliktar, O. (2011). Assessing Iran’s nuclear rationality: The “eye of the beholder”
problem. The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 2(2), 188-206.
doi:10.1080/21520844.2011.616942

206
Shahbaz, M. (2013). Linkages between inflation, economic growth and terrorism in
Pakistan. Economic Modelling, 32, 496-506. doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2013.02.014
Shakoori, M., Kiani, D., & Heidarpour, M. A. (2016). Effect of AIPAC Lobby on
American’s Foreign Policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. Journal of
Politics & Law, 9, 129-155. doi:10.5539/jpl.v9n6p129
Shear, M., & Sanger, D. (2017, November 20). Trump returns North Korea to list of state
sponsors of terrorism. The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/us/politics/north-korea-trump-terror.html
Shenton, A. K. (2004). Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research
projects. Education for Information, 22(2), 63-75. Retrieved from
http://www.iospress.nl/journal/education-for-information/
Shughart, W. F., & William, F. (2011). Terrorism in rational choice perspective. In C. J.
Coyne, & R. L., Mathers (Eds.), The handbook on the political economy of war
(pp. 126-153), Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Silke, A. (2008). Holy warriors: Exploring the psychological processes of jihadi
radicalization. European journal of criminology, 5(1), 99-123.
doi:10.1177/1477370807084226
Silke, A., & Schmidt-Petersen, J. (2017). The golden age? What the 100 most cited
articles in terrorism studies tell us. Terrorism and Political Violence, 29(4), 692712. doi:10.1080/09546553.2015.1064397

207
Simi, P., Bubolz, B. F., & Hardman, A. (2013). Military experience, identity
discrepancies, and far right terrorism: An exploratory analysis. Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism, 36(8), 654-671. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2013.802976
Sing, M. (2016). Dis/connecting Islam and terror: the ‘Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi’ and
the pitfalls of condemning ISIS on Islamic grounds. Journal of Religious and
Political Practice, 2(3), 296-318. doi:10.1080/20566093.2016.1222735
Skidmore, D. (2012). The Obama presidency and US foreign policy: Where’s the
multilateralism?. International Studies Perspectives, 13(1), 43-64.
doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00454.x
Smith, A. G. (2008a). The implicit motives of terrorist groups: How the needs for
affiliation and power translate into death and destruction. Political
Psychology, 29(1), 55-75. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00612.x
Smith, M. A. (2008b). US bureaucratic politics and the decision to invade
Iraq. Contemporary Politics, 14(1), 91-105. doi:10.1080/13569770801913314
Smith, P. M., & Gerstein, D. M. (2007). Assignment: Pentagon: how to excel in a
bureaucracy, 4th Ed. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc.
Smith, S., Dunne, T., & Hadfield, A. (Eds.). (2016). Foreign policy: theories, actors,
cases. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Sowa, J. E. (2009). The collaboration decision in nonprofit organizations: Views from the
front line. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 38(6), 1003-1025.
doi:10.1177/0899764008325247

208
Spaaij, R. (2010). The enigma of lone wolf terrorism: An assessment. Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism, 33(9), 854-870. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2010.501426
Spanier, J., & Nogee, J. (Eds.). (2013). Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign
Policy: Pergamon Policy Studies on International Politics. Elmsford, NY:
Pergamon Press Inc.
Sprinzak, E. (2000). Rational fanatics. Foreign Policy, 120, 66-74. doi:10.2307/1149715
Steele, R. R., Parker, M. T., & Lickel, B. (2015). Bias within because of threat from
outside: The effects of an external call for terrorism on anti-Muslim attitudes in
the United States. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6(2), 193-200.
doi:10.1177/1948550614548727
Sterling, C. (1981). Terror network: The secret war of international terrorism. New
York, NY: Henry Holt & Company.
Sterman, D. (2015, February 4). Don’t dismiss poverty’s role in terrorism yet. Time.
Retrieved from http://time.com/3694305/poverty-terrorism/
Stern, J. (2015). Obama and terrorism: Like it or not, the war goes on. Foreign
Affairs, 94(5), 62-70. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Straus, S. G., Parker, A. M., & Bruce, J. B. (2011). The group matters: A review of
processes and outcomes in intelligence analysis. Group Dynamics: Theory,
Research, and Practice, 15(2), 128. doi:10.1037/a0022734
Strelan, P., & Lawani, A. (2010). Muslim and Westerner responses to terrorism: The
influence of group identity on attitudes toward forgiveness and

209
reconciliation. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 16(1), 59-79.
doi:10.1080/10781910903485294
Sun, P., Mellahi, K., & Wright, M. (2012). The contingent value of corporate political
ties. Academy of Management Perspectives, 26(3), 68-82.
doi:10.5465/amp.2011.0164
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G.
Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp.
33-47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In J.
T. Jost, Sidanius, J. (Ed.), Political psychology: Key readings in social
psychology. (pp. 276-293). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Tansey, J., & O’riordan, T. (1999). Cultural theory and risk: a review. Health, Risk &
Society, 1(1), 71-90. doi:10.1080/13698579908407008
Taylor, A., & Karklis, L. (2016, February 9). This remarkable chart shows how U.S.
defense spending dwarfs the rest of the world. The Washington Post (online).
Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/02/09/thisremarkable-chart-shows-how-u-s-defense-spending-dwarfs-the-rest-of-theworld/?utm_term=.1654c2663250
Taylor, J. (2014). Public service motivation, relational job design, and job satisfaction in
local government. Public Administration, 92(4), 902-918. doi:10.1111/j.14679299.2012.02108.x

210
Takeyh, R., & Gvosdev, N. (2002). Do terrorist networks need a home? The Washington
Quarterly, 25(3), 97-108. doi:10.1162/01636600260046262
Tan, A. (2009). U.S. strategy against global terrorism: How it evolved, why it failed, and
where it is headed. New York, NY: Palgrave-MacMillian.
Tandon, Y. (2000). Root causes of peacelessness and approaches to peace in
Africa. Peace & Change, 25(2), 166-188. doi:10.1111/0149-0508.00149
Tarzi, S. M. (2005). Coercive diplomacy and an “irrational” regime: Understanding the
American confrontation with the Taliban. International Studies, 42(1), 21-41.
doi:10.1177/002088170404200102
Taylor, T. (2008). Inside the death star: Rational decision making, neoconservatism, and
the American enterprise institute. Sigma: Journal of Political and International
Studies, 26(1), 85-96. Retrieved from https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma/
Terry, L. D. (2015). Leadership of public bureaucracies: The administrator as
conservator. New York, NY: Routledge.
Tidwell, A. (2017). The role of ‘diplomatic lobbying’ in shaping US foreign policy and
its effects on the Australia–US relationship. Australian Journal of International
Affairs, 71(2), 184-200. doi:10.1080/10357718.2016.1184620
Tobin, G. A., & Begley, C. M. (2004). Methodological rigour within a qualitative
framework. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 48(4), 388-396. doi:10.1111/j.13652648.2004.03207.x
Toma, J. (2014). Approaching rigor in applied qualitative research, in C. F. Conrad & R.
C. Serlin (Eds.), Handbook for Research in Education: Pursuing Ideas as the

211
Keystone of Exemplary Inquiry, 263-280. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
Publications Ltd.
Toosi, N. (2017, February 28). Breaking with Bush and Obama, Trump talks about
radical Islamic terrorism. Politico (online). Retrieved from
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/donald-trump-congress-speech-radicalislamic-terrorism-235531
Tracy, S. (2010). Qualitative quality: Eight ‘big-tent’ criteria for excellent qualitative
research. Qualitative Inquiry, 16(1), 837-851. doi:10.1177/1077800410383121
Trump, D. J. (2017, December). National security strategy of the United States of
America. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
Tucker, D. (1998). Responding to terrorism. Washington Quarterly, 21(1), 103-117.
doi:10.1080/01636609809550296
Tuuli, M. M., Rowlinson, S., & Koh, T. Y. (2010). Dynamics of control in construction
project teams. Construction Management and Economics, 28(2), 189-202.
doi:10.1080/01446190903365657
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). (2017, May 24). Fiscal year 2018
USAID development and humanitarian assistance budget. Retrieved from
https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/fy-2018-development-andhumanitarian-assistance-budget
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). (2018a, February 16). Who we
are. Retrieved from https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are

212
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). (2018b, February 16). Mission,
vision, and values. Retrieved from https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/missionvision-values
U.S. Department of Defense. (2018a, March). DoD dictionary of military and associated
terms. Joint Publication 1-02. Retrieved from
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents /Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf
U.S. Department of Defense. (2018b, January). Summary of the 2018 national defense
strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American military’s
competitive edge. Retrieved from
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-DefenseStrategy-Summary.pdf
U.S. Department of Defense. (n.d.). DoD 101: Overview of the department of defense.
Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/About/DoD-101/
U.S. Department of State. (2004). Zarqawi letter: February 2004 coalition provisional
authority English translation of terrorist Musab al Zarqawi letter obtained by
United States Government in Iraq. Retrieved from https://20012009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm
U.S. Department of State. (2018, February 12). Briefing on the president’s fiscal year
2019 budget request for the U.S. department of state and USAID. Retrieved from
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/278256.htm
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.a.). About the U.S. department of state. Retrieved from
https://www.state.gov/aboutstate/

213
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.b.). Bureau of counterterrorism programs and initiatives.
Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/documents/organization /212896.pdf
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.c.). Programs and initiatives. Retrieved from
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.d.). State sponsors of terrorism. Retrieved from
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.e.). Bureau of conflict and stabilization operations.
Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/j/cso/
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.f.). Executive order 13224. Retrieved from
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/122570.htm
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.g.). Individuals and entities designated by the State
Department under E.O. 13224. Retrieved from
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/143210.htm
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.h.). Foreign terrorist organizations. Retrieved from
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
U.S. Department of State & U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). (2016,
May). Joint strategy on countering violent extremism. Retrieved from
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/FINAL%20-%20State%20and%20USAID%20Joint%20Strategy%20on%20Countering%20Vi
olent%20Extremism%20%28May%202016%29.pdf
van de Linde, E., & van der Duin, P. (2011). The Delphi method as early warning:
linking global societal trends to future radicalization and terrorism in The

214
Netherlands. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 78(9), 1557-1564.
doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2011.07.014
Vandewaerde, M., Voordeckers, W., Lambrechts, F., & Bammens, Y. (2011). Board
team leadership revisited: A conceptual model of shared leadership in the
boardroom. Journal of Business Ethics, 104(3), 403-420. doi:10.1007/s10551011-0918-6
Van Um, E. (2011). Discussing concepts of terrorist rationality: implications for
counterterrorism policy. Defence and Peace Economics, 22(2), 161-179.
doi:10.1080/10242694.2011.542337
Victoroff, J. (2005). The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological
approaches. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(3), 3-42.
doi:10.1177/0022002704272040
Wanta, W., Golan, G., & Lee, C. (2004). Agenda setting and international news: Media
influence on public perceptions of foreign nations. Journalism & Mass
Communication Quarterly, 81(2), 364-377. doi:10.1177/107769900408100209
Weaver, D. H., & Willnat, L. (2016). Changes in U.S. journalism: How do journalists
think about social media?. Journalism Practice, 10(7), 844-855.
doi:10.1080/17512786.2016.1171162
Weenik, A. W. (2015). Behavioral problems and disorders among radicals in police files.
Perspectives on Terrorism, 9, 17–33. Retrieved from
https://www.uml.edu/research/ctss/perspectives-on-terrorism.aspx

215
Weidenbaum, M. L., (2011). The competition of ideas: The world of the Washington
think tanks. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Welch, K. (2016). Middle Eastern terrorist stereotypes and anti-terror policy support: The
effect of perceived minority threat. Race and Justice, 6(2), 117-145.
doi:10.1177/2153368715590478
Whittaker, A., Brown, S., Smith, F., & McCune, E. (2011). The national security policy
process: The national security council and interagency system. Washington, DC:
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University Press.
Whyte, W. H., Jr. (1952, March). Groupthink. Fortune, 114-117, 142, 146. Retrieved
from https://fortune.com/2012/07/22/groupthink-fortune-1952/
Wigginton, M., Burton, R., Jensen, C., McElreath, D., Mallory, S., & Doss, D. A. (2015).
Al-Qods Force: Iran’s weapon of choice to export terrorism. Journal of Policing,
Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 10(2), 153-165.
doi:10.1080/18335330.2015.1090053
Wildavsky, A. (1987). Choosing preferences by constructing institutions: A cultural
theory of preference formation. American Political Science Review, 81(1), 3-21.
doi:10.2307/1960776
Wilner, A. S. (2011). Deterring the undeterrable: Coercion, denial, and delegitimization
in counterterrorism. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 34(1), 3-37.
doi:10.1080/01402390.2011.541760
Wolff, M. (2018). Fire and fury: Inside the Trump white house. New York, NY: Henry
Holt & Co.

216
Wood, R., & Bandura, A. (1989). Social cognitive theory of organizational management.
Academy of Management Review, 14(3), 361-384. doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279067
Woods, J., & Arthur, C. D. (2014). The threat of terrorism and the changing public
discourse on immigration after September 11. Sociological Spectrum, 34(5), 421441. doi:10.1080/02732173.2014.937652
Woodward, B. (2007). State of denial: Bush at war, part III. New York, NY: Simon &
Schuster.
Woodward, B. (2011). Obama’s wars. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Wright, B. E. (2004). The role of work context in work motivation: A public sector
application of goal and social cognitive theories. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, 14(1), 59-78. doi:10.1093/jopart/muh004
Wright, B. E. (2015). The science of public administration: Problems, presumptions,
progress, and possibilities. Public Administration Review, 75(6), 795-805.
doi:10.1111/puar.12468
Wright, J. (2015). A social identity and social power perspective on terrorism. Journal of
Terrorism Research, 6(3), 76-83. doi:10.15664/jtr.1184
Yar Hamidi, D., & Gabrielsson, J. (2014). Developments and trends in research on board
leadership: a systematic literature review. International Journal of Business
Governance and Ethics, 9(3), 243-268. doi:10.1504/ijbge.2014.064739
Yin, R. K. (2011). Qualitative research from start to finish. New York, NY: The Guilford
Press.

217
Appendix A: Interview Questions
Interview Questions Deployed to Study Participants
1. How does the threat of terrorism equate to other threats to U.S. national security?
2. What do you feel are the primary causes of terrorism today?
3. What has had the greatest influence on your own understanding regarding the causes
of terrorism?
4. How could the U.S. best address the threat of terrorism?
5. How well do you think your organization’s counterterrorism policy professionals
understand the causes of terrorism?
6. How widely shared is your view regarding the causes of terrorism among others
across your organization?
7. Have your own perspectives on the causes of terrorism been influenced by your
organization?
8. How is your organization enabled or hindered by its existing authorities and resources
in addressing terrorism?
9. How well do you think counterterrorism policy professionals that you work with
outside your organization understand the causes of terrorism?
10. How much common understanding regarding the underlying causes of terrorism do
you see across the organizations that work counterterrorism policy?
11. How much do you think other organizations working counterterrorism policy are
enabled or hindered by their own existing authorities and resources in addressing
terrorism?
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Interview Questions (Aligned by Research Subquestions)
SQ1: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align
with existing academic theories?
2. What do you feel are the primary causes of terrorism today?

1. How does the threat of terrorism equate to other threats to U.S. national security?
SQ2: To what extent can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be
understood through individual factors related to personal experience?
3. What has had the greatest influence on your own understanding regarding the causes
of terrorism?
SQ3: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced
by existing bureaucratic cultures in specific U.S. counterterrorism policymaking
organizations?
7. Have your own perspectives on the causes of terrorism been influenced by your
organization?
6. How widely shared is your view regarding the causes of terrorism among others
across your organization?
SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected
between and among the key policymaking organizations?
5. How well do you think your organization’s counterterrorism policy professionals
understand the causes of terrorism?
9. How well do you think counterterrorism policy professionals that you work with
outside your organization understand the causes of terrorism?
10. How much common understanding regarding the underlying causes of terrorism do
you see across the organizations that work counterterrorism policy?
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SQ5: To what extent do these perspectives impact the shaping of U.S.
counterterrorism policy?
4. How could the U.S. best address the threat of terrorism?
8. How is your organization enabled or hindered by its existing authorities and resources
in addressing terrorism?
11. How much do you think other organizations working counterterrorism policy are
enabled or hindered by their own existing authorities and resources in addressing
terrorism?
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Appendix B: Participant Survey Questionnaire
Circle Answer that Applies:
Organization: DoD/OSD; DoD/JS; State Dept; USAID; NCTC
Age Range: 20-30; 30-40; 41-50; 51-60; >60
Gender: Male; Female
Marital Status: Single; Married; Separated/Divorced
Years Married: 1-10; 11-20; 21-30; >30
Do You Have Children: Yes; No
Education Level: No College; BA/BS; MA/MS; Multiple MA/MS; PhD
Education Category: International Relations; Political Science;
Finance/Economics; Social Sciences; Humanities/History; Science/Engineering; Other
Years of Professional Experience: 1-10; 11-20; 21-30; >30
Years of Federal Service: 1-10; 11-20; 21-30; >30
Years in Counterterrorism Policy: 1-5; 6-10; 11-15; 16-20; >20
Self-Assessed Cultural Awareness: Low; Medium; High; Expert
Number of Countries Visited: 1-5; 6-10; 11-15; >16
Cumulative Years Living/Serving Abroad: 1-5; 6-10; 11-15; >16
Language Skills: English Only; 1 Additional; 2+ Additional
Additional Language Reading Skills: None; Marginal; Fair; Proficient
Additional Language Speaking Skills: None; Marginal; Fair; Proficient
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Assessed Current Religiosity: None; Low; Medium; High
Services Attended: Never; 1-3 times/year; 1-3 times/month; 1-3 times/week
Assessed Religiosity before 25 yrs old: None; Low; Medium; High
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Appendix C: Pre- and Post-Interview Emails
Pre-Interview Email
<Potential Study Participant Name>,
As I presented recently at your office staff meeting, I am conducting research into
personal perspectives and organizational factors within the U.S. policy community that
may impact counterterrorism programs and activities. You indicated that you would
like to participate in a one-on-one interview to discuss your perspectives on issues
related to this topic. The interview will between 45-60 minutes and will be conducted
at your facility to ease your participation. Your participation will also involve filling in
a 1-page survey questionnaire just prior to the interview to collect information related
to your personal background, education, and experience, which will provide context to
your responses and be used for comparison with other study participants.
The interview discussion will be audio recorded, but no individual will be personally
identified in the recording, transcripts, on the survey questionnaire, or in the
subsequent research paper. A consent form will be provided to you and I would require
your signature prior to participation in the study.
If you are still interested in participating, please reply in the affirmative to this email.
Would [insert time] on [insert date Month DD, YYYY] in room [insert building and
room location] work for your schedule? No response will be interpreted as an
unwillingness to participate and no further action on your part is required.
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Should you have any questions or require further information regarding this request,
please contact me via phone at [insert phone number] or e-mail [insert e-mail
address].
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Post-Interview Email
< Study Participant Name>,
Thank you for participating in the one-on-one interview with me on [insert date Month
DD, YYYY]. Your openness during the interview and perspectives that you provided
were of great assistance to this research project. Your information will provide a
significant piece of the collected data to help in understanding the prevalence of
specific theories regarding the causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S.
counterterrorism policymaking organizations. Your involvement in this study will
provide researchers, government entities, organizations, and citizens with insights into
the perspectives of, and influences on, U.S. counterterrorism policymakers.
Please let me know if you would like copies of your interview recording and/or
transcript, which I will provide to you upon request. I will send you via email an
executive summary of the study’s analytic results following completion of all
interviews and preliminary analysis of the data.
As we discussed before and after the interview, your identity will be protected, with
any information you provided presented as an alias (an assigned number), ensuring the
anonymity of your responses. I will at no time include your name or anything else that
could identify you in any reports of this study.
Should you have any additional questions, or require further information regarding this
research study, please contact me via phone at [insert phone number] or e-mail [insert
e-mail address].
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Appendix D: Study Participant Demographics Data
Category
Age Range
20 to 30
31 to 40
41 to 50
51 to 60
>60
Gender
Male
Female
Marital Status
Single
Married
Separate/Divorced
Years Married
n/a
1 to 10
11 to 20
21 to 30
>30
Do You Have Children
Yes
No
Education Level
No College
BA/BS
MA/MS
Multiple MA/MS
PhD/JD
Education Category
Int’l Relations
Political Science
Finance/Economics
Social Sciences

OSD

JS

TOTAL
%
#

0
1
1
0
0

1
2
1
2
1

0
3
2
1
0

2
8
11
9
1

6.45
25.81
35.48
29.03
3.23

4
4

1
1

5
2

6
0

23
8

74.19
25.81

0
8
0

2
5
1

0
2
0

2
5
0

1
5
0

5
25
1

16.13
80.65
3.23

0
3
3
2
0

3
1
2
2
0

0
1
1
0
0

2
1
2
2
0

0
1
3
1
0

5
7
11
7
0

16.67
23.33
36.67
23.33
0.00

8
0

5
3

2
0

5
2

5
5

25
10

71.43
28.57

0
2
2
0
4

0
0
6
1
1

0
1
0
1
0

0
1
6
0
0

0
1
3
2
0

0
5
17
4
5

0.00
16.13
54.84
12.90
16.13

4
2
0
0

2
3
0
2

1
1
0
0

5
0
1
0

2
1
0
0

14
45.16
7
22.58
1
3.23
2
6.45
(Continued)

State

USAID

NCTC

1
0
5
2
0

0
2
2
4
0

7
1

DoD
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Category

State

USAID

OSD

JS

TOTAL
%
#

0
0
0

0
1
0

0
3
0

1
5
1

3.23
16.13
3.23

1
0
1
0

2
2
1
2

0
3
2
1

4
12
10
5

12.90
38.71
32.26
16.13

1
1
0
0

3
1
0
3

0
3
2
1

7
13
7
4

22.58
41.94
22.58
12.90

1
0
1
0
0

4
1
1
1
0

6
0
0
0
0

14
8
6
3
0

45.16
25.81
19.35
9.68
0.00

0
0
1
1

0
2
4
1

0
2
4
0

0
5
16
8

0.00
17.24
55.17
27.59

0
0
1
1
0

0
0
1
2
4

0
0
1
1
4

0
0
3
5
23

0.00
0.00
9.68
16.13
74.19

0
2
0

0
5
2

0
2
3

0
0.00
17
54.84
8
25.81
(Continued)

NCTC

DoD

Education Category
Humanities/History
0
1
Science/Engineer
1
0
Other
1
0
Years of Professional Experience
1 to 10
1
0
11 to 20
4
3
21 to 30
2
4
>30
1
1
Years of Federal Service
1 to 10
1
2
11 to 20
4
4
21 to 30
3
2
>30
0
0
Years in CT Policy
1 to 5
1
2
6 to 10
4
3
11 to 15
2
2
16 to 20
1
1
>20
0
0
Self-Assessed Cultural Awareness
Low
0
0
Medium
0
1
High
5
2
Expert
2
4
Number of Countries Visited
0 (None)
0
0
1 to 5
0
0
6 to 10
0
0
11 to 15
1
0
>16
7
8
Cumulative Years Living/Serving Abroad
0 (None)
0
0
1 to 5
4
4
6 to 10
1
2
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Category

State

USAID

NCTC

DoD
OSD

JS

TOTAL
%
#

0
0

1
0

4
2

12.90
6.45

3
2
2

3
2
1

8
10
13

25.81
32.26
41.94

3
2
1
1

3
2
1
0

7
6
8
10

22.58
19.35
25.81
62.50

3
2
1
1

2
3
1
0

6
8
7
10

19.35
25.81
22.58
32.26

1
1
3
2

0
3
2
1

3
12
11
5

9.68
38.71
35.48
16.13

3
0
2
2

0
4
1
1

5
13
5
7

16.67
43.33
16.67
23.33

2
2
3
0

1
2
3
0

5
11
12
2

16.67
36.67
42.86
6.67

Cumulative Years Living/Serving Abroad
11 to 15
2
1
0
>16
1
1
0
Self-Assessed Language Skills
English Only
0
1
1
1+ Language
1
4
1
2+ Languages
7
3
0
Additional Language Reading Skills
None
0
0
1
Marginal
1
1
0
Fair
3
2
1
Proficient
4
5
0
Additional Language Speaking Skills
None
0
0
1
Marginal
1
2
0
Fair
2
2
1
Proficient
5
4
0
Self-Assessed Current Religiosity
None
2
0
0
Low
4
4
0
Medium
2
3
1
High
0
1
1
Religious Services Attended
Never
2
0
0
1-3 Times/Year
4
4
1
1-3 Times/Month
1
1
0
1-3 Times/Week
1
2
1
Self-Assessed Religiosity Before 25-years Old
None
2
0
0
Low
3
3
1
Medium
3
2
1
High
0
2
0
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Appendix E: Qualitative Categories and Themes

Interview
Questions

1. How does the threat
of terrorism equate to
other threats to U.S.
national security?

Non-existential
Real
Number one
Top tier
Categories

Important
Medium
Important
Existential
Exaggerated
Important

Themes

Categories

2. What do you feel
are the primary causes
of terrorism today?

State
Complicated
Vulnerability
Complex
Depends
Complex
Dissatisfaction
Depends
Complex

Complex
Depends

3. What has
had the
greatest
influence on
your own
understanding
regarding the
causes of
terrorism?

4. How
could the
U.S. best
address the
threat of
terrorism?

Time
Experience
Living abroad
Reading
Reading
Reading
Living abroad
Experience
Reading
Experience
Living abroad
Reading
Experience
Living abroad

Focus
Patience
Consistency
Depends
Consistency
Balance
Less tactical
Varied
Strategic
Discretion

Justice/Rule
of Law
programs
DenyDegradeDefeat
Prevention
Domestic
terrorism
Less military
Prevention
Prevention

Top tier

USAID
Political

Reading

Overblown

West’s war on Islam

Experience

Medium
Not biggest

Complex
Powerlessness

Experience
Experience

Important
Medium
Overblown

Inequities
Deprivation
Frustration

Outsized

Isolation

Reading
Experience
Growing up
poor
Academic
study

Consistency

Off ramp
programs
(Continued)
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USAID
Marginalization
Marginalization
Repression
Grievances

Themes

Categories

Medium
Overblown

Marginalization
Grievances
Frustration

Medium

NCTC
Personal motivation

Not existential

Grievances

Real

Ideology (religious)

Experience
9/11
Experience
Academic
study
Experience
Experience
Reading
Studying
Religious
belief
Firsthand
experience
Work
experience

Deep-seated
Themes

Categories

Medium
Not existential

Experience

Not existential

Personal Motivation
Individual Factors
OSD
Complex

Lots of threats
Pay attention

Ideology
Social media

Mid-tier

Lack of education

Living abroad
Dad
(Vietnam vet)
Living abroad

Not existential

Grievances

Experience

High (6 of 10)

Grievances

Living abroad

High

Desire utopia (ISIS)

Experience

At the top

Ideology
Grievances
Repression
Youth bulge
Need for purpose

Books (study)

Experience

Prevention
Lift travel
ban
Messaging
Prevention

Prevention

Not being
PC
Better
profiling
Less kinetic
strikes
Through
partners
Less Strikes
Via Partners
Manage, not
solve
Not kinetic
More
education
Build
infrastructure
Punish Saudi
Arabia
Counter
ideology
Backseat,
indirect
More dialog

(Continued)
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Themes

Not existential
Medium

OSD
Poor
Disenfranchised
Lack of education
Economics
Grievances
Ideology

Experience
Living
Abroad

High

Categories

Important

Joint Staff
Narrative

Not #1

Vulnerability

Baseline threat

Environment

Medium

Ideology

5 out of 10

Local group

Not existential

Poor governance

5 out of 5

Social inequalities
Population explosions
Religious ideology
Lack of education
Chronic conditions
Legacy grievances
Disaffected population

Medium
Themes

Radical ideology
Social media
Inequities
Governance
Grievances

Networking
Military
experience
Military
experience
Military
experience
Military
experience
Military
experience

Experience

Through
partners
Coalitions
Tougher on
sponsors
Diplomacy
Development
Limited
goals
Longer view
Less overt

Via Partners
Coalitions

Ideology
(Continued)
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Interview
Questions

Categories

Themes

Categories

5. How well do you
think your
organization’s
counterterrorism
policy professionals
understand the causes
of terrorism?

Generally
Exceptionally
Generally
Generally
Very well
Generally
Very well
Varied
Generally
Very well

Very well
Very well
Very well
Very well
Better than many
Pretty well
Very well
Fairly well

6. How widely shared
is your view regarding
the causes of terrorism
among others across
your organization?

State
Shared
Generally
Generally
Very well
Commonality
Generally

7. Have your
own
perspectives
on the causes
of terrorism
been
influenced by
your
organization?
In what
ways?

8. How is
your
organization
enabled or
hindered by
its existing
authorities
and
resources in
addressing
terrorism?

Some
Very much
Limited
Some
Less
Very much
Definitely

Constrained
Lacking
Constrained
Limited
Limited
Hindered
Lacking
Hindered
Constrained
Limited
Hindered

Generally

Somewhat

USAID
Somewhat
Mostly
Very well (career)
Somewhat (political)
Generational gap
Fairly well
Pretty well
Diverse
Good corporate view

Very much
Very much
Very much
Very much
Very much
Very much
Very much
Very much
Very much

Hindered
Hindered
Hindered
Hindered
Hindered
Enabled
Hindered
Hindered
Hindered
Hindered
Hindered
Hindered
(Continued)
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Themes

Very Well

USAID
Very/Fairly Well

Very Much

Hindered

Some (but afraid)
Incredibly well

NCTC
Some
Somewhat

Not much
Some

Somewhat

Somewhat

Not Much

Adequate
Somewhat
hindered
Mostly
adequate
Both
Adequate

Categories

Themes
Incredibly well

Categories

Themes

Categories

Themes

Somewhat

Fairly well

OSD
Very well

Yes

Smart people

Fairly well

Balanced

To quick to kinetic

Not sure

Not much

Not well
Not well
Pretty well

Not well
Just fatigue
Not sure

Definitely
Definitely
Definitely

Varies

Generally

Yes

Medium

Somewhat
Very/Fairly Well
Not Sure
Joint Staff
Shared

Very well
Fairly

Not well
Shared

No
Yes

Very well
Not enough
Pretty well

Generally
Firmly
Shared

No
Yes
Not really

Very well
Medium

Generally

Very Well
Not Much

Definitely

Yes

Authorities
good
Limited
resources
Very
understaffed
Adequate
Hindered
Limited
resources
Limited
authorities
Both
Limited

Authorities
good
Lack of staff
Authorities
hindered
Not hindered
Not hindered
Hindered
intentionally
Not hindered
Not hindered
(Continued)
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Interview
Questions

Categories

Themes

Categories

Themes

9. How well do you
think counterterrorism
policy professionals
that you work with
outside your
organization
understand the causes
of terrorism?

Generally
Very well
Generally
Generally
Generally
Very well
Very well
Depends
Generally
Very Well
Generally
Less so
Don’t know
Varied
Improved
Imbalanced
Very good
Uneven

10. How much
common
understanding
regarding the
underlying causes of
terrorism do you see
across the
organizations that
work counterterrorism
policy?
State
Generally
Very much
Depends
Generally
Consensus
Generally

Generally
USAID
Generally
Generally
Depends
Somewhat
Very good
Somewhat

Generally
Somewhat

11. How much do you think
other organizations working
counterterrorism policy are
enabled or hindered by their
own existing authorities and
resources in addressing
terrorism?

Imbalances
Adequate
Overlapping
Overlapping
Imbalances
Imbalances
Imbalances
Unbalanced
Cumbersome
Imbalances
Overlapping
Hindered, prevention
Hindered, resources
Imbalances, resources
Hindered, authorities
Hindered, coordination
Imbalances, resources
Imbalances, resources
Hindered
Imbalances
(Continued)
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Good understanding
General understanding

NCTC
Somewhat
Program focus

Adequate
Adequate

Lack of strategic focus

Issue is coordination

Somewhat

Both Adequate

Categories

Themes

Categories

Themes

Categories

Themes

Good
Generally

Pretty good
Good understanding
Don’t know
Not really
Adequate
Good understanding
Best in IC
Good

OSD
Generally
Yes on macro
No on details
Medium
Generally
Somewhat

Impressive knowledge
Generally

Generally
Joint Staff
Some divergence
General understanding

Very well
Different perspectives
Limited understanding
Good understanding
Different perspectives
Generally
Varied

Commonly
Fatigued
Not well
More cautious
Balanced
Generally
Common View

Hindered by resources
Hindered by resources
Hindered by resources
Resources constrained
Hindered by resources
Lack of resources
Both
Hindered by Resources
Lack of resources
Depends
Absolutely hindered
Severely limited
Limited
Both healthy
Hindered
Limited
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Appendix F: Detailed Analytic Results
Views Regarding the Seriousness of the Terrorism Threat
The first interview question to each study participant was How does the threat of
terrorism equate to other threats to U.S. national security? The common response theme
observed across respondents from all but one of the organizations were responses of
terrorism being a medium threat but not existential. Two general discrepancies were
noted from these primary response themes. Discussions with the State Department
participants showed they had a variety of views, with only three of the eight expressing a
common response theme in viewing the threat posed by terrorism as important. The other
organizational outlier observed from this first question was from the USAID participants,
where two respondents identified the perceived threat of terrorism as medium, and two
others expressing it being overblown.
The interviews conducted with State Department participants showed they
generally viewed the threat of terrorism as both real and important. In addition, their
views indicated the problem posed by terrorism as ongoing. Participant 103 stated their
view “…that terrorism is a perennial problem. There will always be a terrorism problem.
There has always been a terrorism problem. It will continue in perpetuity.” This view was
articulated by several others. Another common view expressed was how the violence of
terrorism is expressed in general terms. Participant 104 expressed this perspective as
follows: “Terrorism, to me, is only a tactic. Terrorism is a technique. Terrorism itself
isn’t a threat, terrorist groups that use terrorism are certainly a threat.”
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The role of modern media, particularly social media, on how terrorism is viewed
as a threat was also a common thread in responses from State Department participants.
Participant 105 stated it as: “Terrorists don’t necessarily want a lot of dead bodies, but a
lot of people watching.” The impact of the widespread visibility of terrorism through
modern media also was highlighted by State Department respondents in the response it
typically elicits. “Participant 101 felt that “…we [Americans] have vastly overreacted and
over spent money and over committed ourselves to never ending wars overseas, in
response to a threat that is a nuisance but not existential.” A similar comment from
Participant 108 was “I think we [Americans] exaggerate the threat of terrorism to…U.S.
national security. Obviously, it is a threat, but it’s not generally one that poses an
existential threat to the U.S.” Of those interviewed, only Participant 107 expressed the
threat of terrorism as “existential,” and only Participant 108 thought the terrorist threat
was “exaggerated.”
Discussions at USAID on this question were the noted outlier from the views
expressed by participants in the other organizations. While some said the terrorist threat
is medium, most used language such as overblown or outsized. The following statements
demonstrate this expressed sentiment. Participant 202 said: “I think it’s been well
overblown.” In a similar manner, Participant 207 said: “I just don’t assess it to be as
significant as we’ve allowed it.” Participant 208 expressed a similar view: “I think it has
an outside impact in the narrative, and on policy, than what the actual threat is...” While
this type response was observed in some of the State Department participants, the
responses at USAID were much more pointed. The few at USAID who perceived the
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threat of terrorism as medium also put this in a broader context of caution, as when
Participant 203 said that terrorism is “Something to keep an eye on, but not something to
be so consumed with that all of your resources flow in that direction.” Only Participant
201 thought the threat of terrorism fell in the ‘top tier’ of threats to U.S. national security.
The views on the threat of terrorism expressed by the two NCTC participants
were that while it remains a real threat, it is overall medium compared to other threats,
and definitely not existential. The view of the threat of terrorism being a long-term
challenge as viewed by the NCTC participants was evident in the discussions. Participant
301 put it this way: “It’s [terrorism] not anything that’s ever going to go away. We may
be able to put it in a box somewhere or keep it simmering in the back burner… But I
don’t think we’ll ever stop it or anything like that. I don’t think we’ll ever eradicate
terrorism.” It is the challenges posed by the U.S. response to acts of terrorism that elicited
further comment from Participant 301, similar to the views noted by many State
Department participants, stating: “What makes terrorism a threat…is the reason why
terrorists exist and use terrorism, it’s a psychological aspect of it, and that I do worry
about. I do worry about that terrorism, unlike many threats, can make us as an American
people do things that really are more of a threat to our way of life than any bomb or death
can be.”
Within OSD, the civilian policy side of DoD, responses to this question indicated
they generally viewed the threat of terrorism as high or medium, but not existential. No
real divergent categories or themes from the OSD participants on this question were
noted. Participant 404 put it this way: “I would say in the current security environment,
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sort of mid-tier, less than it was under prior administrations.” A similar view was
expressed by Participant 405 as “I think it is the threat closest to us, but it may not be the
largest. It’s definitely not an existential threat.” While many of the OSD participants
specifically stated their view that the threat of terrorism is not existential, they also were
clear in their assessment that a terrorist attack is much more likely to occur than other
threats to U.S. national security. Participant 401 said: “I think the likelihood of a terrorist
attack is more likely than the [other] threats.” Participant 405 expressed the likelihood as
follows: “But if we’re talking about terms of what is the active threat towards U.S.
citizens or interest abroad, I would say it’s gotta [sic] be terrorism.”
Most of the OSD participants mentioned the 2018 National Defense Strategy
(NDS) when expressing their views regarding the threat posed by terrorism, where threats
from violent extremist organizations is placed lower than the threats to national security
posed by nations such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2018b). The views expressed by OSD participants on the threat of terrorism
tracked with the NDS, demonstrating the influence this document has had on DoD policy
professionals. Participant 401 said that “There are other threats which actually do pose an
existential threat to the United States…,” a view shared by Participant 405, as “There’s
definitely a larger military threat from them [China, Russia, Iran, North Korea].” It is of
note that the threat rankings outlined in the NDS were also specifically highlighted by
several study participants at both State Department and USAID as well.
For the Joint Staff, their participants expressed a common view that the threat of
terrorism is medium or mid-tier. Participant 505 said: “On a scale of one to ten, I would
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say terrorism is probably a five…” Others (notably Participants 501 and 506) expressed
the threat as “5 out of 10” or “5 of 5,” an oblique reference to how terrorism is ranked in
the NDS (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018b). The threat posed by terrorism was not
downplayed, however, by the Joint Staff participants. Many talked about its negative
impacts on U.S. national interests. Participant 501 highlighted its importance: “It’s a key
threat. It’s a key concern for what we’re working on, not only to our physical homeland,
but to our equities or our interests abroad.” Whether the threat of terrorism could ever be
eliminated was also specifically mentioned by several Joint Staff participants, with a
similar consensus as that expressed by several State Department participants. Participant
503 said that terrorism is “something to be managed, but never defeated.” Participant 505
had a similar view: “Terrorism is an enduring threat and it will never be completely
extinguished…” Of those interviewed, only Participant 505 expressed the threat of
terrorism as “important,” adding that the threat posed by terrorism is “not existential.”
Perceptions Regarding the Causes of Terrorism
The second interview question to each study participant was What do you feel are
the primary causes of terrorism today? A common theme regarding grievances as a
primary cause of terrorism was observed in responses from participants from three
organizations: USAID, OSD, and the Joint Staff. This theme was further amplified in
these responses for grievances due to perceived inequities, marginalization, frustration,
and lack of governance as principal causes of terrorism. Responses from State
Department participants differed from this common theme, with these participants
resisting naming any one particular cause for terrorism, stressing instead the complexities
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of the phenomena due to local or regional dependencies. A total of five OSD and Joint
Staff participants additionally highlighted the role of ideology as a cause for terrorism,
with the two NCTC participants identifying either personal purposes or individual
factors as the main causal factor.
The interviews conducted with State Department participants showed they as a
group resisted the identification of a single cause for terrorist violence. Instead, most
State Department participants stressed the complexity of the problem, with numerous
dependencies as potential motivators for terrorist violence due to local, tribal, or regional
dynamics. Views along this line were as follows: “I think it’s a really complicated
process that involves everything from economics, sociology, political circumstances,
history. In some cases, it’s not genetic, but family related” (from Participant 101), or “It’s
not just one or two factors that go into it. It’s more complex than that” (from Participant
105). Broader complexities due to historical factors, or societal vulnerabilities, were also
part of the views expressed by State Department participants. Participant 103 sees
“…more of historical grievances and economic drivers that open the aperture for terrorist
ideology to take hold.” Participant 102 highlighted the general vulnerability of a
population as an underlying cause: “It is vulnerability. Social economic drivers,
opportunists, radicalizers, who are pressing upon those vulnerabilities.” Dissatisfaction
due to vulnerabilities was also a point made by Participant 108, specifically
“…dissatisfaction is always there, otherwise you wouldn’t go trying to blow people up.”
The common theme emerging from the USAID participants responses to this
question were overwhelmingly marginalization, grievances, and frustration. Participant

241
206 expressed it as “…a sense of marginalization, lack of inclusion in the political
system, grievances, whether they be individual or whether it’s a group affinity type
grievance, seems to be one of the major drivers.” Participant 205 made reference to
broader forces that precluded normal options, a sense “…that there are forces that they
can’t change through the current system. The only way to really affect the change is to do
something drastic.” Two other themes emerging from some USAID participants were
deprivation and powerlessness. Participant 204 said: “I think it is inequity in perceptions
of relative deprivation as much as it is or probably more than ideology. This
susceptibility of terrorism and terrorism is an expression of frustration, of not being able
to have your voice heard through the normal modalities.” Participant 203 shared a similar
view: “I think it’s about powerlessness, which I would equate to exclusion and injustice.”
Two divergent categories were expressed in comments from Participants 202 and 205,
with Participant 202 citing the “West’s war on Islam” as a primary cause of terrorism,
and Participant 205 stressing “personal isolation” as a primary driver.
The views expressed by the NCTC participants were unique to each respondent.
Participant 301 was very clear that they believed religious ideology was the primary
driver of terrorism in the modern age, with simmering hatreds that are “…very deepseated and rooted. The deepest one that you’ll find is the religious motivation for
terrorism.” The other, Participant 302, talked about individual factors and personal
motivations, as in “…what’s in it for them, what’s in it for the terrorist, what are they
losing if they do this, do they have the access and the ability and the willingness to
actually go through with suffering.” Participant 302’s perspective additionally
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highlighted five factors observed in the radicalization process, being namely
“personalizer [factors], group factors, community factors, socio political [factors], and
ideological factors,” with each and every one playing some combined role into why a
person is radicalized and ultimately commits acts of terrorism.
As stated above, the OSD participants’ views aligned with the common theme
observed across USAID and the Joint Staff, that being grievances as a primary cause of
terrorism, where “…disenfranchisement and feeling socially excluded, economically
disadvantaged and politically disenfranchised in your community with no options” (from
Participant 406) open populations up to recruitment to terrorist groups and organizations.
Another category noted in the OSD participants that was unique was the desire for
purpose among young, frustrated populations as a key cause of terrorism, being of
particular concern as this view is easily exploited by a strong ideology. Participant 405
expressed this as “A youth bulge that is not gainfully employed that sees itself as not
having many options and is looking for a sense of belonging to a larger cause.” Only one,
Participant 401, expressed the view that “there’s no one driver, and consequently, there’s
no one thing you can fix or take away that would remove terrorism…” One other,
Participant 402, highlighted that terrorisms “…breeding grounds are centered in
ignorance, lack of education, [and] lack of resources.”
Many of the Joint Staff participants shared the view with USAID and OSD that
underlying grievances are a primary cause of terrorism. Many of the Joint Staff responses
further stressed particular areas of grievances, such as from Participant 503, who stated
that “…poor governance, social inequalities, [and] the population explosions that are
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occurring.” The views regarding ideology, specifically religious ideology and narratives,
were also a recurring view as to the causes of terrorism. Participant 504 said: “I think it’s
religious ideology and lack of education.” Participant 502 had a similar view regarding
the role of ideology: “They have to have an ideology that supports that [violence].” Only
a few (namely Participants 502 and 506) expressed other views regarding primary causes
of terrorism, such as lack of education, local groups, and social media.
Influences on These Views
The third interview question to each study participant was What has had the
greatest influence on your own understanding regarding the causes of terrorism? The
common themes of experience and living abroad was observed across all five
organizations. The theme of experience was qualified in numerous ways, including from
personal experience due to travel overseas as well as professional experience working
foreign policy related portfolios. Responses from State Department and USAID
participants both had an additional common theme of reading, with USAID participants
further adding academic study as a strong influencer on their views regarding terrorism
and its causes. The responses from all the Joint Staff participants indicate their experience
in the context of their personal military careers.
Almost all the responses to this question from the State Department participants
highlighted the combined influences of experiences, living abroad, and reading. No
divergent categories or themes were observed. A common perspective was reflected in
statements such as that from Participant 104: “For me, the grounding was academic.
Proving ground was the field experience…” The role of field experience was also
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highlighted by Participant 108: “Key to my views is the field experience I have had, I
think…” Statements such as “I read a lot. I read a lot of what other people think and have
to say about terrorism…” (from Participant 103) was also common in most of the
responses from the State Department participants. For many, it was also the combinations
of these factors as overall influencers of their perspectives. The view provided by
Participant 107 articulated this combination of factors: “It’s a combination of things. It is,
you know, reading up on what scholars, journalists, others who are smart in the realm of
counter terrorism, sort of just their analysis, but also combining that with face to face
interaction that I’ve had with people who have been affected by terrorism, victims of
terrorism, those who are fighting against terrorism from a criminal justice, law
enforcement point of view and their insights. So for me it’s the combination.”
As with the State Department participants, the common themes of reading and
experience were predominant in the USAID participants. References to the influence of
reading was articulated in ways such as doing “…a lot of reading. I think just trying to be
open to all of the opinions that are out there and being able to assess it together” (from
Participant 205). The role of reading was also stated in the past tense by Participant 208,
based on academic foundations: “I guess, I’m a student of history, so that first and
foremost as an amateur historian, I am able to take a long view where terrorism has
always been part of the human condition…” The role of experience in the context of
travel and field work was also seen in most of the responses of the USAID participants to
this question. Participant 203 said: “Working in the field. I mean, just being, working in
this area. Reading, talking to people, being in the field, talking to people on the
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ground…” Participant 208 said: “So, I guess it’s my lived experience. Interacting with
people, both those on, what I would say are extremist spectrums, or people who have held
extreme views on either side of it.”
The one divergent or unique view expressed within the USAID participants came
from Participant 206, who cited growing up poor in a marginalized area of the United
States, and how that influenced this individual’s overall view of the terrorism challenge.
“I grew up in a more economically and socially marginalized part of the United States.
Where, in that part of the country, there are a number of groups who are anti-government
associated groups. And so, the mindset [towards using violence against authority] was not
unfamiliar to me in people that I had grown up around and that I knew, and I could see
how a sense of marginalization fed into that particular mindset, and I could see how it
could potentially transition into more radicalized or violent behavior.”
Both of the NCTC participants identified the key role of experience having
particular influence on their views regarding the causes of terrorism. Participant 301 also
expressed the influence of a personal religious view, specifically articulated as “My own
personal background, my own personal religious understanding of motivations and my
family’s life and how we kind of got to where we are.” Like the reference from the one
USAID participant on the influence of growing up poor, this personal identification from
Participant 301 on the role their personal religious view influencing how they viewed the
causes of terrorism was a unique one not expressed in a similar manner by any other
study participant.
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The common themes of experience and living abroad appeared in responses from
most of the OSD participants. Participant 401 expressed it as: “Professional experience of
studying terrorists and just being involved in the problem for so long, just that longevity
of it…” Participant 404 put it this way: “I think hands down, my work here in…policy
[making]… There was a great deal of exposure to it and various manifestations.”
Participant 405 talked about the lived experience: “I think it has to be living abroad and
seeing it, being in these cultures. And living around the people who are fighting it kind of
on the front lines is the biggest one.”
One divergent view within the OSD participants, but similar in many respects to
the preceding divergent views from the one participant from USAID and one from
NCTC, regarding the effects of childhood experiences on how issues are viewed later in
life was a statement by Participant 402 in answering this question. “This is gonna [sic]
sound funny. Probably my dad. My dad served in Vietnam. In working with him, and
being in contact with all the vets that came back after that war, there was always
conversations. Most folks don’t realize that we won every single engagement in Vietnam.
Every one of them. Hands down, they [the Vietcong enemy] were just slaughtered, okay,
and yet, we lost the war, and we lost the war because of political will, and we lost the war
because we didn’t understand tribalism, and we didn’t understand insurgencies…”
The Joint Staff participants also stressed the same theme of experience as having
the greatest influence on their views of the causes of terrorism. Their references to
experience, however, was exclusively linked to their military experience in their careers
and spanning their deployments. Participant 502 said: “I would say just my experience
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overseas deployed to environments obviously that are ripe for terrorist organizations
because they lack security, because they lacked any sort of government, and a group.”
This view was shared by Participant 504: “I think experience. Seeing it firsthand. People
living in poverty, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with a religion that at times can
be radical…” The only divergent response came from Participant 501, who also
identified networking as a key influence on their perspectives on terrorism, expressed as
“By and large it’s the networking, and gaining the perspectives of others.”
Views on How the Terrorist Threat Should be Addressed
The fourth interview question to each study participant was How could the U.S.
best address the threat of terrorism? Responses from participants were extremely varied
on this question and no common theme emerged across the organizations. Responses to
this question were extremely varied both within and between organizations. Only within
USAID was there some internal commonality, with five respondents expressing
prevention activities being among the best ways to address the threats posed by terrorism.
Responses from State Department participants were varied, with no real theme
emerging. Consistency in approach was mentioned by a few of those interviewed, but this
response did not occur on a scale to be an observed theme. A few, such as Participant
101, spoke in generalities: “I think the best way to deal with it, is to be aware that it’s not
a one size fits all kind of thing.” This view was shared by Participant 104: “One size does
not fit all for terrorists. It just doesn’t. That’s not an effective way to combat terrorism.”
One (Participant 106) stressed moving beyond a focus on kinetic strikes: “So, to me,
you’ve got to be looking beyond the direct-action response.” Others like Participant 102
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reflected on the need for a long-term approach: “If I were to put into one word it would
be patience. We have to remain patient; we have to be flexible, and we have to be willing
to go through the time and the different avenues to combat terrorism.” A similar view
came from Participant 104: “It is clear, to me at least, we are not going to defeat terrorism
in those places until there is a political solution that brings stability to the country.”
As mentioned above, an emerging theme related to this question was only
observed from the USAID participants, where prevention was prevalent in their collective
responses. These types of responses stressed getting out in front of the terrorism problem.
“I think we need to focus a lot more on looking at the drivers; what causes people to
participate. I would like to see us to have more of a focus on prevention to the extent that
we can” (from Participant 206). “I think that we have to find avenues for people who are
going in those directions. We need to be able to identify them and have outlets for them
to off-ramp” (from Participant 205). “We also have to take a step back and make sure that
we are identifying and addressing the condition which are leading people to commit
terrorist acts” (from Participant 208) A few perspectives, like on from Participant 204,
took issue with a perceived over-emphasis on a military solution: “Not by military means.
I think that’s a tool. I think the best way that U.S can address the threat of terrorism is
looking at the various tools it that has as a toolkit.” Using partnerships and coalitions as
exhibited in the current ‘defeat ISIS coalition’ was also mentioned by Participant 202 as a
better approach. “So, I actually think that the overall de-ISIS campaign plan…has it right.
Roughly, it’s deny them territory, defeat them on the ground. Go for it. It’s prevent them
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from acting as a global brand. Reduce them to local insurgencies or resistance groups that
can be handled through the capacity of partnerships.”
No theme emerged from the responses of the NCTC participants. Participant 302
indicated support for limited military strikes, but also limiting expectations for what this
could achieve: “Accepting that our place in the kinetic world is important and maybe the
greatest contribution we can have to limiting our expectations…” The other, Participant
301, didn’t offer a solution but expressed concerns that as society we are overly cautious
in addressing the terrorism problem head on. Participant 301 stated it this way: “You’re
not going to do it by not calling things as they are. And what I mean by that is we are too
politically correct for our own good. And this is as a society. As a culture and as a
society, we are too scared to call things out because we don’t want to offend or hurt
anybody. And what ends up happening is we water everything down.”
Responses to this question from OSD participants was also varied, with no
discernable theme emerging from their answers. Participant 401 highlighted terrorism as
a condition to be managed, not a problem that could ever be solved. “We can get to a
point where it is a condition we’ve mitigated, it’s a condition that we can live with,
but…it’s probably not something [we can eliminate completely].” Participant 402 on the
other hand suggested more investments in education programs: “[Educated] aren’t
gullible people… Without education, you don’t know any different [way to deal with
problems]… I think education is huge. I think we’ve missed the boat [in our
approach]…” Another, Participant 404, suggested rethinking our strategic partnerships,
especially with countries like Saudi Arabia: “I think we need to take a much more
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realistic stand with regard to our counter terrorism partners. Particularly those in the
Middle East where I think it’s a matter of expediency. Some would argue of necessity
that we’ve engaged with partners and enabled [bad behavior], for example, Saudi
Arabia…” Participant 404 also suggested a reduction in military response options: “We
definitely need to dial down our military solutions to problems that are in essence not
military.” This last view was also articulated by Participant 406, who said: “Maybe we
should take a more backseat, hands off approach by empowering and supporting the local
governments… I feel like the U.S. should take a less prominent role in the counter
terrorism programming that it’s doing, and that’s on all fronts.”
Several Joint Staff participants talked about using partners and coalitions, but this
wasn’t assessed to be an overall theme observed. Participant 501 put it this way:
“Through our partners, and building, maintaining, not building, but maintaining…a
global coalition where we leverage everybody else’s capacity, capability and knowledge,
and especially regional knowledge to address this globally.” One comment, made by
Participant 502, mirrored the one observed with Participant 404 from OSD about limiting
our involvement with strategic partners in the Middle East: “There needs to be a stronger
stance on countries or groups that support the ideology that lends itself to extremism and
extremist thoughts that lead to a terrorist act.” Another, Participant 504, stressed like
Participant 402 from OSD the importance of education: “You have to affect the politics
to incorporate education, to incorporate the reprieve from poverty. So that starts at the
political level.” Participant 506 worried that we overreact to the terrorism issue: “When
we respond with so much fear, anger, outrage, and then ultimately disproportionate
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retaliation in a lot of cases, we just play to their narrative.” A similar comment came from
Participant 505, who indicated an unrealistic desire to ‘fix the problem’ – “Our current
policy seems to be we gotta [sic] stay and fix everything. Our inclination is to get
involved as opposed to our inclination being every opportunity we have, we need to step
away.”
Views on Inter-Organizational Understanding on the Causes of Terrorism
The fifth interview question to each study participant was How well do you think
your organization’s counterterrorism policy professionals understand the causes of
terrorism? The common response theme observed from across all five organizations were
perceptions that their organizations’ counterterrorism policy professionals understand the
causes of terrorism very well. Two general discrepancies were noted from this primary
response theme. Discussions with the OSD participants showed two had divergent
perceptions that their counterterrorism policy colleagues did not well understand the
causes of terrorism. Three of the Joint Staff participant’s expressed divergent
perspectives that their military colleagues had only a medium understanding of the causes
of terrorism.
Two themes in answer to this question was evident in responses from the State
Department participants. On one hand, many had perceptions that their diplomatic
colleagues working in counterterrorism policy understand the causes of terrorism very
well. Participant 102 had a view shared by many at the State Department: “I think if any
entity understands the nuances [regarding terrorism] it is the State Department because of
their experiences as well their access to information.” However, there were also many of
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the State Department participants, like Participant 103, who expressed their view that
their State Department counterterrorism colleagues generally understood the causes of
terrorism: “I think that it is a sliding scale. On the whole, I think that we are generally an
organization that generally understands drivers of violent extremism.” Similar to this
view, Participant 108 expressed it as “I think it varies. I think that, likewise, across the
interagency, it’s kind of hit and miss.”
The common theme emerging from the USAID participants responses to this
question were overwhelmingly very well. “I think actually pretty well…” (Participant
201). “I think pretty well, [as] it’s a small handful of people that have really worked in
depth on this, but I think most of us have worked on it for a number of years now. We’ve
worked seamlessly together” (Participant 206). There were some noted caveats, however.
Participant 203 said: “At the technical level, fairly well. At the policy level, mixed.” This
‘technical’ caveat was stated in the context of those who work predominately in the field,
as opposed to the ‘policy level,’ which seemed to imply those spending most of their time
and effort within the USAID headquarters in Washington. Another nuance was expressed
by Participant 205 as follows: “I think better than many. I don’t think that they
understand as well the structures of terrorist groups, but I think they have a better sense
of what is drawing people in than most other government organizations. This is because
we [USAID] have more people on the ground.” Beyond these nuances, no real divergent
categories or themes were observed.
The responses to this question by the two NCTC participants did not result in a
common theme. Participant 302’s views regarding colleagues understanding was
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“Incredibly well, as this community is frankly been together, it’s actually not as big as,
it’s not that big of a community. [Many in the] CT [counterterrorism] community have
been around and most of us have grown up professionally together…” The view
expressed by Participant 301 was starkly different, however – “They understand the real
causes and motivations behind terrorism that we’re trying to counter and fight. But for
political reasons… they will not call it as it is. …Behind the curtain they will speak one
certain way and they know what the actual cause is on, what the reality is on. But you’d
never get them to own up to that on a TV camera…”
Two common themes appeared in responses from the OSD participants, that of
well and not well, which was interesting. Participants from two separate counterterrorism
offices within OSD were interviewed, but these different themes were not aligned to
either office. On the one side were perspectives like “I think fairly well…” (from
Participant 401) and “Certainly well above average across the board” (from Participant
402). However, the corresponding theme of not well was also expressed by many
participants, like the comment from Participant 404: “I think there’s some understanding.
I don’t know that the depth is there…” This last view regarding perceived ‘depth’ of
understanding was expressed in the context of the fast pace of the workload. Another way
this view was expressed was by Participant 405, who said “I actually don’t think we do
because I don’t think we spend as much time in counterterrorism policy contemplating or
analyzing the causes as much as we do how to fix the immediate problem, which is
protect the homeland, protect U.S. interests now.” There was one divergent view
expressed by Participant 403, who articulated a standard tendency for their OSD
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colleagues being “…to quick to go kinetic…” rather than spending the necessary time
trying to understand the underlying causes of terrorism.
The Joint Staff participants also stressed the theme of very well in their responses
to this question, but medium was also a noted theme. “I think they understand well, yeah
very well...” (from Participant 502). “I think we’re fairly clear on most of it” (from
Participant 503). “I think we understand it well, but that’s all we’ve been doing for 18
years…” (from Participant 504). One interesting aspect in this view, however, was
expressed by Participant 505 as a caveat to this perspective: “I think they understand the
underlying, very high strategic level causes. What I don’t think that they understand
firmly enough is how the tactical aspect of it and our engagements on the ground either
inflate or deflate the underlying disgruntlement of our opposing force.” In this context the
term ‘opposing force’ was meant to mean the terrorist group we are fighting. Only
Participant 506 expressed the divergent view that their military colleagues understanding
the causes of terrorism was not enough.
Individual Views Within Organizations
The sixth interview question to each study participant was How widely shared is
your view regarding the causes of terrorism among others across your organization?
There were two themes noted in responses to this question. Participants from the State
Department, NCTC, and the Joint Staff had perceptions their individual views on the
causes of terrorism were somewhat or generally shared among their colleagues. The
response theme noted from participants from USAID and OSD was their personal views
were shared within their organizations very well. However, three OSD participants
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expressed the divergent perspective that they were not sure whether their own views
regarding the causes of terrorism were shared among their colleagues.
The perspectives from State Department participants were consistent with the
theme that their coworkers generally shared their views regarding the causes of terrorism.
Participant 102 said “I think it’s a shared understanding,” and Participant 105 agreed: “I
think so. I don’t get any indication that it’s not.” Participant 107 said something similar:
“I think we do have a commonality of perspective.” A deeper assessment was provided
by Participant 104, whose perspective as that “I think we’re all within sort of one
standard deviation from the norm on this. No one would take a violent exception to what
I’ve said in regarding drivers and stuff because we do study the problem.”
USAID participants perspectives were that their own views regarding the causes
of terrorism were shared across their organization very well. “I think fairly well” (from
Participant 205). “I think we all are on the same page, to greater or lesser extent. Not
everybody looks at it through the same, exactly the same lens. I think we generally sort of
get how these things play out” (from Participant 203). “I think in USAID there’s a whole
that is definitely the corporate view. People see terrorism as a problem, many of the
countries in which we’ve worked are impacted by terrorism” (from Participant 208).
Participant 201 stated their own views were somewhat shared with their coworkers, and
Participant 207 said the understanding of the causes of terrorism across USAID policy
professionals was diverse.
Both NCTC participants had perspectives that their own views on the causes of
terrorism were somewhat shared with their colleagues in NCTC. However, Participant
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301 was very clear that they didn’t feel the broader nuance they had regarding the
religious motivations to violence was a common perspective, stating: “I do not believe
they share my view very much [regarding religious motivations].”
Two countering themes were noted in the responses from participants from OSD.
For many, their perspective was a common understanding on the causes of terrorism was
well shared. “I think fairly well” (from Participant 401). “I would say yeah, by and large.
I mean, we’ve been at this [a long time]... Most everybody that’s active duty right now
have grown up with the challenge in the desert and the counter-terrorism challenge. It’s
pervasive. They’ve grown up with it” (from Participant 402). However, there were also
several OSD participants that also expressed the perspective that they were not sure of
their coworkers’ views. Participant 405 said: “I would like to think that we all kind of
share that same view, but I’m not sure. It’s not something that we’ve discussed.” One
divergent perspective expressed by Participant 404, whose view was that their coworkers
were just fatigued with the issue: “Most people have the view and attitude that they’re
kind of done with this, and we’ve done what needed to be done, and its time to move on.”
The view that their individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism was
generally shared among their coworkers was the common theme among the Joint Staff
participants. Participant 505 said: “I think that’s very, very, a very common theme, if you
will, maintaining a coalition, sharing of information, is really the best way for us to get at
this.” Participant 505 went on to say: “I think we firmly understand this. We’re engaging
with our counterparts in the field regularly… We’ve lived it recently [on deployment].”
Participant 503 agreed: “I think it’s fairly well understood.” Only Participant 502
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expressed a divergent perspective that their own view was not well shared across the
organization.
Organizational Influences on Individual Views
The seventh interview question to each study participant was Have your own
perspectives on the causes of terrorism been influenced by your organization? There
were two themes noted in responses to this question. Participants from USAID and OSD
had similar perceptions of very much and definitely for whether they felt their
organizations had influenced their views on the causes of terrorism. In contrast,
participants from State Department and NCTC shared response themes of somewhat or
not much as to whether they perceived being influenced in their views by their
organizations. The Joint Staff participants were evenly split, with three each way,
between perceptions of yes and no regarding this question.,
State Department participants shared the general theme of somewhat regarding
whether they perceived their views regarding the causes of terrorism were influenced by
their organization. Several expressed the nuance that external influences weighted more
in their perceptions. Participant 101 said: “I think to some extent. When you’re working
within a bureaucracy on these very big and complicated issues, you really get a sense of
what’s possible and what’s not possible.” Participant 105 though external factors were
more important: “My initial reaction would be to say, it’s probably more shaped by
external factors than internal factors.” A limited divergent view felt that their perceptions
were very much or definitely influenced by the State Department organization. Participant
107 put it this way in response: “I’d say yes because it exposes you to different trains of

258
thought as to what the roots are, and you have some people who are very knowledgeable
of what they are…”
Responses from USAID participants perceptions to this question were strongly
aligned with the theme that their organization had very much influenced their views on
the causes of terrorism. Participant 204 put it this way: “Yeah, I think how it got framed
in my head with drivers, etc. It was definitely influenced by the agency because that was
sort of the framework through which to process. So, I think that did influence it a lot.”
Participant 204 further clarified the importance of their organization on their view of
terrorism: “What the agency did is really kind of help crystallize and formulate how to
process that and articulate some of that…” No divergent views from this response theme
were noted among the other USAID participants.
The responses from the two NCTC participants were consistent, which was the
perception that their organization had not much or just some influence on their views.
Participant 301 answered this question with: “Not much. No. I feel I actually brought
more from the outside based on my personal experience than what I gained from the
bureaucratic experience.” Participant 302 wasn’t sure: “I can’t tell, I’ve been in this
business for so long I can’t tell. I can’t remember a time you know, I don’t feel like I’ve
changed…”
The theme of definitely was a consistent view from the OSD participants on this
question. “Yeah. I think to a very, very large degree…” (from Participant 404). “Yes,
definitely…” (from Participants 405, 406, and 407). There was one divergent view
expressed, however, where Participant 403’s perception regarding how the organization
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influenced their individual view was very low: “I’m thinking really hard, because I don’t
think so. I think that as I described to you, my experience overseas was [much more]
foundational.”
The Joint Staff participants were almost exactly split, with half saying yes,
definitely they had been definitely influenced by their organization. Participant 501 said:
“Oh, absolutely, to the extent that I believe what I believe is by and large not only driven
by our network of interagency and coalition colleagues, but based on the experience of
my direct leaders.” Participant 502 agreed, but with a slight caveat: “Yeah, but I’d also
like to say or think that I can step back from that and look at a broader picture…” The
other stated perception was the opposite vew, saying no, not really, expressed such as the
response from Participant 504: “I would say everybody comes in with their own
perspective… My perspective’s pretty solidified. For me, it’s only reinforced that
perspective.” One interesting nuance was stated by Participant 505 as follows: “It [the
organization] has changed how I viewed the problem, but out of necessity in order to get
the solutions that the war fighter needs.”
Perspectives on Organizational Empowerment in Counterterrorism Efforts
The eighth interview question to each study participant was How is your
organization enabled or hindered by its existing authorities and resources in addressing
terrorism? The principal theme noted for this question were from the State, USAID, and
OSD participants, who expressed the shared perception that their respective organizations
were constrained, limited, and hindered, by their existing authorities and available
resources in their ability to address terrorism. Both NCTC participants had a differing
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view, that their organizations authorities and resources were adequate. The Joint Staff
was the noted divergent view from the other organizations, with four respondents
reflecting that they are not hindered in their efforts to address terrorism.
The State Department participants all expressed the common theme that their
organization is constrained, limited, and hindered by existing authorities or resources.
Regarding authority limitations, Participant 106 said: “Absolutely, confronting authorities
and everything else and jumping through hoops and the lack of flexibility because
congressional oversight for the department is increasingly high.” Participant 102 pointed
out similarly: “I think an issue might be that everybody else has similar authorities. So
there isn’t a really clear line of effort whose got what…” Other views, like that of
Participant 103, stressed the issue being more a lack of resources rather than authorities:
“I think, for the most part, there are very few things that I’m aware of that we have really
wanted to do that we’ve run into a problem of authority. It’s mostly a lack of resources.”
A similar view was “I think the resourcing is difficult” (from Participant 106). Participant
104 said if they could “…wave a magic wand, I would make money more flexible...”
Beyond just authorities and resources, Participant 104 also highlighted the limitations and
constraints due to working processes across the organization – “Coordination, that is like
a chronic problem across everything I’ve ever worked on in the State department. We
have a lot of cooks in the kitchen.”
USAID participants shared a common theme in their responses to this question in
that their perspectives indicated their organization is hindered, primarily regarding
resources. “Resourcing is a challenge, I’ll be honest, because so much of USAID money
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is earmarked and it’s earmarked for the traditional sectors” (from Participant 201). “So,
[resources are] totally inadequate to take anything to scale…” (from Participant 202).
“But you know, you can always do more with more…” (from Participant 203).
Participant 208 felt USAID’s full potential is hindered: “So it means that we’re never
able to truly meet our potential in this space because it’s under resourced.” There were
many shared clarification views by the USAID participants as to earmarks being the
principal limiting factor in resourcing. “Because everyone is constrained by earmarks,
constrained by the flavor of money they have, how discretionary it is or not” (from
Participant 206). “Our budget and the earmarks, and the authorities for the different
flavors of money, is driving the programming that is possible, as opposed to, you know,
what we really need to do…” (from Participant 207). Another view, this time from
Participant 203, stressed the need for more people as the limiting resource: “I would say,
we’re hindered by it in a sense of, we don’t have enough people, we never have enough
people to execute programs.”
Both NCTC participants had views that their organizations authorities and
resources were adequate. Participant 301 expressed the view as: “I bet the resources that
I see even in the current organization [under Trump administration] is not resourced to
the level I think it was back then [under Obama administration] in terms of resourcing.”
Participant 302 was more circumspect: “I’m probably committing a bureaucratic sin,
[but] it would be inappropriate for me to say that anywhere in the CT [counterterrorism]
community, we deserve or need more resources. That’s just not reality, even if true, the
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reality is we have been invested in heavily over the years, and appropriately. We should
not be asking for more…”
While a common response them of being generally limited was expressed by
many OSD participants, there were other views. Several were regarding limitations due to
lack of authorities Participant 404 said: “I think we’re largely hindered from engaging
effectively.” Participant 405 made a similar observation: “I think we have the proper
amount of resources. I’m not sure we have the proper authorities, broadly.” Other
comments reflected perspectives that the limitations were due to lack of resources, such
as that by Participant 401: “Resources, we could always use more resources.” Participant
402 specifically highlighted the resource limitations was specific to staffing challenges,
stating: “From a personnel standpoint, it’s ridiculously understaffed for what we’re
expected to do.” There were some divergent views, however, like that from Participant
403: “We have enough resources and we have enough authority.”
The Joint Staff participants had general responses reflecting that they are not
hindered in their efforts to address terrorism. Participant 503 put it this way: “I don’t
think we are [hindered]… I don’t think people actually know all the authorities that are
out there, and don’t know how to apply the existing authorities that we have with it.”
Participant 504 agreed, saying: “I think we have enough resources… I wouldn’t say
we’re hindered.” However, there were some divergent views. “You always will be
limited by resources. You always will to some sense” (from Participant 502). “I think
you’re definitely hindered by authorities, but that’s a good thing…” (from Participant
506). An interesting reflection on ‘hinderances’ was made by Participant 505: “The

263
hinder part is, I think, [is] put there intentionally. I hope it’s put there intentionally.
Because otherwise we’d use force to answer almost any problem when we might not
always be the right answer.”
Insights into Interagency Understanding on the Causes of Terrorism
The ninth interview question to each study participant was How well do you think
counterterrorism policy professionals that you work with outside your organization
understand the causes of terrorism? The common response theme observed from across
four of the five organizations were perceptions that their counterterrorism policy
colleagues across the interagency understand the causes of terrorism generally, good, and
very well. Responses to this question from USAID participants were the divergent view.
However, this divergence was not in the form of a common theme, but their perspectives
on this question varied broadly. Two of the Joint Staff participants also expressed a
different perspective, namely expressing the view that their interagency counterterrorism
policy colleagues had differing perspectives regarding their understanding of the causes
of terrorism.
The State Department participants expressed the common theme in response to
this question, with perspectives that their interagency counterterrorism colleagues
generally or very well understand the causes of terrorism. Participant 101 said: “You
know…, I think that people understand it, but there are so many different cross-cutting ...
I think the more people know about it, the more complicated they think that it is.”
Participant 102 agreed: “From an interagency perspective, and what we’ve seen in the
academic community, I think they have a very good understand of the drivers of
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terrorism.” A few State Department participants had more nuance in their perspectives of
their interagency counterterrorism policy colleagues, with concerns expressed about
bureaucratic stovepipes. Participant 103 expressed it as: “I think that we are very stovepiped and very narrow, sometimes, in our focus. Unfortunately, a lot of us have been
socialized within our own agencies and not socialized to other agencies on their views. I
see that come across very often when I work with counter-terrorism professionals from
other agencies.” Participant 105 sees more reaction than true understanding: “I would
say, if I had to give a report card approach, just on our broad USG understanding, I think
we’ve been quick to react and assume, without clearly understanding all the drivers.”
Participant 108’s view highlighted the potential impact due to organizational culture,
stating: “It depends. It depends on what agency you’re talking about. It depends on
whether you’re talking about analysts or sort of action guys. It depends.”
The perspectives on this question from the USAID participants was varied, with
no noted theme emerging from their responses. Some like Participant 207 expressed
perspectives that their interagency colleagues had extensive understanding on the causes
of terrorism – “The level of knowledge, expertise, and also tolerance in the community is
really striking, and I think is underappreciated outside of the community.” Others like
Participants 201 and 206 expressed more moderate views, but still with a positive
perspective regarding their interagency colleagues understanding. “I think for the most
part there is people who’ve been doing it for a while, I think it generally pretty
consistent” (from Participant 201). “You know, I think it’s improved over the years. Had
you asked me that same question ten years ago, I would have said there’s a real lack of
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understanding in terms of who causes. I do think we’re getting better as a community, an
interagency community, and understanding the nuances” (from Participant 206). A few
like Participant 202 expressed perspectives that their colleagues had less understanding:
“I think probably less so because they often lack what we have, which is missions on the
ground. Most of our people are forward deployed, they’re in missions, they’re doing
other things in these countries. So, we’ve got that.” Participant 205 agreed with this view:
“I haven’t seen a lot. I see occasionally some. But I think it’s not great.”
Both NCTC participants had perspectives that were consistent with the common
response theme noted, that being their interagency colleagues had a general or good
understanding of the causes of terrorism. Participant 301 felt “…they [have] a very good
understanding of just their slice of the pie of how it touches terrorism or what they can
do.” Participant 302 expressed the more detailed view that organizational biases
influenced the level of understanding, saying: “I think you see natural understandable and
predictable biases, organizational cultural biases in the approaches. I see less interagency
cohesion on trying to do things together in that space, than in the past. But I think that’s
probably replicated on everything.” The lack of workable policy processes was also
highlighted by Participant 301 as having a negative impact: “Yeah, I mean [the]
interagency processes hasn’t been working, that’s not just this [CT] mission. We’ve been
on…a 5-6 year kind of downward trend on how I think, from my perspective, on how the
interagency’s process been working.”
The OSD participants responses to this question also showed the prevalent theme
that their interagency colleagues have a good understanding of the causes of terrorism.
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Participant 406 said: “I mean, people who work on CT [counterterrorism] issues, I think
they also have a good understanding of CT [counterterrorism] causes, effects,
approaches, that kind of thing, but I think that their focus is on different aspects of it…”
Participant 407 agreed: “I think there’s a lot of folks that do have a good understanding.”
One perspective from Participant 401 expressed it as follows: “I think sort of the
bureaucratic truism of where you stand depends on where you sit is especially evident
within the inner agency and CT [counterterrorism], and the causes of terrorism and what
to do to address those in order to reduce the problem set and/or mitigate the conditions of
terrorism are based on the tool sets that your agency works with. That said, I mean, I
think there is a pretty good understanding writ large across the interagency colored by the
bureaucratic/organizational biases of where people work towards solving the CT
[counterterrorism] problem.” There were two divergent perspectives expressed, however,
by Participants 403 and 404. Participant 404 had the perspective that there wasn’t a good
understanding of the causes among their interagency colleagues: “No, I don’t think by in
large they do. They tend to think that the organization you’re apart of eventually tends to
be the lens through which you view all these problems.” The other, Participant 403,
expressed it a bit differently, stressing the challenges of working within bureaucracies. “It
sounds so terrible, but I feel like most of the time we’re stuck in the bureaucracy and that
we’re working bureaucratically.”
The perspectives of several of the Joint Staff participants aligned with the noted
theme that their interagency colleagues generally or very well understood the causes of
terrorism. “I think they understand very well” (from Participant 503). “I think there’s an
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incredible and impressive amount of education and knowledge” (from Participant 501).
Many others, however, expressed the view that their interagency colleagues had different
perspectives, particularly in how terrorist groups are defined and prioritized. Participant
502 put it this way: “I think they do as well, but I think where people differ, again we’re
talking extremes of opinions, is what they believe a terrorist group would be.” Participant
503’s view was: “Where people potentially differ is what the prioritization of those
terrorist groups are and what we can do against them.” Participant 501 had the view that
colleagues understanding are stove piped within organizations: “I think it would depend
on one department or agency versus another… But…it may be very kind of stove piped
within their lane.”
Insights into Commonality of Views Across Interagency Regarding Terrorism
The tenth interview question to each study participant was How much common
understanding regarding the underlying causes of terrorism do you see across the
organizations that work counterterrorism policy? The common response theme observed
from across all five organizations were perceptions that there is generally a common
understanding across the interagency regarding the causes of terrorism. Participants from
USAID and NCTC also expressed the perspective that there was somewhat of a common
understanding across the interagency. The noted divergent views were from Joint Staff
participants, three of whom also expressed perspectives that a common understanding is
not there, or that counterterrorism policy professionals are just fatigued after dealing with
the challenge for 18 years.
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State Department participants had perspectives that there generally is a common
understanding on the causes of terrorism across the interagency counterterrorism policy
professionals. However, there were several noted nuances in responses. Participant 101
had concerns that overall understanding was overshadowed by the day-to-day taskings:
“While we’re looking at sort of the background noise of what is causing this [terrorism]
over the long run, there’s much more of a focus on the day-to-day [situation].” They went
on to highlight perspectives on root cause theory. “I think there’s a lot of discussion of
the root cause, we’re not supposed to use that phrase, or we weren’t for a while, root
causes of terrorism” (from Participant 101). Similar to perspectives expressed by OSD
participants to the previous question, many State Department participants had views that
organizational structures and processes get in the way of a common understanding. “I
would say we get ... once we get up to a certain level, we get a lack of synchronization
because people need to own things. To some degree, we’re all serving different masters”
(from Participant 106). “Where it gets a little more complicated in terms of interagency
coordination, is that you have multiple agencies with very similar authorities…” (from
Participant 107).
The USAID participants expressed the common theme in response to this
question, that there is generally or somewhat of an understanding of the causes of
terrorism across the interagency. Their views stressed this in more of a negative way than
being positive. Participant 202 said: “I think we tend to have the same conversations over
and over again, we tend to do the same superficial assessments over and over again.”
Participant 203 said: “I think it comes to where you stand and depends on where you sit,
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right?” Participant 208 felt “…there is still a long way to go…” Two USAID participants
noted the challenge of the time necessary to achieve understanding of terrorism’s causes.
One, Participant 203, reflected that: “There is not necessarily enough time…bringing
everybody up to the same level so that we have a greater understanding…before we sit
down and try to come up with things collectively. There is a lot of educating each other
as we go.” The other, Participant 208, felt that: “Our attention spans are short,
and…people don’t have the inclination to really want to understand the complex dynamic
that...our own actions and the reaction that those create.”
Both NCTC participants had the view that there is somewhat of a common
understanding of the causes of terrorism across the interagency. Participant 301 felt it is
less so, as “…maybe that’s why things ended up being ineffective because we didn’t all
have the synergy and the understanding of the cause…” The other, Participant 302, was
also skeptical regarding a common understanding, expressing the view that the
commonality was more due to common effort, driving a common understanding. “There
is synergy, in that everybody that touches [particular] lines of effort knew what they had
to do, and we have to work together because we have a common goal… So there is
synergy in that. But that’s again to doing an action or an outcome, not in the
understanding.” Participant 301 also highlighted organizational challenges impacting a
common understanding. “I don’t think so. And the reason why is again very political
because it goes back to the organization and the framework…”
The OSD participants responses to this question also reflected the common theme
with perspectives that their interagency colleagues generally had a common
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understanding of the causes of terrorism. “I think there’s symmetry, it’s not bad” (from
Participant 401). “I mean I think on a macro level, yeah, I mean people realize that these
are incredibly complex problem sets…” (from Participant 404). “In some regards, yes.
But also, in some ways, no…” (Participant 405). Participant 407 expressed the
perspective that a common understanding appeared to be superficial. “I think on the
surface it would seem like there is some alignment but as soon as you get past that there’s
a lot of cases where you’re getting right back into the individual atmosphere and the
culture within or among agencies and departments, which can be disabling.”
The Joint Staff participants also expressed the common theme that their
interagency colleagues generally had a common understanding of the causes of terrorism.
Participant 502 expressed it as: “I think there’s a common understanding…” Participant
503’s view was: “Actually, I think compared to other functional issues, we’re fairly flat,
fairly dynamic.” However, some Joint Staff participants also expressed a variety of
nuances in their perceptions. Participant 501 noted the organizational divergences:
“Based on the many different discussions, I would think there’s some divergence from
one department or agency to another.” Participant 505 felt a common view wasn’t that
prevalent: “I think the understanding of it is not really well understood commonly…”
The view expressed by Participant 504 attributed a possible lack of a common
understanding to fatigue with the terrorism challenge: “I think it’s changed. Again, I
think 18 years has gotten mundane. I think people are at fatigue. I’m not sure there’s
much else we can do that we aren’t already doing. The areas that we talked about, that
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what drives terrorism, we could absolutely do more, but those that we would like to do
more just aren’t there.”
Perspectives on Interagency Empowerment in Counterterrorism Efforts
The eleventh and final interview question to each study participant was How
much do you think other organizations working counterterrorism policy are enabled or
hindered by their own existing authorities and resources in addressing terrorism? The
common response theme observed across four of the five organizations were perceptions
that other organizations are hindered, principally due to a lack of or imbalances in
resources, in addressing terrorism. The noted divergent view was from NCTC, where
both participants had perspectives that other organizations authorities and resources are
adequate, with one additionally noting some hinderances due to coordination issues.
State Department participants expressed a common theme in their responses to
this question, with perspectives that their partner interagency organizations suffer from a
resource imbalance hindering their ability to address terrorism. “If we had clear
authorities as to who owns what and then the resources that matched that policy then I
think we would have a little bit easier time” (from Participant 102). “I think we’re
absolutely under resourced in the long term goals that require patience…” “I think there
is a, largely, an imbalance of resources right now for counter-terrorism professionals
across the space” (from Participant 103). “I don’t see a graded balance [in resourcing]…”
(from Participant 105). Another perspective expressed by Participant 101 was that partner
organizations working counterterrorism are not hindered by authorities or resources, but
have challenges with scope of their required efforts – “I think that’s one of the problems
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that you run into, and it’s not necessarily an inhibition by authorities, or an enabling by
authorities, it’s just that whatever you’re doing has to somehow be looked at in the
broadest possible sense and that doesn’t always happen.”
The USAID participants also expressed the common theme that interagency
partner organizations working counterterrorism are hindered in addressing terrorism, with
several particularly noting the imbalances in the allocation of resources. Participant 207
noted the broader challenges posed by the bureaucracy: “Something that I do think is a
significant hindrance is the [bureaucratic] turf battles…” Participant 207 further reflected
that the primary hinderance was a lack of leadership: “There’s no coming together of a
few, not everyone, a few important leaders to decide what do we want to do about this
problem set…” Participant 205 shared the perspective that resourcing of counterterrorism
programs was fine, with more of an imbalance in the seemingly default to use military
options – “No, we’re not [hindered]. But I do think that it was too easy to take people out
[i.e., via drone strikes] and take people off the battlefield in a way that I think upended
the balance, sort of overstepped. So, a phrase I used all the time…is our analysis cannot
stop at dead.”
Both NCTC participants had perspectives that both the authorities and resources
available to their interagency partner organization to address terrorism is adequate.
Participant 301 expressed the view that they really didn’t know. “You know, I don’t
know. I honestly don’t know if I have an answer to that… I don’t get a sense that a lot of
things are authorities, I think that some people blame authorities for things… I sort of
think people hide behind that sometimes…” The other, Participant 302, didn’t really
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think authorities or resources were a key factor in addressing terrorism. “I don’t think it
matters. I don’t think it matters how much authority or funding or whatever that they
actually have. I think what matters most is that [departments and agencies] agree on [and
work towards] a particular goal…”
The common theme that interagency partner organizations are hindered by
resources in addressing terrorism was predominate in responses from the OSD
participants. “Resources in that they are hindered” (from Participant 407). “State
[Department] is definitely hindered by their resources for sure. I don’t know that intel
[i.e., intelligence] agencies are hindered so much by their resources or their authorities,
from my perspective… But I’m not sure that they are asking for more or they want
more…” (from Participant 405). “I do think that on the development side they don’t have
as many resources…” (from Participant 406).
Many of the Joint Staff participants also shared the perspective that interagency
partner organizations are hindered by resources in addressing terrorism. Participant 506
said: “Absolutely. They are hindered. I don’t think within DOD we are... Most of it’s not
even necessarily authorities, it’s resources.” Another, Participant 504, stressed the
limitations in resources was more due to the lack of personnel or staff, not just a lack of
program resources: “Yeah…I think they are severely limited. Where the Department of
Defense writ large, we’re pretty unlimited in what we can do in the counter-terrorism
space, especially when it comes to direct action piece. [But] compared with our
interagency partners, I mean, we’re talking people. We’re talking horsepower, money,
resources. They just can’t keep up, and the demand for their capabilities is that much

274
higher.” There were also several divergent views expressed by a few Joint Staff
participants, such as Participant 502 feeling that the situation differed across
organizations, and Participant 506 having the perspective that authorities and resources
were healthy among interagency partners working counterterrorism programs.

